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New mobile phones have been designed to include delivery of
mobile advertising and other useful location-based services, but
have they also been designed to protect consumers' privacy?
One of the key enabling technologies for these new types of
phones and new mobile services is Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID), a wireless communication technology that enables
the unique identification of tagged objects. In the case of RFID-
enabled mobile phones, the personal nature of the devices makes
it very likely that, by locating a phone, businesses will also be
able to locate its owner Consumers are currently testing new
RFID-enabled phones around the globe, but the phones are not
yet in general use by consumers in the United States and
Europe. The incorporation of RFID into cell phones in order to
deliver mobile advertising and other location-based services
raises a host of important privacy questions that urgently need
to be addressed before the phones become widely available.
Analyzing the risks to consumer privacy in this new context, this
paper offers a comparative law analysis of the applicable
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regulatory frameworks and recent policy developments in the
European Union and the United States and concludes that there
are many privacy concerns not presently addressed by E. U. and
U.S. laws. This article also offers specific ideas to protect con-
sumers' privacy through applications of fair information
practices and privacy-enhancing technologies. When mobile
phones are RFID-equipped, consumers will need new privacy
protections in order to understand the risks and make knowl-
edgeable decisions about their privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
No longer simply mobile telephones, mobile phones can deliver new
communication and information services for consumers that are made
possible by location-aware technologies.' Location-based services (LBS)
1. Mobile phones come equipped with data, text and video streaming functions, mak-
ing them much more than simple devices for making phone calls. INT'L TELECOMMS. UNION
[ITU], ITU INTERNET REPORTS 2005: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, 25-26 (7th ed. 2005),
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/internetofthings [hereinafter The Internet of Things]
(reporting on technologies that will create a "ubiquitous network society," including RFID and
smart computing, and the important role of mobile phones as a portal to that network society).
"[Wlith the development of mobile internet and mobile commerce service, users can buy thea-
tre tickets, make hotel reservations, and access bank accounts through their mobile phones."
Id. at 26. "Mobile phones are now a significant source of personal information, such as phone
numbers, calendar, photos, messages, passwords and so on." Id. In the future, mobile phones
will provide "an important portal to new enhanced services" and companies in the
telecommunications industry will shift their focus from providing voice communications to
data transmission. Id. at 69.
A mobile (cell) phone is
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for mobile phones empower subscribers to use their phones to find in-
formation about nearby businesses or services, such as movie theaters,
banks or cafrs.2 They can also use their phones for navigation. For ex-
ample, one user can receive directions from one location to another,
locate another person's mobile phone, and receive updates or alerts about
bus delays, traffic jams, or sales at nearby businesses. Mobile phones
designed to receive location-based services will enable users to receive
mobile advertising and other useful mobile services that are customized
to them based on their geographic locations.' One of the enabling tech-
[Actually a radio containing a low power transmitter. When a wireless telephone is
turned on, it searches for a base station within range, which ... relays identifying
information to a local mobile telephone switching office which confirms that the
telephone is assigned to a valid customer and then assigns a frequency on which the
user may communicate.
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Personal Wireless
Service Facility" Provision of Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(C)(ii),
2006 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, § 2 (2006).
2. See K. Michael et al., Location-Based Services and the Privacy-Security Dichotomy
(2006), http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/382/ (published originally in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MOBILE COMPUTING AND UBIQUITuous NETWORKING
91-98 (London, Eng., Oct. 11-13, 2006)). "Location-based services (LBS) rely on knowledge
of a user's location to provide tailored services or information by means of a wireless device
.... Examples include ... advertising targeted at a mobile phone that enters a particular cell
..... " Id. at 2. See also Serena G. Stein, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy Protection from
RFID?: A Case for Federal Legislation, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3 (2007) (discussing
why U.S. laws are insufficient to address consumer privacy concerns related to the broad use
of RFID technology in supply-chain and other contexts); Christoph Seidler, RFID Opportuni-
ties for Mobile Telecommunication Services, ITU-T TECH. WATCH (May 2005), http://
www.itu.int/ITU-T/techwatch/rfid.pdf (defining RFID-based mobile telecommunications
services as "services that provide information on objects equipped with an RFID tag over a
telecommunication network."); Stefan Steiniger et al., Foundations of Location Based Ser-
vices: Lesson 1, Lecture Notes on LBS, V. 1.0 (2006), http://www.geo.unizh.ch/publications/
cartouche/lbslecturenotes-steinigeretal2006.pdf (providing non-exclusive categories of LBS
applications including: navigation (e.g., car park guidance), information (e.g., travel guides),
tracking (e.g., people, vehicles and products), games (e.g., mobile games), emergency assis-
tance (e.g., automotive assistance), advertising (e.g., banners, advertising alerts), billing (e.g.,
road tolls), management (e.g., fleet scheduling), and leisure (e.g., buddy finder, instant mes-
saging)).
3. Laura M. Holson, In CBS Test, Mobile Ads Find Users, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008
(reporting on CBS' plans to try a serious experiment with cell phone advertising that is cus-
tomized for a person's location; participants must have GPS enabled phones and are required
to "opt-in" to receive the ads); see also Marguerite Reardon, Is Mobile Really a Sure Thing for
Google?, CNET NEWS, Feb. 8, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/Is-mobile-really-a-sure-thing-for-
Google/2100-1039_3-6229619.html (reporting that Gartner, a research firm, shows that mo-
bile advertising will grow from $1 billion in 2007 to $11 billion by 2011 and discussing
barriers to Google's efforts to enter this market). But see Caroline McCarthy, The Mobile
Social: Not Ready for Prime Time?, CNET NEWS, Feb. 13, 2008, http://news.cnet.comI8301-
13577_3-9870611-36.html (describing how mobile phone technology and service currently
limits the potential for businesses to provide mobile location-based services in the United
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nologies for new location-based services is Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID), which is "a wireless communication technology that is used
to uniquely identify tagged objects or people. 4 In this case, the "tag" is a
small computer chip with its own antenna that is attached to or embed-
ded in a consumer product. It is designed to store digital information
such as a unique number to identify an individual consumer product. For
example, it can be used to distinguish one can of soda from another, even
though the products are identical in all other respects The tag's antenna
is able to broadcast that number and does not need to have its own power
source because it operates by using energy received from nearby radio
frequency identification readers that scan the tag.6 Tags can be read by
readers even when they are not in the line of sight of the reader and
without human intervention.'
States, such as mobile phones that cannot process "geotagging" or "proximity alerts," and the
prevalence of subscribers without data plans or plans that provide unlimited text messaging).
4. For an overview of RFID technologies and particularly the location tracking capa-
bilities of RFID systems, see DANIEL HUNT ET AL., RFID: A GUIDE TO RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION I (2007). For convenience, Radio Frequency Identification may be referred to
as RFID in this paper. See also MARY RUNDLE & CHRIS CONLEY, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY 41-50 (UNESCO, Commc'n and Info. Sector, 2007),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001499/149992E.pdf [hereinafter ETHICAL IMPLICA-
TIONS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES] (defining RFID and describing uses of RFID to track the
location of people); Jonathan Weinberg, RFID, Privacy and Regulation, in RFID
APPLICATIONS, SECURITY AND PRIVACY 91 (Simson Garfinkel & Beth Rosenberg, eds., Addi-
son-Wesley Professional 2005) (describing the location tracking capabilities of RFID for
consumer goods that are sold directly to individuals). Bluetooth is another technology that
could be used to deliver advertising to cell phone users (e.g., via text message to the cell
phone user) and raises similar privacy and security risks to the cell phone user. Id. at 303.
5. Stephen A. Weis, RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification), in 3 HANDBOOK OF COM-
PUTER NETWORKS: DISTRIBUTED NETWORKS, NETWORK PLANNING, CONTROL,
MANAGEMENT, AND NEW TRENDS AND APPLICATIONS 974, 976-77 (Hossein Bidgoli ed.,
Wiley, 2007).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 975. Currently, passive tags can be read from as far away as 30 feet and active
tags can be read from an even greater distance, up to 300 feet. Katherine Albrecht, RFID
Tag-You're It, SCI. AM., Sept. 2008, at 72, 75; Letter from Melissa Ngo, Senior Counsel,
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Robert E. Clegg, Jr., Senator, N.H. 2 (Apr. 14, 2008),
http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/epic-clegg-hb686.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Letter] (EPIC Analysis of
H.B. 686). See also Beth Bacheldor, Visa Partners with Nokia to Offer RFID-Enabled Ser-
vices, RFID J., Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/view/4359/ (reporting that
"Visa and mobile device manufacturer Nokia are joining forces to deliver new services, in-
cluding contactless payments, money transfers and remote payments, on Nokia's newest ...
[NFC]-enabled handset."). "The NFC-enabled handset contains an RFID module that can
function as an RFID tag and as an RFID reader," operates at 13.56 MHz frequency, supports
ISO/IEC 14443, and will be available worldwide. Id. Nokia's new phone adds a feature of
peer-to-peer communication "so that two NFC-enabled handsets can communicate and ex-
change information with each other by tapping them together (or bringing them within 4
centimeters of one another)." Id. ISO 14443 is an industry standard that "was developed
specifically for identification and payment cards and has a degree of security and privacy
protection built in." Albrecht, supra, at 74. "In contrast, U.S. border cards use an RFID
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Radio frequency identification technology is likely to be incorpo-
rated into mobile phones in the near future. In several parts of the world,
consumers are already testing mobile phones equipped with radio fre-
quency identification devices and experience the ease of making
payments for things like transit fares and fast food purchases.8 They are
also getting a first taste of mobile advertising on their RFID-enabled
mobile phones because the phones come equipped with RFID-readers.
The reader can be used to scan advertising and other information from
nearby RFID tagged items in consumers' environments, such as "smart"
advertising posters placed in transit terminals to obtain information
about nearby restaurants or promotional materials about new products
and services. 9
The advent of location-based services, including mobile advertising,
and the incorporation of RFID into cell phones for the purpose of deliv-
ering these services raises a host of important privacy questions that
urgently need to be addressed while there is still time to protect consum-
ers' privacy through privacy-enhancing design decisions and/or
legislative action.'0 The privacy issues relating to the provision of loca-
tion-based services and mobile advertising include the need to protect
location and other personal data that is collected and used." Other pri-
standard known as EPCglobal Gen 2, a technology that was designed to track products in
warehouses, where the goal is not security but maximum ease of readability." Id. "[Tihe ISO
14443 standard includes rudimentary encryption and requires [contactless payment] tags to be
close to a scanner to be read," generally "a distance measured in inches rather than feet." Id.
Of course, a mobile phone could contain more than one RFID tag, which could be used for
different purposes (e.g., identification of device for repair services, or facilitation of contact-
less payments), and those tags could have different read ranges.
8. Recent consumer trials of RFID-enabled mobile phones in RFID-embedded public
spaces are discussed in Part lII, infra.
9. Id.
10. For a definition of location-based services (LBS), see discussion and references,
supra note 2. See also D. Zachary Hostetter, When Small Technology Is a Big Deal: Legal
Issues Arising from Business Use of RFID, 2 SHIDLER J.L. CoM. & TECH. 10, IT 10-13, 23-28
(2005) (article paginated by paragraph number); Recent Development: Who Knows Where
You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-10 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Development in Harvard
Journal of Law & Technology] (discussing location privacy concerns in the context of law
enforcement use of cellular location information). See also Murray Long, Longitude and Lati-
tude: Location Technologies and Privacy Concerns, 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONERS, Montreal, Canada, at 9-11 (Sept. 26, 2007)
http://www.privacyconference2007 .gc.ca/workbooksTerralncognita-workbook4-E.html#sec
tion002. Long discusses the tracking potential of RFID systems and Professor Wienberg's
suggestion that information sharing among operators of discrete reader networks could create
a massive shared network which becomes a "Panopticon geolocator." Id. (citing Weinberg
supra, note 4, at 91 ).
II. See Working Party 29 Opinion on the Use of Location Data with a View to Provid-
ing Value-Added Services, 2130/05/EN, WP 115 (Nov. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justicehome/fsj/privacy/docslwpdocs/2005/wp I 15_en.pdf [hereinafter Working Party Opin-
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vacy concerns relate to the possibility of exposing consumers to more
spam and the enhanced risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to
personal information stored on mobile phones.'2 Privacy questions also
arise from RFID applications that enable marketers to automatically
track and profile consumers in order to deliver time and location-specific
advertising to them on their mobile phones.'3 These privacy and data pro-
tection concerns are grounded in emerging scholarship about the vision
of an ambient intelligence (AmI) era" that includes discussion of the
ion on Location Data]. This opinion discusses application of the European Union's data pro-
tection laws to the processing of personal data by entities that provide location-based services
(LBS) to users and subscribers. Id. at 2. It recognizes several possible sources of location
information about individual persons that may be used to provide location-based services,
which include: processing data from satellites (GPS), processing data from an electronic
communications network (e.g., mobile phone communications network or Wi-Fi network), or
processing data from any other device, such as an RFID tag located by a reader. Id. at 10.
12. See Kim Hart, Advertising Sent to Cellphones Opens New Front in War on Spam,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/03/09/AR2008030902213.html (reporting that a market research study shows
U.S. consumers are expected to receive about 1.5 billion spam text messages in 2007); Bob
Sullivan, Hit by ID Theft, Then Plagued by Sprint?, THE RED TAPE CHRONICLES-
MSNBC.coM, Mar. 7, 2008, http://redtape.msnbc.com/2008/03/you-might-call.html (reporting
the travails of a cell phone customer hit by an ID thief who added fourteen new lines to his
account and extended his terms of service agreement, resulting in additional charges of over
five thousand dollars and an early termination fee).
13. See generally SERGE GUTWIRTH, PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION AGE 49-60, 83-
108 (Rowman & Littlefield Pub. 2002) (discussing the concept of privacy, focusing on the
concept of the individual's freedom to be oneself, and how this concept is related to the rights
of individuals with respect to the processing of personal data in this information age character-
ized by pervasive computing). See also Jean-Marc Dinant et al., Consultative Committee of the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data: Application of Convention 108 to the Profiling Mechanism-Some Ideas for the Future
Work of the Consultative Committee, CENTRE DE RECHERCHES INFORMATIQUE ET DROIT
(CRID), (Jan. 2008), http:l/www.coe.int/t/e/legal-affairs/legal-co-operation/data-protection/T-
PD(2008)01 enprofiling.pdf.
14. See Antionette Rouvroy, Privacy, Data Protection, and the Unprecedented Chal-
lenges of Ambient Intelligence, 2-1, art. 3 STUD. IN ETHICS, L. & TECH. 1-5 (2008) (stating the
"two aspects-freedom from unreasonable constraints (from the state or from others) on the
construction of one's identity, and control over (some) aspects of the identity one projects to
the world-are at the heart of the most crucial concerns arising when considering, from a legal
and political point-of-view, the emerging Aml scenarios." (emphasis in original)); see also
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY, THE NEW LANDSCAPE 7 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds.,
MIT Press 1998) (explaining the relationship between data protection and privacy as: "Control
over personal information is control over an aspect of the identity one projects to the world,
and the right to privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of
one's own identity."). Rouvroy further explains:
Those two aspects-freedom from unreasonable constraints (from the state or from
others) on the construction of one's identity, and control over (some) aspects of the
identity one projects to the world-are the heart of the most crucial concerns aris-
ing when considering, from a legal and political point-of-view, the emerging AmI
scenarios.
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Internet of Things, the dissemination of RFIDs, ubiquitous computing,
smart objects and surveillance devices.'"
The primary goal of this Article is to convey the results of a com-
parative law study of E.U. and U.S. regulatory efforts to address the
privacy and data protection implications of consumer marketing prac-
tices that employ RFID technologies for the purpose of delivering
mobile advertising and other location-based services. Ultimately this
article strives to answer the question: When mobile phones are equipped
with RFID to support delivery of location-based services and mobile
advertising, what consumer privacy protection is needed to ensure the
level of consumer trust necessary for the growth of mobile commerce
and how best to achieve it?
The article identifies five important privacy and data protection is-
sues for consumers in this new business context that features RFID
systems that operate invisibly and automatically in the background.' 6 It
examines the regulatory frameworks and existing government regulation
in both the European Union and the United States that form the founda-
tion for the regulation of RFID-enabled mobile phones used to deliver
LBS and mobile advertising. Although more extensive government regu-
lation is found in the European Union than in the United States, the
study reveals similarities in E.U. and U.S. law. However there are also
privacy gaps in the sense that important privacy and data protection con-
cerns are not regulated under the current laws of one or both systems.
Anticipating that LBS and accompanying mobile advertising will pro-
duce social, consumer, and commercial benefits,' 7 and recognizing the
relationship between consumer trust and adequate protection of consum-
Rouvroy, supra, at 7.
15. See generally The Internet of Things, supra note 1, at 25-26 (reporting on tech-
nologies that will create a "ubiquitous network society," including RFID and smart computing,
and the important role of mobile phones as a portal to that network society).
16. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Working Party on Info. Security &
Privacy, Report, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID): A Focus on Information Security and
Privacy, DSTI/ICCP/REG(2007)9/FINAL, 5 (2007), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/
olis/2007doc.nsflinkto/dsti-iccp-reg(2007)9-final [hereinafter OECD Report on RFID]
(commenting that the "invisibility of the data collection may be the primary characteristic of
RFID that raises (privacy) concerns" and that "tracking in real time or after the fact may be the
primary functionality of RFID that raises concerns").
17. Location data can provide value-added services to individuals based on knowing
where their mobile phones are at a particular time (providing information upon request to a
mobile phone user about the nearest restaurants, for example). Working Party Opinion on
Location Data, supra note II, at 2-3. Other location-based services enable individuals to be
located via their mobile phones even if they have not requested the services. Id. at 3. Emerging
technologies such as RFID have the potential to produce good as well as ill for society. See
generally ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE I-5 (New Riders 2006); ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 8-10.
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ers' privacy and personal data,'" the article concludes that these privacy
gaps need to be addressed. It considers mechanisms to fill these voids
using government regulation and/or industry self-regulation. After exam-
ining recent legal developments in the European Union and the United
States that may close these gaps, this article discusses self-regulatory
approaches that could be adopted by companies, such as implementing
effective privacy policies and practices or designing RFID-applications
using privacy-enhancing technologies. Further, recognizing the global
nature of m-commerce,' 9 where suppliers of LBS and mobile advertisers
will communicate with mobile phone users across national borders and
consumers' personal data will be easily transmitted to any place in the
world via the Internet, ° this study suggests that adoption of self-
regulatory tools is the preferred method to protect consumers. The study
concludes that the mechanism of privacy impact assessments and
adoption of privacy-enhancing practices, coupled with regulatory over-
sight, is the most feasible approach to protect consumers' privacy in this
emerging area of commerce.
18. Alfred Villoch III, Comment, Europe's Mobile Opportunity: Can the European
Union Legislate Consumer Trust and Compete in the E-Commerce Market with the United
States?, 20 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 439,446-48 (2002).
19. Mobile commerce (m-commerce or mobile e-commerce) is gradually emerging as a
new global commercial environment due to the growing number of consumers who have mo-
bile phones and other portable wireless electronic communications devices. See Peter
Tarasewich et al., Issues in Mobile E-commerce, 8 COMM. FOR THE Ass'N FOR INFO. Sys. 41,
42 (2002) (defining m-commerce as "all activities related to a (potential) commercial transac-
tion conducted through communications networks that interface with wireless (or mobile)
devices."). See also Sridhar Balasubramanian et al., Exploring the hnplications of M-
Commerce for Markets and Marketing, 30 J. ACAD. OF MARKETING Sci. 348-61 (2002)
(providing a five component conceptualization of rn-commerce that is separate from the
underlying technologies related to mobile communications devices). Mobile commerce
encompasses a wide range of interactive business processes that occur before, during and after
actual sales transactions. See Tarasewich et al., supra, at 42. An important technological
development that facilitates m-commerce and allows users to interact with information and
services immediately by accessing the Internet through their mobile phones is known as wire-
less application protocol (WAP). Essentially, with WAP, consumers' mobile phones act as
mini-Web browsers. Villoch 1I, supra note 18, at 447. Another important technological devel-
opment for m-commerce is emerging RFID technologies that will enable mobile phone users
with RFID-equipped mobile phones to purchase goods and services through "contactless"
transactions between their phones and RFID systems embedded in the environment. See infra
Part 1II.
20. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on "Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) in Europe: Steps Towards a Policy Framework", COM (2007) 96, 2008 O.J. (C 101)
01, 15, available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/sitelmySite/shared/
Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2007/07-12-20_RFIDEN.pdf [hereinafter EPDS Opinion
on RFID].
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This Article offers input for the privacy impact assessments that will
be the basis of designing privacy strategies, privacy policies and privacy-
enhancing technologies to protect consumers from privacy risks related
to RFID-enabled mobile phones. It provides three examples of the cate-
gories of privacy topics and related analyses to consider in privacy
impact assessments for RFID-enabled mobile phones. The first category
addresses application of essential fair information practices, such as pro-
viding adequate consumer notice regarding the privacy-implicating
features of RFID-enabled phones. A second category relates to the need
to explore the selection of privacy-enhancing technologies that could
give consumers the ability to remain anonymous in some situations and
perhaps even disable the RFID tags included in their mobile phones. A
final category examines whether mobile phones should be designed to
include transparency-enhancing features in order to make the privacy
implications of using RFID applications more obvious to consumers,
e.g., giving consumers access to personal information and classifications
that are being collected by virtue of using RFID-enabled mobile phones
and that will be used by marketers to target them for mobile advertising.
Finally, this article offers a list of RFID-specific privacy questions
and possible technical solutions that relate to this new business context.2'
Discussions with technical experts on RFID and a review of the RFID-
literature both support the conclusion that, at least theoretically, there are
technical solutions for many of the perceived privacy concerns related to
RFID-enabled mobile phones. The list is offered to stimulate discussion
between technical and legal privacy experts who hopefully will work
together to find privacy-enhancing solutions to adequately protect con-
sumers' privacy in the era of RFID-enabled mobile phones,
location-based services and mobile advertising. To the extent that such
solutions are found, it will reduce the need for RFID-specific govern-
ment regulation that could discourage further development of new and
useful location-based services using RFID technologies and create legal
barriers to global mobile commerce.
I. THE IMPORTANT ROLE MOBILE ADVERTISING MAY PLAY IN
PROVIDING LOCATION-BASED SERVICES FOR CONSUMERS
Mobile advertising (m-advertising) is advertising directed at con-
sumers through their mobile phones and it is likely to play an important
role in business models to deliver LBS to consumers.22 M-advertising
21. See infra Part VIII.
22. Eric Pfanner, Mobile Phones Are a New Frontier in Advertising, INT'L HERALD
TRiB., Mar. I1, 2007 (on file with author) (reporting that approximately one billion mobile
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refers to ads sent to and displayed on mobile phones and other handheld
wireless communications devices.23 As used in this article, m-advertising
includes direct marketing as well as other forms of advertising that users
may access on their mobile phones. 24 Like location-based services in
mobile commerce, mobile advertising may be tailored to individual con-
sumers based on their geographic location at a specific time.25 In this
respect, mobile advertising has advantages over print or broadcast adver-
tising because it allows marketers to send location and time-specific,
26personalized advertisements directly to consumers . Further, as
phones will be sold in the world in 2007); John Finegold, How Your Wireless Network Will
Change Your Social Network, PEN COMPUTING, http://pencomputing.com/features/ulocate-
lbs.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
23. JAANA TAHTINEN & JARI SALO, SPECIAL FEATURES OF MOBILE ADVERTISING AND
THEIR UTILIZATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD EMAC CONFERENCE 7 (EMAC, Murcia,
Spain 2004), http://www.taloustieteet.oulu.fi/arvoa-luovat/Julkaisut/Tahtinen%20and%2OSalo
%202004%2OSpecial%20features%20of%20mobile%20advertising%20and%20their%20utili
zation.pdf. Research on emerging business models for mobile advertising reveals three essen-
tial elements: the advertising service (which includes the chosen technology used to deliver
the m-ads to the consumers' mobile devices), the roles of the actors in providing the advertis-
ing service, and the value-creating exchanges between the actors. Hanna Komulainen et al.,
Business Models in the Emerging Context of Mobile Advertising, FRONTIERS OF E-BUSINESS
RESEARCH 2004, 590-605, http://www.ebrc.info/kuvat/590-605_04.pdf. Successful business
models for generating revenues from mobile advertising are still being developed. Id. at 591.
The business actors that are involved in creating value through mobile advertising include: (I)
application provider (software vendor who develops the software system needed for mobile
advertising); (2) advertiser (creates the content in terms of mobile ads for a mobile advertising
system); (3) infrastructure provider (provides the network infrastructure needed to run the
services); (4) mobile network operator (rents the network from the infrastructure provider in
order to provide access to the wireless network and enable the sending of m-ads); (5) mobile
service provider (offers the mobile advertising service system to content providers); and
(6) end-user (consumer who receives the mobile ads). Id. at 592.
24. For a discussion of the distinction between advertising, including online advertis-
ing, and direct marketing, see E-COMMERCE LAW, DOING BUSINESS ONLINE 119-36
(Simmons & Simmons, Palladian Law Publ'g Ltd. 2001) (providing an overview of the regu-
lation of online advertising and direct marketing in the United Kingdom). Generally, online
advertising uses non-broadcast media and the content is available for viewing on a
one-to-many basis. Id. at 119-21. However, transmission of that content does not happen si-
multaneously, but rather occurs when the Web site is accessed by each individual user. Id.
Direct marketing is a business practice that involves communicating promotions of businesses'
products and services directly to individuals, whether by telephone, fax, e-mail or other meth-
ods. Id. Direct marketing generally involves processing personal data about consumers. Id.
25. Of course, not all m-advertising is location or time-specific. For example, banner
ads to be displayed on mobile phones need not be tailored to consumers' geographic locations
at specific times, although the relevance of the ads to consumers could be enhanced if the ads
were so tailored.
26. See James C. White, People, Not Places: A Policy Framework for Analyzing Loca-
tion Privacy Issues (Spring 2003) (unpublished Masters Memo Prepared for the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Duke University), http://www.epic.org/privacy/location/
jwhitelocationprivacy.pdf. M-Commerce businesses may use location information about con-
sumers to create content "whose value comes from knowledge of where a user physically is,"
such as alerts about traffic jams or weather information. Id. at ii. See also Jari Salo & Janna
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compared to online advertising directed generally to consumers using
computers with Internet access, the prevalence of mobile phones among
consumers and the personal nature of the devices, including the likeli-
hood that consumers will have their mobile phones with them most of
the time, make mobile advertising an attractive medium.
Advertisers, mobile telecommunications carriers (mobile carriers),
mobile phone manufacturers (handset manufacturers) and other third
parties (such as mobile service application providers) may all be in-
volved in generating or delivering i-advertisements.2 ' There are multiple
forms of m-advertising. For example, advertisers may communicate their
messages to consumers' mobile phones by calling mobile phone num-
bers to talk with consumers or sending voice, text, instant or multimedia
messages (e.g., video clips) to consumers' mobile phone numbers. 28 It is
also technically possible to send an electronic ad message directly to a
consumer's mobile phone by sending it to a wireless Internet domain
name provided by the consumer's wireless carrier.29 Advertisements may
also be displayed on mobile phones when consumers access Web sites
using their internet access-equipped mobile phones. 30 Adware software
programs loaded directly on consumers' phones by handset manufactur-
ers or downloaded to consumers' cell phones from the Internet are
another way to deliver mobile advertising.3 This paper discusses yet an-
Tahtinen, Retailer Use of Permission-Based Mobile Advertising, in ADVANCES IN ELECTRONIC
MARKETING ch. VIII (Irvine Clarke III and Teresa B. Flatherty, eds.) (2005); Working Party
Opinion on Location Data, supra note 11, at 2-3.
27. Nancy J. King, Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones and Consumer Privacy: Ensuring
Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging Mobile Advertising Practices,
60-2 FED. COMM. L.J. 239, 243 (2008).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 261-64. See also Edwin N. Lavergne, FCC Gives Teeth to the CAN-SPAM Act
of 2003, New Rules Strictly Limit Commercial Email to Cell Phones, I N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
861, 866-67 (2005).
30. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Verizon to Allow Ads on Its Mobile Phones, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2006, at C5; Bob Keefe, Cell Phones Poised to Become One More Ad-Driven Me-
dium, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 2006 (on file with author); Eric Sylvers, Cell Phone Ads
May Take Off Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, http://nytimes.com/2007/02/14/business/
media/14adco.html (reporting that Yahoo began displaying ads in early 2007 on sites accessi-
ble to subscribers with advanced cell phones in 19 countries). Mobile phone users would see
the ads when going to Yahoo's home Web page on their phones and could then click on an ad
to dial a company directly or to get more information and special offers). Id. Sylvers stated:
Already, ads are creeping onto cell phones around the globe. At this rate, experts
say, it will not be long before the 2.2 billion mobile phone users around the world
consider it natural to tune into a 15-second spot before watching a video, sending a
message or listening to a downloaded song between phone conversations.
Id.
31. See Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Spyware Technologies: Limiting the Hori-
zons of Digital Privacy, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 473, 479-81 (2006) (discussing adware that
places random or targeted ads on the screen of the user and its relation to spyware, which is
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other way to generate mobile advertising-building RFID technologies
into mobile phone handsets and embedding RFID technologies into con-
sumers' environments (like shopping malls or bus stations) for the
specific purpose of delivering mobile advertising (and location-based
services).32 When the available methods of delivering mobile advertising
are considered in conjunction with technological advances enabling ad-
vertisers to target advertising to individual consumers based on the
geographic location of their mobile phones at a particular time, the
enormous potential of the mobile advertising market is apparent. Not so
obvious are the consumer privacy and data protection implications of
using location tracking technologies to generate m-advertising, including
3the risk that mobile phones will become the new portal for spammers.
If left unregulated, mobile advertising and location tracking technologies
may develop in ways that are simply too privacy-intrusive to support the
healthy growth of global m-commerce.-
New social networking applications for Internet-enabled mobile
phones provide location-based services that help people connect with
friends and the places around them. They are a good example of new
LBS services that have the potential to both benefit consumers and
provide opportunities for businesses supplying the LBS services to gen-
erate revenues through location-based m-advertising.35 Some of these
new social networking applications are currently offered without charge
to users, but create potential advertising revenue opportunities for sup-
pliers, should they choose to convey mobile advertising to users along
with social networking services. For example, one social networking
generally an application installed on a user's computer without their knowledge that can moni-
tor everything that users do with their computers including their activities on the Web and
transmit that information to an outside entity). New forms of these technologies may accom-
pany e-mail messages, software programs or cell-phone applications (so-called "parisiteware"
or "privacy-evading technologies"). Id. at 481.
32. See Parts Ill, IV.
33. See Laura M. Holson, Spam Plague Is Migrating from Computers to Cellphones,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at Cl (reporting that cell phone spam is increasing and that most
cell phone spain reaches cell phones through gateways that link the Internet and cell phones,
such that a spammer may send e-mail that appears as text messages on cell phones by utilizing
Internet addresses dedicated to wireless phones. At AT&T, for example, the address to send an
Intemet-to-phone electronic message is the customer's cell phone number followed by
@text.att.net).
34. See also Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Location In-
formation and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 381-82 (2003) (commenting
that call location information technology promises a wealth of benefits for users and may
produce a dream for advertisers, including the development of mobile location services market
worth billions, but also raises privacy issues for Americans who may find their own cell
phones have become location tracking devices for government [and commercial] use).
35. See, e.g., Welcome to BuddyFinder, http://buddyfinder.com.au/buddyfinder.htm
(last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
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service enables members to locate their friends through their mobile
phones.36 To participate, members share their mobile phone numbers and
the mobile phone numbers of friends that they would like to be able to
locate with the social networking provider.17 Scholars envision a privacy-
enhanced model location-based mobile advertising platform (LAMM)
for a social networking application that will enable mobile phone users
to find and communicate with their friends. LAMM is designed to be
able to deliver mobile messaging services along with mobile advertising
while also incorporating design features to protect the privacy and per-
sonal data of users and to give users control over the time, frequency and
types of mobile advertising messages they are willing to receive.38 De-
signed to be compliant with data protection and spain laws in the
European Union, one of the key features of LAMM is that it follows the
principle of "opt-in" notice and consent; users receive a full privacy pol-
icy and give their explicit consent to have their locations tracked and to
receive m-advertising messages. 9 Although the LAMM model employs
different tracking technologies than the RFID applications discussed in
this article,4 0 it provides insightful analysis of the fundamental privacy
and data protection issues involved in delivering LBS and m-advertising
and is a useful starting point for considering the implications of deliver-
ing LBS and m-advertising using RFID-enabled phones in RFID-
embedded environments.
In the future, mobile advertising may make it possible for consumers
to receive free or reduced-cost mobile telecommunications services (e.g.,
voice, text, mobile Web access and LBS) in a system where the cost is
offset by mobile advertising revenues, as opposed to the current user-
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Tour, BuddyFinder TourTM, http://buddyfinder.com.au/buddy-finder/
tour.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
38. See Evelyne Cleff & Gyozo Gidofalvi, Legal Aspects of a Location-Based Mobile
Advertising Platform, 2 INT'L. J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 261 (2008). According to Cleff and
Gidofalvi, their model (which they have named LAMM):
LAMM is an effective vehicle for location-based [mobile] advertising [that] will
create significant commercial opportunities. LAMM will provide the opportunity
for users to check for the instant availability of people, communicate instantly and
use the platform to exchange ideas and information. Messages in LAMM are,
unlike Short Messaging Services (SMSs), not limited in length and are transmitted
in real time. Moreover, LAMM enables users to indicate their status (available,
busy, etc.), allowing for a context-sensitive and real-time communication channel.
The same feature also enables control of the time and frequency of received adver-
tising messages. Finally, messaging by means of LAMM will be more cost efficient
than SMS.
Id. at 262. LAMM is a theoretical model not yet commercialized. Id.
39. Id. at 268.
40. See id. at 265.
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paid subscription and fee model. Perhaps mobile advertising will sup-
port free or lower cost telecommunications and information services for
mobile phone users that are analogous to the role advertising revenues
play in supporting online content. When contemplating the emerging
context of location-based services and mobile advertising, it is essential
to discuss the related consumer privacy and data issues. We need to do
this now, while there is still time to ensure that consumer privacy and
data protection concerns are given appropriate weight in the evaluation
of technical design features, commercial feasibility and consumer bene-
fit. This paper argues that the incorporation of RFID technologies into
mobile phones, making it possible for advertisers to directly deliver tar-
geted, location-specific advertising to consumers on their mobile phones,
creates significant threats to consumer privacy and data protection that
outpace the regulatory systems currently in place to protect consumers.
II. TECHNOLOGIES THAT SUPPORT LBS AND
DELIVERY OF M-ADVERTISING
It is presently possible to electronically track the geographic loca-
tions, Web-surfing and other behaviors of mobile phone users who are
using their mobile phones.42 There are three technologies that work in
conjunction with mobile phones to generate location data that could
be used to enable businesses to identify mobile phone users' geo-
graphic locations in order to provide location-based services and
41. See, e.g., Elinor Mills, In Search of the Google Phone, CNET NEWS, Oct. 24, 2007,
http://news.cnet.com/In-search-of-the-Google-phone/2100-1041_3-6214939.html (speculating
that the Gphone would be supported by advertising, based on filing of a patent application by
Google for advertising-supported telephony); Amol Sharma, Can a Google Phone Connect
with Carriers?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at B I (commenting that "Google-powered phones
are expected to wrap together several Google applications-among them, its search engine,
Google Maps, YouTube and Gmail email-that have already made their way onto some mo-
bile devices" and "[i]f Google isn't careful, sensitive user information could end up in the
wrong hands, leading to spamming, stalking and other invasions of privacy.").
42. However, currently the tracking technology may be unreliable in some situations.
See John Dunbar, Cell Phones Lack Reliable Area Tracking for 911 Emergencies, CORVALLIS
GAZETTE-TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A7. FCC regulation requires companies that use network
technology (triangulating among cell phone towers to determine the caller's location) to locate
callers in emergencies to come within 300 meters of the caller 95 percent of the time and also
requires companies that use handset technology (global positioning satellite (GPS) technology
to locate callers) to come within 150 meters 95 percent of the time. Id. A recent study by the
Association of Public Safety Communications International (APCO) of mobile carriers' ability
to meet the FCC standards, which encompassed tests conducted in seven different communi-
ties across the United States, showed that the companies were unable to meet these standards a
significant portion of the time. Id.
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location-specific advertising. 43 First, the mobile phone user's cell phone
number" and a unique Mobile Identification Number 5 (assigned by the
manufacturer to each mobile phone and unchangeable by the user) make
it possible for mobile phone carriers using signal triangulation processes
to track an individual cell phone user by tracking the location of her mo-
bile phone.46 Second, location-tracking technologies utilizing Global
43. See Recent Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, supra note 10,
at 307-11 (explaining how cell phones work to provide location information about the cell
phone user in the context of potential governmental abuses of cell phone data, including dis-
cussion of GPS and cell phone triangulation technologies); Working Party Opinion on
Location Data, supra note II, at 10 (discussing systems that produce location data based on
information processed from GPS systems, telephone networks, or RFID tags located by read-
ers, and the potential to identify individuals' locations through systems using these
technologies by locating objects in their possession, such as mobile telephones).
44. Recent Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, supra note 10, at
309 (the unique Mobile Identification Number enables carriers to use GPS or other tracking
technologies to track a specific cell phone because it distinguishes an individual cell phone
from all other cell phones).
45. Id. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set a
deadline after which cell service providers must supply location information so that emer-
gency callers from cell phones can be located within 150 meters; however, the specific type of
location technology that cell service providers use to meet this requirement was not legislated.
Id. at 307. So, for example, there is no law that requires cell phones sold in the United States
to have GPS chips.
46. Signal triangulation is a process used to estimate a mobile phone's location based
on the relative positions of the different cellular receiving towers that carry signals from the
user's phone. Timothy Joseph Duva, Comment, You Get What You Pay for. . . and so Does the
Government: How Law Enforcement Can Use Your Personal Property to Track Your Move-
ments, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 165, 169 (2004). Signal triangulation works in the following way:
Each tower in a provider's network is equipped with radio intercepts that receive sig-
nals from any active cell phone. When two or more of these towers receive signals
from the same phone, the towers are able to compare the signals and locate the unit in
one of two ways: Time Difference of Arrival ("TDOA") or Angle of Arrival ("AOA").
When a cell phone connects with a provider's tower using a TDOA system, the tower
measures the amount of time it takes for the signal to leave one location and reach the
other .... These time measurements make it possible to estimate the distance between
the tower to the phone. When more than one tower can do so, an algorithm allows the
system to determine coordinates corresponding to the phone's latitude and longitude.
Much like the TDOA system, angle-of-arrival technology [AOA] uses signals between
the cell tower and the wireless phone to determine location. Rather than measuring the
time it takes for the signal to travel between the two positions, however, the tower re-
cords the angle at which a phone's signal arrives at the station. When multiple towers
receive signals, the system can compare the angles of arrival and thus triangulate the
relative location of the cell phone .... In urban areas, the number of towers and their
sectioning into directional "faces" (north face, south face, etc.) gives providers access
to quite accurate location information. While making a single phone call, your signal
can move between different cell towers or faces on a single tower, creating a virtual
map of your movements. In rural settings, the location information available to pro-
viders is significantly less accurate simply because fewer towers are available. In some
service areas, cell service is provided by a single tower covering several hundred
square miles. Neither TDOA nor AOA techniques can triangulate locations in such
circumstances.
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Positioning Service (GPS) technologies also enable mobile phone carri-
ers to locate and track individual mobile phones. 7 Mobile phones
equipped with GPS technology allow mobile communication networks
to give the exact geographic position of mobile phones which are so
equipped, and thereby permit tracking of people in possession of the
GPS-equipped mobile phones.48 GPS enables providers to "pin-point the
position of a GPS-enabled phone anywhere on the globe.'49
Third, radio frequency identification devices (RFID)0 may soon
be embedded in mobile phones, enabling communication between
Recent Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, supra note 10, at 308-09.
Signal triangulation does not yield location data as precisely as that generated by GPS sys-
tems. Duva, supra, at 169. One limitation of triangulation is that it does not work if the user's
mobile phone is turned off. Recent Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology,
supra note 10, at 309.
47. Kristen E. Edmundson, Note, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer
Privacy Be Lost in Order for People To Be Found?, 38 IND. L. REV. 207, 209 (2005). GPS works
by measuring the time it takes for a signal to travel the distance between satellites and a cell
phone's GPS chip. When the GPS chip receives four synchronized signals from GPS satellites, it
can calculate a three-dimensional location that is accurate to within twenty meters. However GPS
does have certain disadvantages; because the system depends on receiving information from
satellites, it does not perform well when trees, buildings, or other barriers obstruct access. Recent
Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, supra note 10, at 308. The information
produced by GPS technologies could be used by advertisers to provide location-specific advertis-
ing messages, to provide traffic information and guidance to drivers, and in conjunction with 911
emergency services. See Villoch I1, supra note 18, at 448-49.
48. See id.
49. Recent Development in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, supra note 10, at 308.
50. RFID systems have three components: a tag, a reader and a database. Laura Hild-
ner, Defusing the Threat of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through Technology-Specific
Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134-35 (2006). First, a silicon
chip and antenna combination [hereinafter RFID tag] is attached to or incorporated into con-
sumer goods (including a mobile phone). Id. The tag may include an electronic product code
(EPC), but unlike the bar code currently imprinted on many consumer products, it may be
encrypted with a unique code that makes individual products individually identifiable (particu-
larized information). Id. The RFID tag may be very small, as small as a grain of sand, and thus
unnoticeable by consumers. Id. The tag's antenna transmits the tag's particularized informa-
tion. Id. Second, RFID systems include a RFID reader (reader). Id. Readers use radio waves to
scan tags to obtain their data. Id. Readers may be mobile or stationary and come in variable
sizes and powers. Id. A tag used for commercial purposes generally does not have a battery,
operates at ultrahigh frequencies, such that readers can access them within a few feet. Id.
RFID systems have an advantage over EPC systems because the RFID reader can read infor-
mation from RFID tags even if the RFID tag is not in their line of sight and the reader can
process multiple RFID tags at the same time. Id. Third, RFID systems include a database. Id.
The RFID database receives the information programmed onto RFID tags that has been read
by the RFID reader. Id. The RFID database can link information received from the RFID tag
to product information and potentially to information about the person who possesses the
consumer item with the RFID tag. Id. For a detailed overview of consumer applications of
RFID technologies, see U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Radio Frequency Identification: Applica-
tions and Implications for Consumers, A Workshop Report from the Staff of the Federal Trade
Commission (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050308rfdrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC Work-
shop Report].
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advertisers and consumers with RFID-equipped phones.' Consumers'
use of RFID-equipped mobile phones in combination with the strategic
placement of RFID readers in the consumers' environment (for example,
in a shopping center) will enable advertisers to track the location of con-
sumers as they move throughout communities, collecting data about
consumers' behavior in the environment and delivering advertising to
consumers on their mobile phones that is targeted to a consumers' geo-
graphic location at a specific time.52 Once location data about consumers'
mobile phones has been collected and stored in a database, it may be
uploaded to the Internet for potential use by the collector and other par-
ties, including advertisers.53 Of course, the location data will probably
51. David Meyer, Operators Want RFID in Phones, ZDNET.CO.UK (2006), http://
news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39284785,00.htm (reporting that the GSM
Association (GSMA), representing operators that service more than 82 percent of the world's
phone users, is pushing for a global standard on near field communications (NFC)). Such a
global standard would address short-range wireless technology that is based on having an
RFID chip embedded in mobile phone handsets combined with NFC software. Id. Wide-
ranging applications for such technology include enabling mobile phones to serve as a key for
the phone user's car that could open the car door and put the user's choice of music on the car
stereo. Id. An RFID-equipped phone with NFC software could also act as a payment device in
stores or to download concert tickets that would then be recognized by an RFID reader at the
concert venue. Id. See also John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveil-
lance, The Privacy Act of 1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0020
(2005) (reporting on the emerging trend of integrating RFID in mobile handsets). See also
Beth Bacheldor, Nokia Uses RFID-Enabled Phones to Police Its Security Guards, RFID J.,
Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleprint/2904/-1// (reporting that mo-
bile phones carried by security guards at the company are outfitted with RFID tags in the
handset and an RFID reader in its outer shell and enable the company to track its security
guards as they patrol buildings, parking areas and common grounds); Bacheldor, supra note 7
(discussing the models of RFID-enabled handsets that have been issued by Nokia since 2005).
Nokia's latest model that is a NFC-enabled handset containing an RFID module that can func-
tion as an RFID tag and as an RFID reader and supporting peer-to-peer communication.
Bacheldor, supra.
52. See generally Katina Michael, Trends in the Selection of Automatic Identification
Technology in Electronic Commerce Applications, Faculty of Infomatics-Papers, Univ. of
Wallongong 8-9 (2003), originally published as Michael, K, Trends in the Selection of Auto-
matic Identification Technology in Electronic Commerce Applications 135-52, in BUILDING
SOCIETY THROUGH E-COMMERCE: E-GOVERNMENT, E-BUSINESS AND E-LEARNING, (N. Cerpa
& P. Bro eds., Univ. of Talca, Chile, 2003)), available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/375.
Michael provides a case study about the use of RFID transponders attached to animals to track
them in an environment embedded with RFID readers and discusses the convergence of RFID
and other auto-identification technologies that is occurring in e-commerce applications. Id.
Auto-identification technologies, including RFID, can also be used to track consumers' loca-
tions and deliver advertising to their mobile phones. See infra Part III for discussion of the
BART RFID Trial that is based on consumers use of RFID-equipped mobile phones in combi-
nation with the strategic placement of RFID readers in the consumers' environment that enable
advertisers to track the location of consumers as they move throughout the environment and to
deliver advertising to consumers on their mobile phones based on the consumers' geographic
location at a specific time.
53. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECH-
NOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 9, GAO-05-551 (May 2005), available at http://
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only be useful for delivering LBS and other advertising for a limited
time period because consumers also are mobile and will not likely re-
main at a specific location very long.
Given this Article's focus on the privacy implications of providing
RFID-enabled phones to consumers, it is important to discuss how these
phones will enhance the ability of advertisers to deliver mobile advertis-
ing to consumers. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is
a specialized agency of the United Nations for information and commu-
nications technologies 4 It has issued a report explaining opportunities
presented by RFID for mobile telecommunications services. This report
explains how RFID-enabled mobile phones may soon provide consumers
with new services. 5 The report specifies that RFID-based mobile com-
munications services can be used to provide information on objects
equipped with an RFID tag over a telecommunications network. Once a
mobile phone is equipped with an RFID reader it can retrieve informa-
tion on tagged items which is stored in a database and is accessed via the
mobile network. 6 The report explains how advertising can be delivered
to mobile RFID-enabled mobile phones:
Information retrieval via RFID enabled mobile phones could be
used for advertisements. Posters or paper-copies of advertise-
ments could carry a small RFID-tag. Anybody interested in more
information on the advertised product or event would just have
to hold his mobile phone close to the tag. The information would
then again be retrieved from a database. The delivered informa-
tion could also be multimedia-content: For example, the RFID
equipped cell phone could provide a free preview of a movie
when the user reads an RFID tag that is attached to the movie
poster.
57
Furthermore, the presence indication capability of RFID can be used to
produce automated messages to mobile phones whenever the mobile
phone comes near an RFID reader, so presumably these messages could
be advertising messages. 58 For this purpose:
[T]he RFID equipped mobile phone does not act as a reader but
carries an RFID tag. RFID equipped cell-phones might thus
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05551.pdf (providing an exhibit showing the components of an
RFID system that includes storage of data in databases that are connected to the Internet).
54. See International Telecommunications Union, http://www.itu.intlnetlhome/
index.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
55. See generally Seidler, supra note 2.
56. Id. §§ 3, 3.1.1.
57. Id. § 3.1.1 (citation omitted).
58. See id. § 3.1.6.
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have to be equipped with both a reader and one or multiple
RFID tags .... [T]he RFID tag on the phone would then enable
readers in the environment to identify the phone-and respec-
tively the person carrying it.59
The report also explains the relationship between Near Field Communi-
cations (NFC) technology and RFID, indicating NFC is not equal to
RFID services in mobile networks, but is instead a subset of it.6° The
NFC communications protocol is a concept already used for RFID-
enabled mobile phones.6 ' The NFC communications protocol has not yet
been widely adopted by handset manufacturers who are engaged in mass
production of cell phones, and no mobile operators have yet bought the
phones to promote NFC services to their customers.62
The Report's discussion of the use of RFID to provide new services
for consumers and advertising opportunities assumes the information
retrieval and presence indication capabilities of RFID will be used in
conjunction with a telecommunications network. But from a regulatory
compliance standpoint, what if m-advertisers used RFID-embedded en-
vironments like shopping centers and bus stations to communicate their
m-ads directly to consumers who have RFID-enabled mobile phones
without using the telecommunications network? And what if RFID-
enabled phones were the industry-standard for mobile phones such that
many or most mobile phones sold to consumers were already equipped
59. Id.
60. Id. § 3; see also INNOVISION RESEARCH & TECH. PLC, NEAR FIELD COMMC'N IN
THE REAL WORLD § 2.3 (Dec. 2007) (on file with author) (describing how NFC works).
61. Seidler, supra note 2, § 3.2. The NFC protocol is an ISO/IEC 14443 compatible
short-range communication protocol operating over distances of a few centimeters, which uses
the 13.56 MHz high frequency range. Id. "The reader provides power to the chip in the passive
RFID tag by inductive coupling." Id. A report by ABI Research "gives NFC-enabled mobile
phones a market share of fifty percent by the year 2009." Id.
62. NFC is still an emerging technology that could have a bright future building on the
infrastructure already used in Europe to enable people to use their mobile phones to make
contactless payments for transportation, groceries, movie admissions and other services. See
Jonathan Collins, Could NFC Fail to Take Off?, RFID J., Apr. 7, 2008, http://
www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/4005/l/128 (arguing that the lack of current adoption
of NFC protocols in mobile phone handsets are a "reflection of the business issues and part-
nerships required for NFC payment applications, not a judgment on the potential of the
technology."). The emergence of mobile phones equipped with RFID modules compliant with
NFC specification is expected to boost the popularity of contactless payments. Mary Catherine
O'Connor, RFID Payment Fobs Fail to Woo Consumers, RFID J., Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/4002/l/l/. Nokia produces RFID-enabled mo-
bile phone handsets and is scheduled to begin shipping its fourth generation RFID-enabled
handsets using NFC protocol in Fall 2008. Bacheldor, supra note 7. A partnership between
Visa and Nokia has been announced to enable Visa to offer RFID-enabled services such as
contactless payments utilizing Nokia's newest model of RFID-enabled mobile phones, al-
though a spokesperson for Visa said the company has immediate plans to develop payment-
related services to leverage the peer-to-peer communications features in the new phones. Id.
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with RFID tags and readers to facilitate the delivery of LBS and m-
advertising messages to consumers?
Existing government regulation of telecommunication carriers in
both the United States and Europe already address, to some extent, the
privacy and data protection concerns associated with location tracking
technologies that utilize GPS or cell phone triangulation.63 However,
technologies like RFID-enabled mobile phones make it possible for mo-
bile advertisers to deliver m-advertising without using the services of
highly regulated public carriers, thus undermining the current regulatory
framework that focuses on public carriers. When consumers have RFID-
enabled mobile phones and shopping centers and bus stations are em-
bedded with RFID technologies, mobile advertisers will be able to track
consumers through their phones and deliver m-advertising directly to the
phones through contactless wireless communications that do not require
use telecommunications networks. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the
adequacy of government regulation in the European Union and United
States to protect consumer privacy and data protection in emerging
m-advertising contexts that involve consumer tracking facilitated by
RFID technologies. 64
III. MOBILE PHONES COMBINED WITH RFID TECHNOLOGIES CREATE
VALUE BUT ALSO RAISE PRIVACY CONCERNS
For both businesses and consumers, there are benefits to be gained
when consumers have mobile phones that are equipped with RFID tech-
nologies and the business environment is equipped with RFID readers
and tags. But there are also privacy and data protection concerns. When
RFID systems are used to deliver LBS and mobile advertising, there is
the potential for consumers to be unaware of privacy-intrusive nature of
these systems. One of the distinguishing characteristics of RFID systems
and other AmI systems is that they may lack transparency from a privacy
perspective, meaning that RFID systems may operate automatically and
63. See discussion infra Part VII (reviewing the existing E.U. and U.S. regulatory
frameworks for RFID applications).
64. Work by previous scholars on consumer privacy issues related to RFID is the start-
ing point for this study. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 2, 91 35-40 (2007) (proposing to amend
existing U.S. laws, which the author concludes are insufficient to address consumer privacy
concerns related to the broad use of RFID technology in supply-chain and other contexts);
Eden, supra note 51, at 29 (arguing for amendments to the Privacy Act of 1974 to require
corporations to preserve individual anonymity with respect to consumer privacy preferences).
This study differs from previous work on this topic because it utilizes a comparative law ap-
proach with a focus on E.U. and U.S. law and because it focuses on RFID use in mobile
phones, as opposed to broader focus on use of RFID in the supply chain or the broad use of
RFID in consumer products.
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invisibly in the background, resulting in a form of secret surveillance.
Furthermore, to the extent that RFID systems gather, store and use per-
sonal data, they may not provide appropriate notice and consent features
from the perspective of fair information practices. Recent consumer
trials testing systems using RFID-equipped mobile phones for
m-commerce transactions help provide a context for discussion of the
potential risks from the perspective of privacy and data protection.
66
One such consumer trial in the United States features the use of
RFID-equipped mobile phones by San Francisco commuters who use
Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART" and "BART RFID Trial").67 More than
200 San Francisco-area commuters, who were already subscribers of
Sprint mobile phone service, have agreed to use Sprint's RFID-equipped
cell phones . In the trial, these commuters are able to use their phones to
pay fares on the local subway system, to download directions to the
nearest Jack in the Box fast food restaurant and to pay for their pur-
65. Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling into the Future: An Assessment of Profiling Tech-
nologies in the Context of Ambient Intelligence, I FIDIS J. OF IDENTITY IN THE INFO. Soc'Y 7
(2007), http://joumal.fidis.net.
66. See Claire Swedberg, Cell Phone Service Providers Start Global NFC Initiative,
RFID J., Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/3893/l/l/ (describing the
launching of a NFC mobile phone pilot titled "Pay-Buy-Mobile" in France, Taiwan and Tur-
key, with plans to expand the trial to eight more countries this year). In the trials, local banks
and credit card companies partner with mobile service companies and phone manufacturers to
provide sample groups of consumers with NFC-enabled mobile phones they can use to pur-
chase goods and services from participating vendors. Id.
67. Mary Catherine O'Connor, SF's Transit System Offers Commuters Fast Access to
Subways and Sandwiches, RFID J., Jan. 31, 2008. The trial also involves mobile phones
equipped with Near Field Communications (NFC) technology, which is a wireless technology
that uses a high-frequency RFID protocol to exchange data through RFID modules embedded
in electronic devices such as cell phones. Id. The businesses participating in this trial include:
BART (configured the database); First Data (providing payment processing services for the
trial); ViVOTech (providing online registration to create debit or credit accounts for customers
for the trial and provides software to power the RFID application inside the cell phones); and
Samsung (manufacturer of RFID-equipped handsets). Id. Also, NXP Semiconductors (devel-
oped the chips for the Sprint NFC enabled mobile phones to facilitate secure, contactless
communication between the mobile devices and BART's fare gate readers). See Press
Release, BART Trial First To Use Mobile Phones to Pay for Fares & Food, ViVOTech
(Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.vivotech.com/newsroompress-releases/BART-trail-release.asp
[hereinafter ViVOTech Press Release] (announcing that "participants can hold their specifi-
cally-equipped Sprint mobile phone up to certain Jack in the Box® and Sprint 'smart
advertisements' on BART station walls and download either directions to the nearest Jack in
the Box restaurant or content from Sprint").
68. Sprint, a leading mobile telecommunication carrier in the United States, is involved
in the trial through its existing relationships with consumers-only subscribers of Sprint's
mobile telecommunication services were invited to participate in the trial. O'Connor, supra
note 67. In the trial, Sprint also delivers content to participants. See ViVOTech Press Release,
supra note 67.
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chases at Jack in the Box locations.69 In return, trial participants receive
mobile advertising. 70 To participate, a commuter must have a mobile
phone that has been embedded with a RFID module.7 ' The system also
requires RFID readers and RFID tags to be incorporated into the physi-
cal environment where consumers will use the phones. In this case, the
environment already contained some of the RFID technology needed for
the trial because the subway turnstiles in the subway stations had already
been equipped with RFID readers that were installed in 2006 to facilitate
BART's EZ Rider program. The EZ Rider Program allows frequent
BART commuters to pay for their fares using RFID-enabled plastic
cards: a commuter pays his fare through a debit account that is created
and linked to the ID number encoded in the inlay on the commuter's
card.72
In the 2008 trial, the RFID-enabled plastic card was replaced by a
cell phone embedded with an RFID module. Smart posters inside the
BART station allow the commuters to get directions to the nearest Jack
in the Box Restaurant and to access content provided by Sprint, includ-
ing advertisements. For example, the smart posters featuring Jack in the
Box restaurants have RFID tags embedded in them; commuters use their
phones equipped with an RFID reader to collect a URL from the tag on
the poster and then the phone's Web browser calls up the Web page for
the URL to display the nearest restaurant location.73 Once at a Jack in the
Box restaurant, RFID readers installed in Jack in the Box Restaurants
allow commuters to pay for their orders by holding their phones close to
74RFID readers. RFID technology installed in Jack in the Box restaurants
is used to capture the commuters' purchases.75 Commuters get a receipt
from Jack in the Box when their orders are complete.76 A database holds
participants' account IDs and links their user accounts to payment
69. This test of NFC technologies in both a mass transit and a retail environment is
expected to run for several months in 2008. Id.
70. Id.
71. O'Connor, supra note 67 (reporting that the specific RFID technology used in the
trial is a NFC module). Samsung handsets are being used in the trial; however Samsung does
not currently sell RFID-enabled handsets to the public in the United States. Id. Nokia offers an
RFID-enabled model in the United States and Europe and RFID-enabled phones are widely
used in Asia. Id. See also RFID in Japan: Japan's Experience with RFID Phones and Con-
tactless Cash, DIGITAL WORLD TOKYO, Apr. 30, 2008, available at http://
www.digitalworldtokyo.com/index.php/digital-tokyo/articles/rfid-japans-experience-with-
rfid-phones-and-e cash/.
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processing services." Commuters have the option to set up a personal
identification number which they would need to key-in before accessing
the system, but unless they do so, they will be able to just press one but-
ton on their phones and then hold their phones up to the payment
terminal. 8 If a commuter loses his phone, the commuter may contact
Sprint to have the phone deactivated. 9
In the trial, consumers benefited in several ways: they saved time by
avoiding the need to wait in line to purchase tickets to get on the subway,
they did not need cash or correct change to purchase their subway tick-
ets, they were able to get directions to Jack in the Box to buy food, thus
saving time finding a restaurant, and they were able to buy food quickly
at Jack in the Box restaurants without having to carry cash. To the extent
that consumers welcome relevant advertising, they also benefited by hav-
ing access to advertising or other content available through Sprint's
smart posters in the subway, perhaps being able to view movie previews
or access special offers. Essentially, their phones became a source of
LBS services to pay for subway tickets and food and to obtain directions,
as well as providing a source of m-advertising content. Among the ad-
vantages to participating businesses were enhanced efficiency of
operations, including cost savings, boosting the number of riders on the
subway and visitors to participating restaurants, having better data about
their customers and having a ready mechanism to deliver m-advertising.
Personal data used in the BART RFID Trial included location data to
enable tracking of commuters. To illustrate, location data about a com-
muter will be generated whenever a commuter's phone is held close
enough to an RFID reader to be read (at the subway turnstile or in the
Jack in the Box restaurant when payment is made) or when the com-
muter's RFID reader is held up to a smart poster to get directions or
access other special ads and offers from Sprint. Information about com-
muters will also be generated by the system, such as what they buy or
when they travel, and linked to a particular commuter by his unique
identification number. In the current trial, commuters must take the ini-
tiative to obtain the advertising content by holding their RFID-equipped
mobile phones near smart posters in the BART stations. 80 However it is
not difficult to imagine how advertising could instead be marketed to
consumers. For example, when a commuter pays for his subway ticket or
food purchases, RFID readers used to process the purchases can send
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perhaps via his telecommunications service. Location and other personal
information gathered in the BART RFID Trial could be used to target
other advertising to individual consumers based on market or consumer
behavioral analysis and on a time and location specific basis.
Ongoing consumer trials, such as the BART RFID Trial, demonstrate
that now is the time to address the consumer privacy and data protection
concerns associated with bringing new RFID-equipped mobile phones
and location-based services to the market. There is still time to design
the technology and supporting regulatory systems to protect consumer
privacy interests.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF FINDING COMMON SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT
CONSUMER PRIVACY AND FACILITATE M-COMMERCE
The significant privacy and data protection concerns associated with
consumers' use of RFID-enabled mobile phones are part of broader pri-
vacy concerns relating to our current information age that feature
ambient intelligence and autonomic computing.8' In "The Internet of
Things," the future made possible by emerging technologies such as
RFID systems, sensors, smart technologies and nanotechnologies is en-
visioned to be one with autonomic computing environments that produce
and use ambient intelligence. In an ambient intelligence (AmI) envi-
ronment, humans are surrounded by pervasive, ubiquitous and
interconnected computers that anticipate their preferences in order to
adapt their environment to their inferred wishes.83 Autonomic computing
81. With autonomic computing systems, "[s]ystems manage themselves according to an
administrator's goals. New components integrate as effortlessly as a new cell establishes itself
in the human body. These ideas are not science fiction, but elements of the grand challenge to
create self-managing computing systems." Jeffrey 0. Kephart & David M. Chess, The Vision
of Autonomic Computing, COMPUTER MAO., Jan. 2003, at 41, http://www.research.ibm.com/
autonomic/manifesto/ (attributing the term "autonomic computing" to Paul Hom, who intro-
duced it in his March 2001 keynote address to the National Academy of Engineers at Harvard
University); see also PAUL HORN, AUTONOMIC COMPUTING: IBM's PERSPECTIVE ON THE
STATE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6 (2001), http://www.research.ibm.comautonomic/
manifesto/.
82. The Internet of Things, supra note 1, at 9-40.
83. Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 7 (describing the key elements of Ambient Intelli-
gence and citing THE NEW EVERYDAY, VIEWS ON AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE (E. Aarts & S.
Marzano eds., Rotterdam 2003) as a source of previous definitions of this term). According to
Hildebrandt, the key elements of an ambient intelligence (Aml) environment are that comput-
erized devices are:
-embedded (many networked devices integrated into the environment)
-context-aware (these devices recognize you and your situational context)
-personalized (they can be tailored towards your needs)
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technologies are a precondition for creating ambient intelligence, and
RFID is one of the autonomic computing technologies upon which the
vision and creation of ambient intelligence rests.4
As described in Exhibit A, there are at least six distinct consumer
privacy concerns that arise when RFID-enabled mobile phones are used
to deliver location-based services and m-advertising. These six consumer
privacy issues are: data protection, tracking, spamming, skimming and
eavesdropping, profiling using personal data, and profiling using
anonymous data.5
EXHIBIT A
KEY PRIVACY ISSUES FOR CONSUMERS:
WHEN MOBILE PHONES ARE RFID-EQUIPPED AND USED TO DELIVER
LOCATION-BASED SERVICES AND MOBILE ADVERTISING
Privacy Risk
1. Data Protection
The potential for advertisers and other
third parties to collect consumers'
personally identifying information from
the RFID tags in their phones.
However, if a read-only function is
assigned to the RFID-reader in the
phone and the reader does not
communicate a unique identification of
the phone in the process of reading a
tag in the user's environment, use of
the phone as a reader does not raise
data protection issues because this
process should not reveal any personal
information.
Explanation & Examples
-Product identification information similar to the type of
information on a bar code; for example, a unique
identifying number for each mobile phone and the
phone's model number, which are not personally-
identifying data unless it is linked to an individual
person.
-Other types of personal information that could be
stored on RFID tags in mobile phones: consumer's
name, address, mobile phone number, date of
purchase, method of payment (although it is not
necessary to store this type of information on an RFID
tag as it could be stored in a separate database that is
linked to the phone via a unique identification
number).
-Other types of personal information stored on the
consumer's mobile phone apart from the storage
capacity of the RFID tag that could be accessed by
hacking the phone's memory include: the users list of
contacts, passwords for accounts, messages, etc.
-adaptive (they may change in response to you)
-anticipatory (they can anticipate your desires without conscious mediation).
Id. at 7. "Other key elements ... are: hidden complexity; the absence of keyboards or moni-
tors, the fact that the environment itself becomes the interface, real time monitoring and
proactive computing." Id.
84. Id. For an explanation of the term "autonomic computing," see Kephart & Chess,
supra note 81, at 41.
85. See Exhibit A, infra. Two types of consumer profiling are discussed in this exhibit
that are distinguished by whether the profiling uses personal data or instead uses anonymous
data. See id. at items 5 and 6.
i
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Privacy Risk Explanation & Examples
2.Tracking -RFID readers in the consumer's environment will
The potential to reveal the geographic detect the presence of the RFID tags in the user's
location of the consumer by virtue of phone-since the phone must be within the read
location tracking capabilities related to range of the reader for this to occur, the reader will
having an RFID-equipped phone with capture information about the user's geographic
an RFID tag that transmits a unique location at a specified time.
identifying number, which may be -Also, when the consumer uses his mobile phone to
enhanced by having a phone that has read a smart poster and then moves to another
also been equipped with other location location to purchase a product using his RFID-
tracking technologies (e.g., GPS). equipped phone, his geographic location may be
captured by the RFID-system that he is interacting
with and can be stored in a database.
-GPS data about the location of a mobile phone user
could be combined with the RFID-captured data about
the consumer's location for more complete tracking
data about the consumer's location at specific times.
3. Spamming -When the consumer uses his mobile phone to make
The increased risk of receiving a contactless payment transaction, the mobile phone's
unsolicited m-advertising (e.g., voice RFID-reader may access mobile span or a
telemarketing calls, SMS or text- subsequent confirmation of a payment transaction
message ads, multi-media ads, pop-up sent to the mobile phone may be accompanied by
or banner ads generated by their mobile spain (e.g., text, multi-media, banner, pop-up
phones). Also, the increased risk of span to be displayed on the phone).
having adware or spyware software -Advertisers who have knowledge of the consumer's
downloaded on their phones that could mobile phone number may generate text messages
be used as a mechanism to deliver and other forms of advertising sparn to consumers
spam. that are location and time specific facilitated by RFID-
readers in the consumer's environment that detect the
consumer's location and are able to identify the
phone's user.
-The phone's RFID reader is a new potential portal for
adware and spyware software downloads to the
phone that may thereafter be used to generate m-ads
to the phone. If the download is without adequate
notice and consent, this creates a portal for spare.
Fall 20081
134 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:107
Privacy Risk
4. Skimming & Eavesdropping
The risk that consumers' personally
identifying data stored on their phones
will be accessed by others without
authorization or that transmissions of
personal data will be intercepted while
it is in transit by unintended and
unauthorized parties (e.g., rival
advertisers, criminals engaged in
identity theft or fraud).
5. Profiling Using Personal Data
The risk that consumers' personal data
will end up in commercial data banks
and be added to consumer dossiers by
virtue of the ability of REID systems to
collect data automatically and to then
communicate that data easily over the
Internet. Effectively, a consumer may
lose control of the collection and
sharing of his personal data, raising the
risk of identity theft and fraud.
Explanation & Examples
-Depending on the types of data recorded on RFID
tags in mobile phones and/or the security risks
associated with having RFID-readers in the phones
that can be hacked in order for an outsider to access
other personal data that is stored on the phones,
consumers' personal data may be accessed while it is
in electronic storage by persons without authorization
(skimming).
-Alternatively, personally identifying information could
be intercepted without authorization while it is in the
process of being communicated between an RFID tag
and an RFID-reader (eavesdropping).
-Due to the contactless nature of RFID and the fact
that RFID-systems operate autonomously in the
background without the user's intervention, the mobile
phone user may not be aware of the leak of his
personal data.
-If the data on the RFID-tag is encrypted, this may
prevent breach of personal data stored on the tag, but
skimming & eavesdropping may still be used to track
the phone if the tracker can uniquely identify one
phone from another.
-Because RFID-systems can store personal data in
databases that can be connected to the Internet, any
data in digital form can be processed using data
mining techniques to create consumer dossiers and
can be shared with others through access to the
database or transferring the data to other databases.
-Examples of the types of data that could be stored,
analyzed, shared include: location data and other
personally-identifying data about consumers with
mobile phones including data collected by virtue of the
RFID-enabled phone as well as other data. Such data
may or may not be made anonymous at the time of
collection or thereafter.
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Privacy Risk Explanation & Examples
6. Profiling Using Anonymous Data -Consumer is included in a favorable group
The risk that data about consumers will profile/classification; e.g., receives mobile advertising
be gathered and used to create group that will grant him a favorable purchasing opportunity
profiles that are applied to groups of compared to other consumers who are not in the
consumers in order to generate favorable classification, such as a discounted price on
targeted marketing to desirable groups an item he is interested in purchasing.
of consumers according to the -Consumer is excluded from a favorable group
marketers objectives. The privacy profile/classification; e.g., does not receive a favorable
concern to consumers is the lack of purchasing opportunity compared to other consumers
transparency of the process if who are in the favorable profile, so, for example, he
consumers are not given access to must pay a higher price to purchase an item that he is
information about the knowledge interested in compared to other consumers that are in
profiles that are applied to them and the favorable classification.
that determine whether or not they are
being included or excluded from
receiving favorable marketing
opportunities, etc.
The starting point for resolving each of these important privacy chal-
lenges is recognizing that they arise in the context of ambient intelligent
systems. An essential component of ambient intelligence systems is in-
formation about users, so, from a consumer privacy perspective, some
argue it is likely that losing control over one's personal information is an
unavoidable cost of entering into an AmI world.86 Such a world, charac-
terized by pervasive and invisible information systems that constantly
and automatically record events that occur there, makes it highly
unlikely that individuals who enter will retain control over how their per-
sonal information is processed. Understanding the ubiquity and
invisibility of computers operating in AmI environments is critical to
addressing the risk of eavesdropping and skimming for consumers using
RFID-enabled phones because it means that consumers are not well-
situated to prevent or detect data and communication leaks." Addition-
ally, spamming, the vexing problem of unsolicited electronic
communications, is expected to be a problem not only for those using
Internet-connected computers, but also for mobile phone users. This is a
key privacy issue as mobile phones are now an essential and very per-
sonal communications device that consumers are likely to have with
them nearly all of the time. Mobile phones are a convenient portal to the
AmI era and the benefits of new location-based services. Yet that con-
venience will be lessened if it comes with interruptions of personal time
86. See Rouvroy, supra note 14, at 8-9.
87. See EPIC Testimony on AK RFID Bill, infra note 108, at 3.
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and space in the form of increased spam made possible by RFID-enabled
mobile phones and RFID-embedded environments.
Finally, the privacy risks related to consumer profiling take on more
importance in AmI environments. As Rouvroy argues, the "reasons that
privacy issues are so vividly debated on the threshold of an 'AmI era' go
well beyond ... important concerns for control over personal informa-
tion (data protection)" and include discussions about the impact of AmI
on individual privacy.88 One significant privacy impact identified by
Rouvroy relates to the impact on individual autonomy that occurs from
the classifications of people that occur in an Am environment.89 For ex-
ample, consider one AmI scenario: an RFID system installed in a
shopping center for marketing purposes that is designed to focus on con-
sumers carrying RFID-enabled mobile phones. A primary goal of such a
system is to classify consumers for a variety of marketing purposes, such
as their willingness to buy certain products. 90 Although such a system
may be designed to aid the customer by automatically displaying infor-
mation optimized to the consumer's needs or preferences, as interpreted
by the system, the benefit to the consumer depends on how the system
classifies that consumer, and whether the system changes the classifica-
tions as a result of consumer response. This process has been called
"making up people."9'
The privacy concern for the customers in this AmI scenario involv-
ing RFID and mobile marketing is not merely that tiny details of their
lives, such as shopping habits or movements within a shopping area, are
being observed, but rather that meaning may be accorded to these small
details captured by the system. So, the probable impacts of AmI are less
about discovering what is preexisting about the consumer and more
about creating new interactions and behaviors involving the customer
and the marketer. These new interactions are produced through the "in-
terplay of statistics and correlations" that produce or reinforce "norms,
the criteria of normality and desirability against which individual life-
88. See Rouvroy, supra note 14, at 9.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Viewed from a privacy perspective, consumers in this mobile marketing scenario
are the objects of "scientific or bureaucratic inquiry for a variety of purposes going from con-
trolling to helping them," and the result is classification of people that affects the people
classified, and, in turn, the classifications are changed by the system to reflect the changes in
the people produced by the classifications. Id. at 16.
91. lan Hacking, "Making Up People", LONDON REV. OF BOOKs 23-26 (Aug. 17, 2006)
(reprinted from IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 99-114 (2002)) (discussing how peo-
ple are moving targets in scientific investigations that classify people; such investigations
interact with them and change them, and since they are changed, the people are not quite the
same kind of people they were before, and so the target of the investigation has moved, a
process Hacking calls the "looping effect").
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styles, preferences, choices and behaviors will be evaluated." 92 AmI clas-
sification systems are designed to reward consumers who are compliant
with these norms, but sanction deviant consumers, e.g., by discriminat-
ing among consumers in terms of providing increased or reduced access
to specific places, goods, services, activities or other opportunities.'
Analysis of the role of law in this new context requires considering
whether individuals should have access to the classifications that are ap-
plied to them in order to exercise individual rights of self-determination
and to enable them to effectively participate in the democratic processes
that ultimately legitimize or constrain uses of such classifications. 94
The advent of RFID-enabled mobile phones gives us a context for
privacy discussions that is broader than whether law should protect per-
sonal data. This presents an opportunity to work towards global solutions
that may not be possible in the context of data protection alone. As such,
the discussion is really about trade-offs between protecting the personal
liberty of consumers and the freedom of businesses to participate in
commerce and to market their products and services. Protection of per-
sonal liberty is an essential principle found in the legal systems of both
the European Union and the United States.95 Arguably, even if the Euro-
pean view that protection of personal data is necessary as a fundamental
right is never adopted into U.S. law, it may be possible to reach workable
privacy solutions because both legal systems place a high value on pro-
tecting personal liberty.
92. Rouvroy, supra note 14, at 16-17.
93. Id.
94. Rouvroy says:
The central importance of privacy and data protection in the context of Aml is thus
not merely due to the fact that Aml systems record what happens in "real life."
What is crucial here is that those systems "construct" . . . the meaning of those
events and, on the that basis, frame the user's environment in ways that in turn im-
pact... self-perception, choices, preferences and behaviors, interfering... with the
effective exercise by individuals of their capacity for self-determination.
Id. at 17 (arguing that "to the extent that those classifications condition access or denial of
access to valuable opportunities in life, they should result from a democratic deliberative
process." Id. at 18). Rouvroy says that AmI systems are problematic from an ethical and legal
perspective because such systems fail to respect individual autonomy. Aml systems produce
"knowledge ... about users on the basis of correlated data [that] transforms the subjects about
whom that knowledge is constructed," turning the user's position as a "subject" into a position
of being an "object." Id. at 18.
95. See generally Nancy J. King, Fundamental Human Rights Principle Inspires U.S.
Data Privacy Law, But Protections Are Less Than Fundamental, in CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY
AND DATA PROTECTION LAW, PERSPECTIVES OF EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN LAW, 71-
98 (Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit (CRID), Maria Veronica Perez Asinari &
Pablo Pallazzi, eds., Bruylant 2008).
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A. Data Protection
When businesses use consumers' personal data, questions of infor-
mation or data privacy arise.96 Generally speaking, personal data are
information that are specific to individuals, such as the person's name,
address, phone number, sex, age, marital status, and income.97 Protecting
the privacy of personal data and associated fair information practices are
recognized as being important to society and to the development of
global commerce."
Principles of fair information practices for the protection of personal
data can be found in numerous sources including: (1) those set forth in
legislation (like the principles enacted in national laws of countries in the
European Union that have implemented the Data Protection Directive in
the European Union or the Customer Proprietary Network Information
("CPNI") rules under the federal Communications Act and related bind-
ing administrative rules in the United States); 99 (2) policy statements of
96. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal
Paradigm? Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1315, 1325-26 (2000) (using the terms "data protection," "data privacy," and "infor-
mation privacy" interchangeably to describe the same types of government regulation). Data
privacy, also called information privacy in the United States, has been described as:
One of the branches of the legal right to privacy ... concern[ing] itself with the ex-
tent to which persons are able to limit access to information about themselves. The
right is expressed as a person's right to "control," "limit access to," or "determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is to be
communicated to others."
See Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unen-
cumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 487
(1990).
97. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2001),
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186 - _ ,00.html [here-
inafter OECD Privacy Guidelines]. According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, "personal
data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual". Id. § l(b). See
also Council Directive 94/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive] (defining "personal data" to include, data about natural persons "who can be identi-
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity.").
98. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L.
REV. 717, 730-31 (2001) (commenting that there is a "consensus among democratic states
that information privacy is a critical element of civil society."); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving
Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1325
(2000) (commenting that "democracies converge on a basic set of principles for 'data protec-
tion' or 'data privacy'. These norms of fair information practice constitute what can be termed
First Principles, and their acceptance separates democratic societies from totalitarian re-
gimes").
99. See generally supra note 97.
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government agencies that are advisory but not legally binding (in the
United States, the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") fair information
principles of notice, consent, access, security, and enforcement);' and
(3) the principles announced by international organizations that are advi-
sory but not legally binding (like the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data).'0 ' In the United
States and the European Union, some consensus appears to exist on the
basic components of fair information practices. For example, each of
these sources of fair information principles includes notions of meaning-
ful notice and consent by the data subject to the use or disclosure of his
personal data by any entity collecting the data. But the advent of RFID-
enabled phones and RFID-embedded environments creates significant
challenges in giving notice and obtaining consent. These challenges in-
clude the invisibility and autonomous operation of RFID technologies
from the consumer's perspective; this is characterized by contactless
communications between devices that can operate automatically in the
background without user involvement. Another challenge is the con-
sumer's difficulty in using a small mobile device to receive and review
privacy notices and to indicate consent. And, if the consumer receives
the notice but does not wish to consent, how may the consumer protect
his privacy in an RFID-enabled environment without leaving his mobile
phone elsewhere? Will the RFID-equipped device have an off-button?
Can the consumer choose to have the RFID module permanently or
temporarily disabled?
To the extent that RFID systems use or generate personally-
identifying information about consumers, they raise questions of
personal data protection, but not all uses of RFID involve personal data.
In some situations there is no ambiguity about whether an RFID system
uses personal data-such is the case with many RFID systems that use
personal data like an identification number to control access by persons
100. FTC, Fair Information Practice Principles [FTC's FIP], http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). The second principle, Choice/Consent,
includes obtaining consumer consent about how information collected from them may be
used. Id. See generally King, supra note 95, at 71-98.
101. OECD Privacy Guidelines, supra note 97. See also Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-
Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal Information Protectors, 44
AM. Bus. L.J. 55, 61 n.26 (2007) (summarizing the OECD fair information practices to in-
clude these general principles: (1) collection limitation; (2) data quality principle; (3) purpose
specification; (4) use limitation principle (which includes a restriction on use of the individ-
ual's personal data without the consent of the data subject or by the authority of law); (5)
security safeguards principle; (6) openness principle; (7) individual participation principle;
and (8) accountability principle).
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to a facility or service.' 2 When an RFID system makes it possible to link
non-personal data to an identified individual, the system uses personal
data.'O3 For example, RFID systems used in supply-chain systems may
store a unique number on an RFID chip attached to a box of product in
order to identify it and track it. This system does not use personal data
because none of the data used is about an individual person. But if the
unique number stored on the RFID chip is collected or processed to en-
able association of the number with an individual person, then it can
become personal data.'O Furthermore, access to information on a RFID
tag may reveal information about the person carrying an object with an
RFID tag even if no personal information is stored on the tag, and some-
times this information can be quite sensitive. For example, it could be
inferred that a person carrying a specific medication, identified through
an RFID tag on the container in which the medicine is stored, has an as-
sociated medical condition.'05 In the context of a mobile phone, assume
an RFID tag built into the phone contains typical electronic product code
information, such as the identity of the manufacturer of the phone, the
type of product (e.g., model number), and a unique serial number for the
phone.' °6 If the RFID tag is read by a third person like a marketer, it will
reveal that a person is carrying a Samsung mobile phone of a certain
model and with a certain serial number, but it does not contain person-
ally-identifying information. On the other hand, when the marketer
accesses a database that links the phone's serial number to its purchaser
(e.g., information such as the credit card details of the phone's purchaser
or the name of the purchaser in a warranty registration database), then
the RFID data has become personal data.' 7
B. Eavesdropping and Skimming
The wireless nature of RFID technology presents a security risk for
consumers because they may be unaware that their personal information
102. OECD Report on RFID, supra note 16, at 38-39, 42.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 38.
106. Id. Please note that the mobile phone example is the author's own hypothetical
based on the OECD's discussion of the standard types of data anticipated to be included on
RFID-tags on consumer devices.
107. The OECD Report discusses a grey area that relates to the possibility that the col-
lection of a unique set of data, included in one or several different RFID tags, which could be
related to a specific individual, makes the information personal data within the scope of E.U.
data protection laws. Id. at 42. Industry representatives have challenged this interpretation and
take the position that "data protection frameworks should apply only in cases where data proc-
essed through the use of RFID technology either contains personally identifiable information
such as name, account or registration number or is combined with other personal data (e.g.,
personal data stored in a database or smart card)." Id.
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has been stolen through skimming or eavesdropping. 8 Skimming de-
scribes a situation in which someone with an unauthorized RFID-reader
uses it to obtain information from an RFID chip in a mobile phone with-
out the mobile phone user's knowledge or consent.' ° Eavesdropping
occurs when an "unauthorized individual intercepts data as it is read by
an authorized RFID-reader or transponder.""0
For a mobile phone user with an RFID-enabled phone, the privacy
risks of eavesdropping and skimming occur because her phone has been
equipped with an RFID tag that contains a memory chip that can store
personal and other data and which can be read to reveal their contents.
RFID readers in the consumer's environment are able to initiate contact
with RFID tags in mobile phones as long as the tag is within the reading
distance of the RFID system.' Generally speaking, the distance neces-
sary to read RFID tags was initially thought to be only a few inches, but
tests have shown that RFID tags can be read from thirty to seventy feet
away in some instances."2 "In the absence of effective security tech-
niques, RFID tags are remotely and secretly readable.""' Although the
"creation of a small, easily portable RFID reader may be complex and
expensive now, it will be easier as time passes," thus increasing the risk
of skimming and eavesdropping."4
C. Spamming
A third privacy concern is the likelihood that unsolicited advertising
will increasingly be received on consumers' mobile phones, thus intrud-
ing on consumers' personal space and time in both public and private
spheres. M-ads may become as ubiquitous as unwanted spam in the
email environment but are likely to be more bothersome given that
108. See S.B. 293: Electronic Communications Devices: Hearing on S.B. 293 Before the
S. Judiciary Comm., 25th Legis., 2008 Sess. 3 (Alaska 2008), available at http://epic.org/
privacy/rfid/ngotest_031708.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Testimony on AK RFID Bill] (prepared
testimony and statement of Melissa Ngo, Senior Counsel and Dir., EPIC Identification &
Surveillance Project).
109. Id. (defining the term "skimming" in the context of skimming RFID-chipped items
such as identity or bank cards).
110. Id.
Ill. Id. The RFID-reader in the consumer's phone also can initiate contact with RFID
tags in the consumer's environment, such as tags embedded in smart posters or product pack-
aging, but for simplicity's sake in analyzing the privacy risks to the consumer, this detail is not
discussed here.
112. Id. (referencing tests by the Department of Homeland Security in 2005). See also
Ari Juels, The Vision of Secure RFID, 95 PROC. OF THE IEEE 1507, 1507 (2007) (commenting
that "certain types of inexpensive RFID tags (with no embedded power source) are subject to
reading at a distance of tens of feet.").
113. EPIC Testimony on AK RFID Bill, supra note 108, at 3.
114. Id.
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consumers are likely to have their phones turned on and with them
nearly all the time."5 The precise question addressed here is "Is having
an RFID-enabled phone for the purpose of using it to receive location-
based services likely to expose consumers to more spam?"' 16 There are
two basic reasons that consumers have a higher risk of receiving in-
creased spam on their mobile phones by virtue of having an
RFID-enabled mobile phone. First, when the consumer uses his phone to
receive location-based services, advertisers have the opportunity to send
consumers advertising along with the service or information the con-
sumer is seeking. The m-ads could accompany directions or a map that
the consumer requests, and to the extent the consumer gives consent to
receive the service, it may be argued he is also impliedly consenting to
receipt of the advertising and, therefore, it is not spam."' But while the
consumer has his phone turned on to use his phone's reader, he may also
receive spam from other advertisers to whom he has not given consent,
such as a text message from another advertiser that has an RFID-reader
nearby and has detected the mobile phone user's presence by reading the
RFID tag in his phone. To generate a spam message, the other advertiser
would also need access to enough personally-identifying information
about the phone user in order to send the m-ad without any action on the
part of the phone user. If the mobile phone user's RFID-tag includes his
mobile phone number or if it simply includes a unique identifying num-
ber that can be used to access a database containing his mobile phone
number, the rival advertiser will be able to send an m-ad to the mobile
phone user."'
115. See Holson, supra note 33 (reporting on the increase in mobile spam and efforts by
telecommunications carriers and companies producing spam detecting software to detect and
block mobile spam).
116. See supra Exhibit A.
117. See infra Part VII for a discussion of the legal regulations on sending span mes-
sages in the United States and European Union, including requirements to obtain consent to
send mobile advertising.
118. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Truth About Cell Phones and the Do
Not Call Registry: Despite Re-Circulating E-mail, It Is Still Not Necessary to Register Cell
Phone Numbers (June 21, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/06/
dnccellphones.shtm. The National Do Not Call Registry accepts registrations from both cell
phones and land lines. See King, supra note 27, at 276. In the United States, there is no federal
law that precludes mobile carriers from disclosing consumers' mobile phone numbers for the
creation of directories; however, there are no official mobile phone directories published by
telephone companies. Id. at 326. Furthermore, it is generally lawful for unofficial directories
to be created by data banks or by businesses for the purpose of delivering m-ads. Id. However,
there are unofficial directories of cell phone numbers. See, e.g., Cell Phone Numbers, Cell-
PhoneNumbers.com, http://www.cellphonenumbers.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (reporting
on the best cell phone directory sites, which include ReverseMobile.com, Reverse Phone De-
tective, PhoneNumberScan.com). Most of these directories provide the names of people who
are associated with a telephone number (reverse cell phone directories). Id. However, in Janu-
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Second, the risk that the user of an RIFD-equipped mobile phone
may inadvertently download adware or spyware is a more significant
privacy concern." 9 Having an RFID-reader in a mobile phone creates a
new way for adware and spyware to be downloaded to a phone.'20 Con-
sider a scenario in which a mobile phone user uses their RFID-reader to
access a smart poster in order to obtain a travel guide for a city that she
is visiting. Along with downloading the top ten sights to see in Paris, a
software program is downloaded to the user's phone that will generate
m-advertising, such as pop-up ads for local stores or restaurants. Or per-
haps the downloaded software is actually designed to communicate the
user's mobile phone number to an advertiser so that it can send m-ads as
text or multi-media messages. Once adware or spyware software is
stored in the memory of a mobile phone, it can be used to deliver adver-
tising on the mobile phone and engage in other privacy-invasive behavior
(such as communicating the user's contact list or passwords stored on
the phone to an outside party without notice or consent) in ways that are
analogous to the risks of adware and spyware downloads from the Inter-
net to desktop or laptop computers.'2'
D. Tracking
If the information stored on an RFID-tagged consumer item is
unique to the particular item, it can be used to distinguish the person car-
rying the item from all other persons and thus be used to track the person
carrying the RFID-tagged item.'22 "Tracking is enabled by the collection
or processing of location and time data and can be performed either after
ary 2008, an online cell phone directory was launched by a company listing 90 million cell
phone numbers of U.S. subscribers, made available for a fee, without first obtaining the con-
sent of subscribers to include their numbers in the directory and reportedly making it very
difficult for subscribers to "opt-out" of having their phone numbers made available through
the site. See Alex Johnson, Cell Phone Directory Rings Alarm Bells, MSNBC.coM (Jan. 30,
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22902400/. After only a few days, the company discon-
tinued this online directory of cell phone numbers, reportedly after receiving complaints from
consumers and Verizon Wireless. See Peter Svensson, Database Company Intelius Shuts Down
Cell-phone Directory After Consumer Complaints, NWI.coM, Feb. 6, 2008, http://
nwitimes.com/articles/2008/02/06/business/business/doce3e5fa64e896806b862573e5007c2 10
f.txt.
119. For a discussion of the legal restrictions on deploying spyware and adware in the
United States and the European Union, see infra Part VI.
120. See Garrie & Wong, supra note 31, at 481 (discussing the need to broaden the term
"parasiteware" to include unauthorized forms of spyware that accompany cell-phone applica-
tions).
121. Id.
122. OECD Report on RFID, supra note 16, at 39 ("[Tlracking people is possible if they
carry or wear objects that include RFID tags.").
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the fact with data already stored in a database, or in real time."'2 3 It is
important to consider the privacy implications regarding the uses by con-
sumers of RFID-tagged mobile phones that could enable others to track
and distinguish users through an RFID-enabled mobile phone.
After-the-fact tracking can be produced by RFID systems by bring-
ing together location, time and other information, which has been
previously stored in one or more databases, a process that has been
called production of "digital footprints.' 24 For example, initial tracking
of an RFID-tagged ticket of an identified or unidentified sporting fan for
access control to a sporting event could be followed by later processing
to reveal information about the participant's activities and behavior at
that event, such as which concessions he purchased. In contrast, real-
time tracking using RFID-tags enables the tracker to distinguish an indi-
vidual in a group and to monitor his behavior while it is occurring, even
when the tracker does not know the person's identity.'25 To do so, the
monitor needs to provide the individuals with functional tags (not
blocked or deactivated) that can later be read and to place readers at ap-
propriate locations, taking into consideration the operation ranges of
RFID technologies.'
2 6
The interoperability of the RFID tags is also relevant to tracking.
This issue relates to whether parties other than the party that originally
supplied the RFID-tagged item are able to read the tag.'27 The OECD has
limited its discussion of tracking using RFID by expressly excluding the
privacy implications of open infrastructure that could be used for
tracking objects and people.128 However, the emerging context of
RFID-enabled phones in RFID-embedded environments, as illustrated
by ongoing consumer trials of RFID-enabled phones, will force this dis-
cussion. The BART RFID trial demonstrates the efforts of industry
groups like Near Field Communication Forum to develop technology
that will permit interoperability of RFID-tagged items and systems.1
29
123. Id. at 40. Tracking individuals is possible even though no personal data are stored in
an RFID tag carried by the individual. Personal information about the individual may be ob-
tained thereafter when the person uses his or her credit card, bank card, shopper card, etc. The
"link between the unique RFID number of the tag and a person's identity needs to be made
only once for the card to serve as a proxy for the person thereafter." Albrecht, supra note 7, at
75.





129. See discussion of the BART RFID Trial, supra Part III.
When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped
E. Profiling
Profiling is "a computerized method involving data mining from
data warehouses, which makes it possible, or should make it possible, to
place individuals, with a certain degree of probability, and hence with a
certain induced error rate, in a particular category in order to take indi-
vidual decisions relating to them."3° Sophisticated machine profiling by
businesses engaged in customer relationship management (CRM) is de-
signed to gather "relevant data about as many (potential) customers as
possible as part of marketing and sales strategies [in order to use that
data to try to determine] which customers may be persuaded to become
their new customers under what conditions."'' The delivery of LBS and
m-advertising are applications of personalized marketing and CRM that
focus on delivering location and time relevant services and advertising to
customers and potential customers. To the extent that delivery of LBS
and m-advertising uses automated profiling in this process, it needs to be
analyzed for its impact on consumer privacy.
Profiling is accomplished by machines that are "software programs
trained to recover unexpected correlations in masses of data aggregated
in large databases."'32 The profiling process does not merely query the
database to find data that is already known to be there, such as the sum
of attributes already recorded in the database; rather it attempts to "dis-
cover knowledge" that was not already known to be in the data. 3 3 The
130. Dinant et al., supra note 13, at 5.
131. Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 2 (alteration in original). See also Dinant et al., supra
note 13, at 9-10 (discussing applications of data mining for personalized marketing and cus-
tomer relationship management and marketing).
132. Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 5.
133. Id. According to Hildebrandt:
Automated profiling can be described as the process of knowledge discovery in da-
tabases (KDD), of which data mining (DM; using mathematical techniques to
detect relevant patterns), is a part. KDD is generally thought to consist of a number
of steps:
(1) recording of data
(2) aggregation & tracking of data
(3) identification of patterns in data (DM)
(4) interpretation of outcome
(5) monitoring data to check the outcome (testing)
(6) applying the profiles
Id. (citations omitted). This type of profiling is new in two ways: it is produced by machines
and it differs from classical empirical statistics because it results from a hypothesis that
emerges in the process of data mining that is then tested on the population rather than a
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major privacy concern regarding profiling used for CRM purposes, such
as facilitating targeted marketing to support delivery of LBS and m-
advertising, is that it may result in "asymmetry of access to knowledge"
between customers and marketers.' - The harm from this asymmetry of
knowledge is that a customer who is "unaware of the profiles that are
applied to her ... may be induced to act in ways she would not have
chosen otherwise."'' 5 Mireille Hildebrandt gives the example of a person
whose online behavior is profiled and matched with a group profile that
predicts that the chance that she is a smoker on the verge of quitting is
67 percent. 36 A second profile also predicts that if she is offered free
cigarettes together with her online groceries and receives news items
about the reduction of dementia in the case of smoking, she has an 80
percent chance of not quitting.' 37 If a tobacco company generates the pro-
files described above for marketing purposes, the customer's behavior
may be influenced, thereby inducing her to purchase cigarettes, yet she
will be unaware of the group profiles used to target her as a potential
customer by the marketer. From a privacy analysis, the customer cannot
exercise her personal autonomy to the extent that she is unaware of the
knowledge produced and used by the profiling practices of the mar-
keter.' 8 Protection of her privacy interest in this regard calls for
providing a regulatory mechanism that will protect her autonomy in the
sense of enabling her to gain access to the knowledge profiles that are
being used by marketers to select her for particular types of ads and
promotions. ' 9 Presumably, if she has the same information as the mar-
keters about the knowledge profiles she falls in, she may choose to
exercise her autonomy and change her behavior, such as resisting the
sample. Id. at 6. An advantage of KDD is that it can "trace and track correlations in an ever-
growing mass of retained data and confront us with inferences drawn from past behavior that
would otherwise be lost to oblivion." Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 9. A second privacy concern is the risk of unfair discrimination based on re-
fined profiling technologies that allow sophisticated market discrimination, such as price
discrimination between groups of customers that is based on undisclosed group profiles. Id. at
10. While price discrimination "may be a good thing in a market economy ... fairness again
depends on consumers' awareness of the way they are categorized." Id.
135. Id. at9.
136. ld. at 9-10.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10-12, 15-17 (arguing for regulation that creates a privacy right to access, in
real-time, knowledge profiles being applied to people; including the potential consequences,
in order to protect personal autonomy). Hildebrandt argues that Transparency-Enhancing
Technologies (TETs), as well as Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs), need to be provided
with respect to the use of the smart technologies that enable Ambient Intelligent (AmI) Envi-
ronments, and she lists sensor technologies, RFID systems, nanotechnology and
miniaturization as the enabling technologies. Id. at 7, 15-17. The use of Transparency-
Enhancing Technologies to protect privacy is discussed infra Part V.A.
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free cigarettes or seeking treatment to stop-smoking. The important
benefit of making the profiles transparent to the customer is that she is
then empowered to acquire knowledge of the profiles and this awareness
will enable her to avoid being unfairly manipulated.
However, automated profiling does not always utilize personally-
identifying data about individuals. To the extent that profiling processes
use personally-identifying information about individuals, the data pro-
tection concerns discussed earlier in this section are applicable.
40
However, when profiling is based on anonymous data or the application
of group profiles to an anonymous person, the process does not necessar-
ily involve processing personal data.'4' To the extent that profiling
practices do not collect or make use of personally identifying informa-
tion about the individuals profiled, existing data protection laws may not
140. See supra Part IV.A. See also Dinant et al., supra note 13, at 12-14 (discussing
application of Article 15 of the European Union's Data Protection Directive to render the
making of automated decisions about individuals a data protection violation in some circum-
stances). However, the European Union's Data Protection Directive's applicability depends on
all four of the following conditions being met:
-a decision must have been taken;
-this decision must have legal effects in respect of a person or affect him/her sig-
nificantly;
-the decision must have been taken solely on the basis of automated data process-
ing; [and]
-the data processed must be designed to evaluate certain personal aspects of the in-
dividual affected by the decision.
Id. at 14. The CRID Profiling Study comments that sending a brochure to a list of people se-
lected on the basis of automated processing cannot be considered as significantly affecting the
person within the meaning of Article 15, but
[O]ther types of advertising used in cybermarketing seem more problematical, par-
ticularly when they involve unfair discrimination based on an analysis of
clickstream data (for example, a person visiting a Web site who is offered goods or
services at a higher price than others, or a person who is refused the opportunity to
purchase goods or services that are available to others).
Id. at 13-14. The CRID Profiling Study discusses the possibility that Article 15 "could cover
the development of a profile derived from data which are not necessarily and directly personal
within the meaning of the relevant legislation," since Article 15 regulates a type of decision
(automated decisions) and not just the processing of personal data, providing the other condi-
tions are met. Id. at 14.
141. Data protection law only protects personal data of identifiable persons, while most
profiling is done on the basis of anonymized data to which the legislation does not apply. Wim
Schreurs et al., Legal Issues: Report on the Actual and Possible Profiling Techniques in the
Field of Ambient Intelligence, FIDIS DELIVERABLE 7.3, 48-49 (2005) (on file with author),
available at www.fidis.net. In the same way, the application of a group profile to an anony-
mous person does not fall within the scope of data protection legislation, although it may have
substantial consequences for this person. Id.
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apply.'42 Thus, these business practices mainly give rise to broader con-
cerns of personal privacy, rather than data protection concerns.
The advent of RFID-enabled phones to be used by consumers in
RFID-embedded environments designed for LBS and m-advertising pur-
poses will generate a great deal of data about consumers' locations,
purchasing habits and other details of their daily lives. This will fuel
automatic profiling systems designed to produce knowledge about con-
sumers for marketing purposes. The consumer data generated from this
new context can be collected and stored as anonymous data in data
warehouses that also store data collected from other sources. Data min-
ing would then be applied to the data in the warehouse to identify
correlations between groups of consumers and to produce group profiles
to be used for marketing purposes. Ultimately, a particular consumer
would be included in a group profile and the particular ads, promotions
and other communications he receives would be based on this classifica-
tion. Yet, without disclosure of the profiles that are being applied to the
consumer, the consumer would not know why he is not treated the same
as consumers in other classifications that, for example, may receive more
favorable promotional opportunities from a marketer.
V. SELF-REGULATORY TOOLS TO PROTECT PRIVACY
AND PERSONAL DATA
Technologies to enhance privacy and the use of protective privacy
policies are two of the key self-regulatory tools aimed at protecting con-
sumers' privacy and personal data. Both will be explored in this section.
A. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) encompass "technical and
organizational concepts" that aim to protect a consumer's identity and
often involve encryption in the form of "digital signatures, blind signa-
tures or digital pseudonyms.' 43 The advantage of PETs is that they may
offer those in mobile commerce anonymity and enable the consumer to
participate without revealing his or her identity or otherwise providing
142. Use of anonymous data for profiling purposes may satisfy data protection rights
under Council of Europe Convention 108 and the Data Protection Directive, but it does not
eliminate the individual's privacy rights under Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Dinant et al., supra note 13,
at 30-31. See also Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 12-14 (discussing applications of profiling
to customer relationship management and marketing).
143. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW I, 624 (2d ed. 2006) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
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personally identifying information (PII).'" A second potential techno-
logical solution, Platform for Privacy Preferences ("P3P"), has also been
proposed to protect consumer privacy in e-commerce.'4 P3P is software
designed to monitor Web site privacy policies. It enables consumers to
communicate their privacy preferences before the Web sites they visit are
able to collect their PII. Then, consumers are able to make choices about
whether to visit the Web sites and, if so, to provide their P1. 46 P3P is
currently underutilized "due to a lack of significant customer and indus-
try buy-in.' ' 47 Although P3P was designed for traditional e-commerce,
P3P could become an effective tool to help consumers exercise choices
related to privacy policies associated with m-advertising. But first, the
technology would need to be made compatible with the mobile environ-
ment.'
41
Making a distinction between Transparency Enhancing Technologies
(TETs) and the broader concept of PETs helps focus consumer privacy
discussions related to AmI technologies on the question of whether it is
transparency, rather than anonymity, that consumers most need in the
context of emerging uses of RFID systems and other AmI technolo-
gies. '49 For example, when customer relationship management use
computer profiling to provide targeted services to customers, Mireille
Hildebrandt argues that providing adequate transparency means giving
consumers access to the profiles that are being applied to them so that
they have the opportunity to assess the impact of profiling on their
lives.' 50 Furthermore, because RFID systems produce "an immense
144. Id. For example, privacy-enhancing location-based services (LBS) for conventional
deployment (which typically involves a mobile operator and a LBS service application pro-
vider) have been proposed to give users more control over their personal data. See Eleni Kosta
et al., Legal Considerations on Privacy-Enhancing Location Based Services Using PRIME
Technology, 24 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 139, 139-46 (2008). Privacy-enhancing LBS sys-
tems using a PRIME toolbox enhance the privacy of users by involving an intermediary that
decouples the mobile operator and the LBS service application provider, thus allowing mobile
users to receive LBS without unnecessarily disclosing their identities or unnecessarily giving
access to personal data that could be used to create excessive consumer profiles. Id.
145. SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 143, at 642. See also Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 97.
146. Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 97.
147. Id.
148. Evelyne Beatix Cleff, Implementing the Legal Criteria of Meaningful Consent in
the Concept of Mobile Advertising, 3 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 262, 267-68 (2007) (report-
ing on a project called Privacy in Mobile Intemet (PIMI) that has the objective of developing
an advising privacy platform for small displays like those found on mobile phones).
149. Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 16-17. See generally PROFILING THE EUROPEAN
CITIZEN, CROSS-DIsCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds.,
Springer 2008).
150. Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 2-3, 9-11, 12-13, 17 (providing an example of the
types of profiles that could be applied by a tobacco company to target customers likely to
engage in purchasing behavior that is profitable to the company and explaining why consum-
ers need access to information about the profiles being applied to them in contexts like this).
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amount of data about (change of) location and if linked to other data they
provide a rich resource for profiling practices," there is a special need for
TETs in RFID applications.' While PETs that are designed to protect
consumer privacy will naturally focus on hiding data and on the use of
pseudonyms that will enable consumers to be anonymous in the presence
of RFID technologies, these types of technological protections for pri-
vacy will not be adequate to minimize the privacy risks associated with
autonomic profiling because consumers will need more than just the
ability to avoid identification.'52 Instead, what consumers need to protect
their privacy in a world of autonomic computing is access to the profiles
that are used with respect to them, which means that effective TETs must
be put into place.5 3 In this regard, Mireille Hildebrandt argues that the
present generation of data protection laws fail as privacy regulation
largely because they do not address the real privacy issue, which is the
generation of highly sophisticated group profiles that are applied in ways
that significantly impact the privacy of those profiled:
To counter the threats of autonomic profiling citizens will need
more than the possibility of opting out, they will need effective
transparency enhancing tools (TETs) that render accessible and
assessable the profiles that may affect their life .... [W]e ur-
gently need to develop transparency-enhancing tools to match
the proactive dimension of our smart environments. This will re-
quire substantial cooperation between social scientists, computer
engineers, lawyers and policy makers with a clear understanding
of what is at stake in terms of democracy and the rules of law.' 4
B. Privacy Policies
Privacy policies are statements of fair information practices that in-
dividual companies or an industry association of companies have
promised to follow for the collection, processing, and distribution of in-
dividuals' personally identifying information.'55 In other words, privacy
policies give notice or disclose an organization's privacy practices to in-
dividuals who are on the receiving end of m-advertising. The extent to
which a company-specific privacy policy complies with fair information
principles advocated or adopted by various organizations is a measure of
151. Id. at 15-17.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 17.
155. Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 68.
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how well that policy is designed to protect the personal data and privacy
of individuals.
There is a growing consensus among privacy experts that complex
privacy policies contained in a single document are not an effective way
to communicate with consumers about the fair information processing
practices of a business. 1 6 Instead, privacy policies that feature more than
one layer of consumer notices, from short notice forms to longer notice
forms, are generally viewed as more effective methods to communicate
privacy policies. 57 According to privacy experts, whether the notice is
provided online or in paper form, a short initial privacy notice should be
provided to the consumer that discloses:
(1) Who is covered by the privacy notice (i.e., who is the respon-
sible person or entity);
(2) The types of information collected directly from the individ-
ual and from others about the individual;
(3) Uses or purposes for the data processing;
(4) The types of entities that may receive the information (if it is
shared);
(5) Information on choices available to the individual to limit the
use and/or exercise of any access or other rights, and how to
exercise those rights; and
(6) How to contact the data collector for more information and
how to complain (to the collector and to an independent over-.\ 158
sight body, if appropriate).
In determining whether a privacy policy conveys appropriate notice
of a company's privacy practices, it is important to look at the nature of
the medium on which the privacy policy and disclosures about the policy
156. See id. at 101 (arguing the "future of electronic privacy policies lies in a multilay-
ered notice format rather than one long and complex document."). See also CTR. FOR
INFORMATION POLICY LEADERSHIP, TEN STEPS TO DEVELOP A MULTILAYERED PRIVACY No-
TICE 1-9 (Mar. 2007), http://www.hunton.com/files/tbls47Details %5CFileUpload265%
5CI405%5CTenSteps-whitepaper.pdf; Martin Abrams et al., Memorandum, Berlin Privacy
Notices (Apr. 2004), http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl-s47Details/FileUpload265/68 1[Berlin_
WorkshopMemorandum_4.04.pdf.
157. See references cited id.
158. See Abrams et al., supra note 156 (commenting that "[wihile notices will be differ-
ent from organization to organization and from sector to sector, similarity in format will
facilitate individual knowledge and choices."). Focus group research related to U.S. consumers
has shown that consumers prefer boxes with bold headings. Id. Also, in comparison to the
short notices that are the initial notices contemplated under this multilayered privacy ap-
proach, the additional completed notices would include all the details required by relevant
laws. Id.
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are made and on which the consumer will convey her consent. Currently,
the viewing screen on most mobile phones is very small. Although some
screens are getting larger, they are likely to remain very small compared
to the screen on a desktop or laptop computer. The possibility of using
multilayered privacy policies, as opposed to a comprehensive stand-
alone privacy policy, is especially relevant in this discussion of obtaining
appropriate consent for m-advertising.'59
Industry associations of global businesses involved in m-advertising
are proposing model privacy policies for their members to address pri-
vacy and data protection concerns of m-advertising and location-based
services. In some cases, when the industry focuses on applications of
RFID technologies, these policies may also address specific privacy is-
sues related to their members' use of RFID technologies. A leading
industry association in mobile advertising, the Mobile Marketing Asso-
ciation ("MMA"), promotes the adoption of a Code of Conduct for
industry members that will include m-advertisers.'6 The MMAs mem-
bers include the full range of companies focused on the potential of
marketing via mobile devices, such as advertisers, handheld device
manufacturers, and telecommunications carriers and operators, as well as
retailers, software providers, and service providers.' 6' The MMA's Code
of Conduct is based on five categories: Notice, Choice & Consent, Cus-
tomization & Constraint, Security and Enforcement & Accountability.
62
159. See Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 101. Models for short privacy notices that could
be delivered on the screen of a mobile phone have been proposed, including one proposal that
would provide only four lines of disclosure-it would simply notify the mobile phone user
that: (I) the company has a privacy policy, (2) "We collect your information to market to you
and to service your account," (3) "You may tell us not to do so," and (4) "View our complete
privacy policy by calling [telephone number] or at [Web site address]." Id. at 102, rig 1. See
also DMA Policy Generators, DIRECT MKTG. Ass'N, http://www.the-dma.org/privacy/
privacypolicygenerator.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
160. See About the MMA, MOBILE MARKETING AssociATION, http://mmaglobal.coml
(last visited Jan. 4, 2009). The MMA is headquartered in the United States and has "400
members representing over twenty countries," Its members include "agencies, advertisers,
hand held device manufacturers, carriers and operators, retailers, software providers and ser-
vice providers, as well as any company focused on the potential of marketing via mobile
devices"). Id. See also The Internet of Things, supra note 1, at 93 (describing proactive ap-
proaches of industry associations and individual companies to protect mobile users from the
annoyance of unsolicited messages). The MMA defines mobile marketing as "the use of wire-
less media as an integrated content delivery and direct response vehicle within a cross-media
marketing communications program." Laura Marriott, Mobile Marketing: Back to the Basics,
CLICKZ, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3623954. Mobile is
viewed as one of many media channels to be integrated with other traditional and digital me-
dia elements such as print, on-pack, TV, and radio. Id.
161. See About the MMA, supra note 160.
162. See Code of Conduct for Mobile Marketing, MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION,
http://mmaglobal.com/modules/content/index.php?id=5 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
MMA Code of Conduct].
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This code is an exercise of industry self-regulation that has a highly pro-
consumer privacy aim:
The Code provides consumers with the ability to opt-in and opt-
out of receiving mobile marketing; it allows them to set limits on
the type of messages received, based on their own preferences.
To improve relationships between mobile operators and adver-
tisers, the code compels its members to provide information of
perceived value to the customer, to use analytical segmentation
tools to optimize message volume and to align their privacy
policies.1
61
On a regional level, the Federation of European Direct Marketing
(FEDMA) has also adopted a code of conduct for its members.'
64
Other industry associations may also play a role in establishing fair
information practices for mobile commerce and mobile advertising to
the extent that the associations adopt codes of conduct or privacy poli-
cies that their members commit to follow either directly or indirectly, by
adopting company-specific policies that are consistent with the industry
association's code. For example, the Global System for Mobile Commu-
nications Association ("GSMA") is a global trade association
representing hundreds of mobile phone operators (mobile carriers) and
mobile phone manufacturers. 65 GSMA adopted a "Mobile Spam Code of
Practice" ("Spam Code") to protect the secure and trusted environment
of mobile services by ensuring that "customers receive minimal amounts
of spain sent via SMS and MMS" (mobile message service or instant
messaging).' 66 The Spam Code only addresses mobile spam and does not
purport to set fair information practices generally applicable to the col-
lection, use, or disclosure of consumers' P11. In addition, the Spam Code
is only mandatory for those members who have signed it.' 67 However, in
the context of mobile spam, it does require member operators who are
163. The Internet of Things, supra note I, at 93.
164. The European Commission recently issued Communication on Data Protection and
notes that its Article 29 Working Party approved policy was established by FEDMA and char-
acterizes it as an important milestone in self-regulation. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Follow-Up of the Work Pro-
gramme for Better Implementation of the Data Protection Directive, COM (2007) 5 final,
(Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/
com_2007_87_f3en.pdf [hereinafter EC Communication on Data Protection].
165. About GSM Association, GSM WORLD, http://www.gsmworld.conabout-us/
index.htm 9 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
166. GSM Association Mobile Spam Code of Practice, GSM WORLD, (Feb. 2006),
http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/mobile-spam.pdf. This code "takes a firm stance on
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signatories to the agreement to "[p]rovide a mechanism that ensures ap-
propriate customer consent and effective customer control with respect
to mobile operators' own marketing communications." '6'
The Near Field Communication Forum ("NFC") is another industry
association poised to play an important role in establishing fair informa-
tion practices for mobile advertising. The NFC represents companies
around the globe that are involved in near field communications tech-
nologies, and its members include mobile phone manufacturers and
mobile carriers.'69 The incorporation of RFID technologies into cell
phones and other mobile communications devices is an example of the
type of privacy-implicating technologies that the NFC Forum will ad-
dress.'7° Of all the industry associations engaged in examining how
consumer privacy impacts their business practices, the NFC Forum is the
one best situated to address the privacy issues related to the use of RFID-
enabled phones for delivery of LBS and mobile advertising. This is be-
cause its members represent all of the kinds of businesses that will be
involved in using RFID technologies for LBS and mobile advertising
purposes, including global telecommunications carriers, application pro-
viders and mobile handset manufacturers.' 7 Yet, as demonstrated by the
large number of businesses that are working together in the BART RFID
Trial, it will likely be very difficult for its members to agree on an indus-
try privacy code to protect consumers, even without considering the
global nature of its membership that often operates under different regu-
latory frameworks. The NFC's Privacy Advisory Council has not
adopted a privacy code of conduct for its members and has not an-
nounced a plan to adopt such a code, although it has said it is planning to
issue a position paper that addresses policies for the protection of pri-
vacy when using NFC technology as well as a checklist to ensure
interested parties are aware of each of the privacy tenets. 172
168. Id.
169. See Near Field Communication (NFC) Forum, http://nfc-forum.org/home (last
visited Jan. 4, 2009) (describing the NFC Forum as a global "non-profit industry association
that promotes the use of NFC short-range wireless interaction in consumer electronics, mobile
devices and PCs.").
170. See Near Field Communication (NFC) Forum, Near Field Communication White
Paper, Near Field Communication and the NFC Forum: The Keys to Truly Interoperable
Communications, NFC FORUM (2006), http://www.nfc-forum.orglresources/white-papers/
nfc-forum.marketi ng-whitepaper.pdf.
171. See Near Field Communication (NFC) Forum, http://www.nfc-forum.org/
membercompanies/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (discussing membership of the NFC Forum).
See also discussion of focus on NFC technologies in the BART RFID Trial, supra notes 67,
71.
172. See Near Field Communication (NFC) Forum, Committees and Working Groups,
http://www.nfc-forum.org/aboutus/committees andwgs#pac (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). In
contexts that do not address the use of RFID in mobile phone handsets or embedding con-
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Although much work has been done to define principles of fair in-
formation practices by industry associations and by governmental
organizations that could serve as models for company-specific privacy
and data protection policies, there is a gap between the theory and how
to practically implement the theory to provide fair information practices
for consumers."3 Criticism of company-specific policies include argu-
ments, some supported by empirical studies, that privacy policies are not
read or understood by consumers and fail to provide meaningful con-
sumer protections for PI, but consumers assume that such policies do
protect their privacy and personal data. Critics also argue that compa-
nies recognize that consumers do not read or understand paper or
electronic privacy policies. 7 1 Consequently, some companies take advan-
tage of consumers' failure to read or understand their privacy policies by
failing to make any real promises of fair information practices in their
policies or by including privacy disclaimers that enable the companies to
do as they will with consumers' PII, even to the point of selling consum-
ers' personal data to third parties.'76 To the extent these policies are
purely voluntary, self-regulatory efforts by companies or industry asso-
ciations-meaning that the policies are not tools to communicate
legally-required standards, or there is no effective government
sumer environments with RFID technologies for the delivery of LBS and mobile advertising,
some industry codes and nonprofit organizations have issued guidelines to address privacy
issues related to RFID. See, e.g., European Policy Outlook RFID, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF
ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY, 30 (2007), http://www.nextgenerationmedia.de/documents/
EuropeanPolicyOutlook-finalversion.pdf (reporting that EPC global has issued binding
guidelines for all its members that requires labeling of products containing RFID, extensive
consumer information and the possibility to deactivate RFID tags at the points of sale; major
retailers in the United Kingdom have agreed upon a code of conduct for the implementation of
RFID in the retail sector; and the International Chamber of Commerce and the United States'
Center for Democracy and Technology have created guidelines for the application of RFID in
the area of the end consumer). See also Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology,
EPIC (2004), http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfid-gdlnes-070904.pdf [hereinafter EPIC's Guide-
lines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology].
173. See, e.g., Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control
Over Personal Information?, II I PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 610-11 (2007) (arguing that online
privacy policies have become ubiquitous but have not resulted in real privacy protection for
consumers and that "[w]e now have ten years of experience with privacy self-regulation
online, and the evidence points to a sustained failure of business to provide reasonable privacy
protections.") (internal quotations omitted). See also references for privacy guidelines de-
signed to address the use of RFID technologies, id.
174. See id. at 611 (reporting on a survey that found 75 percent of consumers believed
their information could not be sold just because a Web site has a privacy policy and another
survey that found 57 percent believed that the mere presence of a privacy policy meant the
Web site could not share consumers' personal information with third parties).
175. See Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 69-70 (reporting that studies show Web site visi-
tors are not clicking, reading, or understanding privacy terms and are not basing any decision
on whether to continue on the Web site on the terms of the Web site's privacy policy).
176. See id. at 69.
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enforcement of the standards-they generally have failed to ensure fair
information practices that protect consumers.
Of course, government regulation is also an important tool to protect
consumers' privacy and data protection. This article now compares the
existing regulatory frameworks in the European Union and the United
States to examine how the law in these regions answers significant pri-
vacy and data protection questions arising from m-commerce contexts
that include RFID-equipped mobile phones, LBS, and accompanying m-
advertising.
VI. E.U. AND U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR
RFID APPLICATIONS
In both the United States and the European Union, efforts to regulate
RFID take place in a legal framework that heavily regulates providers of
mobile communications services' and generally prohibits unfair com-
mercial practices.18 The European Union's Unfair Commercial Practices
177. Under the European Union's regulatory framework, information society services
(including mobile and wireless communication services) are the responsibility of the Informa-
tion Society and Media Directorate General, one of the Directorates General that make up the
European Commission. See Information Society and Media Directorate General, European
Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/information-society/index-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009). Mobile phone devices and mobile communication services are regulated
as information society services. See Thematic Portal, Information Society and Media Direc-
torate, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/index-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009). Furthermore, regulation of e-commerce is generally addressed as regula-
tion of information society services. See, e.g., Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particu-
lar e-Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000/31/EC, pmbl. 7-8 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EU),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:178:000 1:
0016:EN:PDF [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. The E-Commerce Directive requires that
specified types of information be included in promotional offers and that required information
be clear. Id. art. 6. Advertisements, including m-ads, must be identifiable to the consumer as
commercial communications. Id. arts. 6(a), 7. It is illegal to disguise the sender's identity in a
commercial communication. See infra Part VII.B. for a discussion of the U.S. Federal Com-
munication Commission's regulatory powers over providers of mobile and wireless
communications services and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's powers to protect con-
sumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices related to advertising.
178. Council Directive 2005/29/EC, O.J. (L 149) 22 (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/1_149/I_1492005061 len00220039.pdf [hereinafter
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive]; 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(b) (2008) (providing FTC
enforcement authority that covers unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occur in or affect
interstate commerce). The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) in the United States
generally prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices. Id. § 57a(a)(l)(b). The U.S. law allows
states to adopt laws that are more protective of consumers than the federal law. See, e.g., dis-
cussion of state consumer protection laws that exceed the federal consumer protection laws
regarding restrictions of telemarketing practices. FTC, Comments of Verizon Wireless in re
Telemarketing Sales Rules Review, FTC File No. P994414, (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 16,
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Directive, which must be implemented into Member-States' laws and
allows Member-States to adopt national laws that provide additional
health and safety protections for consumers, is similar to the Federal
Trade Commission Act in the United States (FTC Act), as both laws ap-
ply to unfair and deceptive marketing practices. 79 But unlike the FTC
Act, the European Union's Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is
more specific in its definitions of prohibited business practices. Both
the U.S. and E.U. laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive commercial prac-
tices may help curb abusive marketing practices, including those of
companies that adopt privacy policies as self-regulatory tools, but then
fail to live up to those policies.'
The applicable law in the European Union and United States which
protects consumers from privacy risks related to data protection, track-
ing, spamming, skimming, eavesdropping and profiling is discussed in
the next section, including identification of gaps in the regulation. This is
followed by a comparison of the differences and similarities in the two
regulatory frameworks.
A. European Union Regulatory Framework Focuses
on Data Protection
The starting point for understanding the E.U. privacy law is a recog-
nition that privacy legislation is primarily about protecting individuals'
personal data from unauthorized processing. In the European Union, in-
dividuals have personal data protection under treaties and other
legislation.' 82 The Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) requires E.U.
2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/comments/verizon.htm [hereinafter
Verizon Comments on the TSR].
179. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(b) (2008) (providing FTC enforcement authority
that covers unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occur in or affect interstate commerce)
with Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 178, arts. 3, 11, 19.
180. See Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 178, arts. 6 (defining mis-
leading actions), 7 (defining misleading omissions), 8 (defining aggressive commercial
practices), 9 (prohibiting use of harassment, coercion and undue influence).
181. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, Gateway Learning Corp., File No. 042-
3047 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0423047/040707agree0423047.pdf, for an example of a FTC enforcement action against a
company that violated its own privacy policy. See also 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(b); Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive, supra note 178, art. 6(2)(b) (prohibiting as a misleading action
the non-compliance with commitments capable of being verified (not merely aspirational) that
have been made by a business in a code of conduct to which the business has agreed to be
bound); Ciocchetti, supra note 101, at 72-74. The situation of businesses adopting privacy
policies but failing to follow them has been identified as an example of the weakness in rely-
ing on industry self-regulation to protect consumers' privacy and personal data and the need
for government regulation. See supra notes 173-176, 180 and accompanying text.
182. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 2 (Nov.
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Member-States to adopt data protection legislation regulating the proc-
essing of personal data and the free movement of such data. 83 This
Directive expressly refers to the fundamental rights of privacy that are
contained in conventions and treaties and states the intention to regulate
the processing of personal data consistent with these fundamental
rights." In 2002, the E-Privacy Directive was adopted to regulate the
processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector,
which includes publicly-available telecommunications and Internet ser-
vices. ' The Data Protection Directive is general legislation that provides
the principles of data protection for natural persons in the European Un-
ion and it is supplemented by the more specific E-Privacy Directive that
covers the electronic communications sector.'86 While the Data Protec-
tion Directive applies to all processors of personal data, the E-Privacy
Directive applies only to publicly available electronic communications
services in public communications networks in the European Commu-
nity (hereinafter "public carriers"). 87 Therefore, data processing that uses
the services of mobile carriers and public Internet service providers is
covered by the E-Privacy Directive as well as the Data Protection Direc-
tive, but data processing by other businesses, such as m-advertising
10, 1997), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/I 1997E/htm/l 1997E.html
#0173010078 (recognizing the Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and requiring Members of the European
Union to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention). More recently, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides: "Everyone has the right to
the protection of personal data concerning him or her." Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000) [hereinafter E.U. Charter].
183. Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, art. 4.
184. Id. at pmbl. (providing that "the object of the national laws on the processing of
personal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,
which is recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law."). Privacy
as a fundamental right is also recognized in international law, but there is no specific recogni-
tion of data protection as a fundamental right similar to that found in the European Union. See,
e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
185. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EU), available at
http://mineco.fgov.be/intemet-observatory/pdfflegislation/directive-2002-58-en.pdf [herein-
after E-Privacy Directive].
186. Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Follow-Up of the Work
Programme for Better Implementation of the Data Protection Directive 2007/C 255/01, 19,
2007 O.J. (C 255), 1 (EU), available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/
mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2007/07-07-25_Dir95-46_EN.pdf [hereinaf-
ter EDPS Opinion on Data Protection]. The E-Privacy Directive harmonizes the provisions of
Member-States' laws with respect to processing personal data in the electronic communica-
tions sector. Id. art.l.
187. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185, art. 3(l).
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application providers and LBS providers that do not use the services of a
public carrier, is only covered by the Data Protection Directive.
The Data Protection Directive applies only to the processing of per-
sonal data and limits its scope by defining personal data as information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. 8 It defines the
processing of personal data broadly as "any operation or set of opera-
tions which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, . . . use, . . . dissemination, [etc]."' 89
Individuals ("data subjects") are assured certain rights with respect to
their personal data while "data controllers" are required to follow rules
and restrictions with respect to their data processing operations, includ-
ing disclosing to data subjects the identity of any data controller and the
purposes for which personal data are being collected.' 9° The Data Protec-
tion Directive includes core principles of data privacy protection that
define the rights of individual data subjects and the responsibilities of
data controllers in the context of processing personal data, regardless of
the context (consumer, employment, etc.). Pursuant to the Data Protec-
tion Directive, personal data may only be collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and may not be processed inconsistently with
those purposes (commonly referred to as the "finality principle").' 9' The
purpose of the processing itself must be legitimate ("legitimacy princi-
ple"),' 92 and the data subject must be fully informed on the details of the
processing, including who has access to the data, how it is stored and
how the subject can review it ("transparency principle").' 93 The "propor-
tionality principle" requires that personal data be adequate, relevant and
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is collected and fur-
ther processed.' 94 As a direct and mandatory result of the Data Protection
Directive, there are national data protection laws in the E.U. Member-
States that are administered by local data protection authorities and
188. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, art. 2(a) (including natural persons
"who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity"). But see Dinant et al., supra note 13, at 12-14 (stating that, unlike
the other provisions in the Data Protection Directive, Article 15 of this directive, which deals
with automated individual decisions, may make it unlawful to make a decision about an indi-
vidual solely on the basis of automated data processing, even when no personally-identifying
information is used in the process, if several cumulative conditions are met).
189. Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, art. 2(b) (emphasis added).
190. Id. art. 10.
191. Id. art. 6(l)(b).
192. Id. art. 7.
193. Id. art. 12.
194. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
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Member-States' data protection laws have been amended to be consistent
with the Data Protection Directive's core principles.'"
There is ongoing action by the European Commission to further im-
plement the two key E.U. regulatory instruments on data protection: the
Data Protection Directive and the E-Privacy Directive.'96 Even without
adopting proposed amendments to the E-Privacy Directive that would
explicitly mention RFID, there is little doubt that current E.U. law, in-
cluding treaties and legislation that protect individual privacy and
regulate the processing of personal data, also apply to the use of new
technologies like RFID.'97 The Article 29 Working Party ("Working
Party") recognized early on that important privacy and data protection
concerns are involved in the use of RFID technologies, as evidenced by
its issuance in 2005 of a working document on data protection issues
related to RFID technology. '9' It is clear that the existing data protection
195. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 97, at 1I; see also National Data Protec-
tion Commissioners, http://ec.europa.eu/justice homeffsj/privacy/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
196. See generally Data Protection Directive, supra note 97; E-Privacy Directive, supra
note 185. See infra notes 282-284, 290-296, and 301-304 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the European Commission's efforts to further implement these two directives.
197. In its Communication on RFID, the European Commission summarized and refer-
enced the applicable treaties that protect personal data in the European Union, including
Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union, which states that the Union is founded on prin-
ciples of liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights and freedoms, and Article 8 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which protects personal data as one of these freedoms. Com-
munication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Radio Frequency Identi-
fication (RFID) in Europe: Steps Towards a Policy Framework, at 5, COM (2007) 96 final,
(Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/rfid/doc/
rfid.en.pdf [hereinafter EC Communication on RFID]. It also confirmed that protection of
personal data is covered by the Data Protection Directive (see supra note 97), regardless of the
means and procedures used for data processing and is applicable to all technologies, including
RFID. Id. at 5-6. ("The protection of personal data is covered by the general Data Protection
Directive regardless of the means and procedures used for data processing. The Directive is
applicable to all technologies, including RFID."). The European Commission said the E-
Privacy Directive (see supra note 185) complements the Data Protection Directive, although
its applicability is limited to processing of personal data in connection with publicly available
electronic communications services in public communications networks. Id. at 6. See also EC
Communication on Data Protection, supra note 164, at 7. Describing the Data Protection Di-
rective as technologically neutral, the European Commission commented that "its rules may
continue to apply appropriately to new technologies and situations. It may be necessary,
though, to translate those general rules into particular guidelines or provisions to take account
of the specificities involved in those technologies." Id. at 7.
198. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Working Document on Data Protec-
tion Issues Related to RFID Technologies, WP 105, 10107/05/EN (Jan. 19, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-homelfsjlprivacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wpi05_en.pdf [hereinafter
2005 Art 29 Working Document]. The Article 29 Working Party is an independent European
advisory body on data protection and privacy. Id. at I. Its responsibilities are described in
Article 30 of the Data Privacy Directive and Article 15 of the E-Privacy Directive. See Data
Protection Directive, supra note 97; E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185. The Article 29
Working Party established a subgroup on RFID to analyze the concept of personal data and to
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regulatory framework applies to the utilization of RFID technologies in
Europe without needing to adopt new legislation or amend existing legis-
lation.'" However, currently there is no RFID-specific legislation in
place in the European Union and neither the Data Protection Directive
nor the E-Privacy Directive specifically addresses RFID technologies in
the context of consumer privacy and data protection.' °°
Beyond data protection laws, there are other laws in the European
Union that apply generally to some of the privacy concerns associated
with consumers using RFID-enabled mobile phones to receive mobile
advertising and LBS services.
1. Restricting Unsolicited Mobile Advertising
The E-Privacy Directive adopts the data protection principle of "opt-
in" notice and consent that requires advertisers to obtain users' consent
prior to sending unsolicited advertising messages through publicly avail-
able electronic communications services.2°' It specifically covers
telemarketing calls made by autodialing equipment and electronic
mail."" Because the definition of electronic mail in the E-Privacy Direc-
tive is broad enough to include mobile advertising sent to a consumer in
a text message, voice message, regular e-mail message accessed on the
consumer's mobile phone, e-mail delivered on the consumer's mobile
phone using a wireless Internet address, and multi-media advertising
messages delivered to the consumer's phone, it establishes a general rule
that all electronic messages are subject to the requirement that advertis-
ers must obtain the consumer's consent in advance of sending the
103message. To the extent that mobile advertising uses autodialing equip-
ment or is electronic mail sent using a public carrier, it can only be sent
to a consumer on a permissive basis, meaning the consumer must give
his consent in advance to receive advertising from the sender ("opt-in"
rule), unless covered by an exception to this rule.
There is one important exception to this rule: a person (natural or le-
gal) is allowed to send electronic communications to a consumer in order
to directly market the person's own similar products and services to the
consumer. 04 The exception only applies if all three of the following
address the question of to what extent RFIDs are covered by the Data Protection Directive.
See EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at II n.19.
199. See EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at 12-18.
200. See infra Part VII.A.2 for discussion of the RFID guidelines proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission. See infra Part VII.B. I for discussion of state law efforts to regulate RFID
in the United States.
201. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185, art 13(1).
202. Id.
203. Id. art. 2(h).
204. Id. art. 13(2).
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conditions are met: (1) the consumer is a customer of the person sending
the direct marketing communications; (2) the consumer's electronic con-
tact details were obtained by the person sending the direct marketing
from the consumer in the context of a sale of a product or service; and
(3) the consumer has the opportunity to object, free of charge, at the time
the contact details were collected as well as later, to the sending of direct
marketing communications.205 The E-Privacy Directive prohibits sending
electronic mail for direct marketing purposes by "disguising or conceal-
ing the identity of the sender on whose behalf the communication is
made" or sending electronic mail without a valid address for the con-
sumer to use to send an "opt-out" request.
2 6
When advertising is delivered to a consumer on his mobile phone
through the phone's RFID reader, must the consumer give advance con-
sent to the advertiser? The E-Privacy Directive does not directly apply in
this situation as long a public carrier's network (such as a public tele-
communications network or the Internet) is not used in the process of
delivering the advertising message to the consumer's mobile phone.27 As
long as the consumer consciously used his RFID reader to access the
RFID tag of the advertiser, it seems fair to infer that he has given consent
in this situation.
2. Using Location Data to Deliver Mobile Advertising
and Other LBS
The E-Privacy Directive defines traffic and location data and is thus
part of the regulatory framework for delivering LBS and m-advertisingS 209
to the extent that a public carrier is involved. Public carriers are pro-
hibited from using traffic data for the purposes of marketing electronic
communications services or for the provision of value-added services
(e.g., location-based services and m-advertising) without the consent of
205. Id.
206. Id. art. 13(4).
207. Id. art. 3(l). See also EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at 6 (stating
that the applicability of the E-Privacy Directive is limited to "processing of personal data in
connection with ... publicly available electronic communications services in public commu-
nications networks.").
208. See infra note 376 and accompanying text (explaining how RFID readers read
RFID tags in their environment including those that store advertising content). So a con-
sumer's RFID reader may automatically read advertising content from tags in his environment
when his phone is brought within proximity to the tags and without a conscious use of the
RFID reader for this purpose.
209. Traffic data is "any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a commu-
nication on an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof'. E-Privacy
Directive, supra note 185, art.2(b). Location data means "any data processed in an electronic
communications network, including the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a
user of a publicly available electronic communications service." Id. art. 2(c).
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the subscriber to whom the data relates.2 0 Additionally, unless location
data has been made anonymous, public carriers must provide specific
types of notice to subscribers and obtain their consent before processing
location data other than traffic data to provide location-based services or
m-advertising.2 ' Businesses that are not public carriers also must obtain
consumer consent to process location data that is personal data under the
Data Protection Directive in order to deliver location-based services and
m-advertising, but if they do not use the services of a public carrier, they
do not have to comply with the more restrictive rules on using location
data found in E-Privacy Directive.2 " This means that in the European
Union, using personal data to deliver LBS or m-advertising is not lawful
unless it is with the permission of the person receiving the m-ad or other
location-based service.2 3 However, when RFID-enabled phones and
RFID-embedded environments are used to deliver m-advertising, it is not
always necessary to involve the services of a public carrier because the
communications may occur directly between the consumer's phone and
RFID devices embedded in the environment by businesses; thus, cur-
214rently, the E-Privacy Directive does not apply to this situation. Further,
if personal data processing is not involved, for example, if the communi-
cations are made without revealing any personally-identifying
information about the consumer or being able to link to other sources of
210. Id. art. 6(3). Furthermore, the public carrier must erase or make anonymous such
traffic data when it is no longer needed for the purpose of transmitting a communication,
unless the subscriber has given consent or another exception applies. Id. art. 6(l ).
211. Id. art. 9(1). Article 9 also gives subscribers the right to withdraw their consent to
the use of location data that is personal data. Id. art. 9(1)-(3). Location data:
May refer to the latitude, longitude and altitude of the user's terminal equipment, to
the direction of travel; to the level of accuracy of the location information; to the
identification of the network cell in which the terminal equipment is located at a
certain point in time and to the time the location was recorded.
Id. pmbl. T 14. Access to location data is essential to providing location-based services
through a telecommunications network.
212. See supra text accompanying note 185 regarding the scope of the E-Privacy Direc-
tive.
213. See CONCISE EUROPEAN IT LAW 186-87 (Alfred Billesbach et al. eds., 2006) ("[A]
provider of telephony services could provide location data to a third company in the frame-
work of a processing agreement to provide end customers with weather forecast information
or tourist information based on their location data. In such a case, the service provider is re-
quired to inform the users and subscribers about the forwarding of their data before they give
their consent to the processing of location data other than traffic data for the provision of value
added services."); see also Working Party Opinion on Location Data, supra note 11, at 2-3
(opining that "since location data always relate to an identified or identifiable natural person,"
they are covered by the Data Protection Directive).
214. But see infra text accompanying notes 301-305 (discussing the European Commis-
sion's proposal to amend the E-Privacy Directive which, if adopted, will resolve at least part
of this regulatory gap).
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personal data about the consumer, then generally, the Data Protection
Directive does not apply.25
3. Restrictions on Spyware and Adware
The E-Privacy Directive prohibits the use of electronic communica-
tions networks to store information or to gain access to information
stored in the terminal equipment of the subscriber or user unless con-
sumers have been given clear and comprehensive information consistent
with the Data Protection Directive and the opportunity to refuse process-
ing of their personal data.2 6 Terminal equipment is broad enough to
include a consumer's mobile phone. The preamble to the E-Privacy Di-
rective specifically mentions spyware:
Terminal equipment of users' of electronic communications
networks and any information stored on such equipment are part
of the private sphere of the users requiring protection under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. So-called spyware, web bugs, hidden
identifiers and other similar devices can enter the user's terminal
without their knowledge in order to gain access to information,
to store hidden information or to trace the activities of the user
and may seriously intrude upon the privacy of these users. The
use of such devices should be allowed only for legitimate pur-
poses, with the knowledge of the users concerned.27
Thus, the E-Privacy Directive suggests that "any intrusion into the
electronic domicile [of the consumer] through spyware, web bugs, hid-
den identifiers, like cookies or other similar devices, ought to be
considered a violation of the private electronic space (virtual domicile),
[and] could even be viewed as a form of hacking" punishable as a crimi-
nal offense.2 8 Accordingly, installing adware is not per se illegal, but is
subject to the requirements to provide notice and obtain users' consent
before downloads can be made to a user's equipment using a public elec-
tronic communications network. Consumers have an "opt-out" right to
refuse to have a tracking software or devices placed on their mobile
215. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 97. But see Dinant et al., supra note 13,
at 12-14 (discussing application of Article 15 of the E.U. Data Protection Directive to render
the making of automated decisions about individuals a data protection violation in some cir-
cumstances even when no personal data is used).
216. But cf E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185, art. 5(3) (providing exceptions to this
rule for technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the
transmission of a communication or access or as strictly necessary to provide an information
society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user).
217. Id. $ 24.
218. See CONCISE EUROPEAN IT LAW, supra note 213, at 169-70.
When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped
phones and other terminal equipment.2 9 However, spyware, which by
definition is deployed without users' knowledge or consent, is illegal if it
is downloaded to a mobile phone using a public carrier's network.
4. Prohibitions on Skimming and Eavesdropping
Does the E-Privacy Directive prohibit skimming information from
RFID tags in consumers' RFID-enabled mobile phones or interception of
radio communications between RFID tags in consumer's mobile phones
and RFID readers in a transit mall? The answer is unclear, at least in
some circumstances. For example, if the information skimmed is not
personal data or linkable to personal data, then generally the Data Pro-
tection Directive and the E-Privacy Directive do not apply. It may be that
the information obtained by skimming or eavesdropping in the above
situations is likely to reveal only a unique identifying number stored on
the consumer's RFID tag in his phone that is not linked or linkable to a
specific person, and if so, it is not personal data. Furthermore, the skim-
ming of data from an RFID tag by a RFID reader does not necessarily
involve the use of an electronic communications network, because such
networks are defined in the E-Privacy Directive as "public communica-
tions network and publicly available electronic communications
services''2° (public carriers), and it is possible for a person who is not a
public carrier and has no relationship to a consumer to place an RFID-
reader in a transit mall in order to skim or eavesdrop information. Since
this could be done without using a public carrier in any way, arguably
the E-Privacy Directive does not apply. However, it is unlikely that
skimming or eavesdropping is legal in the European Union, even if the
E-Privacy Directive is not applicable. To the extent that personal infor-
mation is processed by a skimmer or eavesdropper, the Data Protection
Directive is still applicable, because its scope is not limited to public
carriers. Furthermore, Article 8 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights (ECHR) protects the secrecy of people's
correspondence, whether it is in electronic form or not, and irrespective
of the technical means of interception or surveillance.
In sum, in the European Union, the primary consumer privacy pro-
tections related to RFID-enabled mobile phones used to deliver mobile
advertising and other location-based services are primarily a question of
data protection. Where RFID-enabled phones are used to deliver m-
advertising, there are privacy gaps in the regulation to the extent the ser-
vices of a public carrier or the use of personal data are not involved.
However, even when public carrier services or personal data are not
219. Id. at 170 n.5.
220. See E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185, art. 3(l).
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involved, fundamental privacy rights can be expected to apply. Addition-
ally, some Member-States' criminal laws or other more protective civil
laws may apply.
B. U.S. Regulatory Framework for Privacy
Compared to the framework of general data protection and privacy
protections available in the European Union that is acknowledged to
cover commercial utilization of RFID technologies for marketing or
other purposes,22' relatively few federal privacy or data protections exist
for consumers in the United States.222 A patchwork of federal laws and
two key federal agencies comprise the U.S. privacy and data protection
framework. At the federal level, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) is the key agency responsible for regulating
telecommunication carriers and is charged with protecting subscribers
from unwanted commercial solicitations on their mobile phones, such as
telemarketing and mobile spam.223 In addition, the FTC, under its powers
to enforce laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices, has the
power to bring enforcement actions against businesses who engage in
unfair or deceptive trade practices, including those that breach their own
privacy policies in their dealings with consumers (even though no law
requires businesses to have such privacy policies in the first place).224
Federal laws regulating telemarketing and spain and restricting the
use by telecommunications' carriers of "customer proprietary network
information" can be viewed as providing minimum privacy and data pro-
tection standards for m-advertising, although these laws fall far short of
providing a comprehensive federal privacy and data protection frame-
work similar to that found in the European Union. This section examines
applicable laws in the context of RFID-enabled mobile phones and m-
advertising. As this section will show, these laws often have significant
gaps in their application to RFID-enabled phones that give rise to pri-
vacy and data protection concerns that need to be addressed.
221. See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
222. The complex nature of U.S. laws that potentially restrict mobile advertising prac-
tices and protect consumers' privacy and personal data in this context have been analyzed in
depth in a recent study by this author. See King, supra note 27. Therefore, these laws are dis-
cussed only briefly here, to permit this article to focus on the privacy and data protection
implications of RFID technologies.
223. See generally id. In contrast, this article focuses on applicable federal laws and their
potential to address the abuses of mobile advertising directed at RFID-enabled phones.
224. See id. at 248 n.30; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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1. Restrictions on Telemarketing
Under federal law, the making of live unsolicited phone calls for ad-
vertising purposes without consumer consent is- generally lawful,
although consumers have the legal right to "opt-out" of receiving com-
mercial solicitations (e.g., phone calls, text messages or multi-media
messages) on their mobile phones by registering their mobile phone
numbers on a National Do Not Call Registry or making a request to be
placed on a company's own Do Not Call List. 225 Even where consumers
have not so opted out, some telemarketing practices are restricted.226 For
example, it is unlawful to make a telemarketing call to a consumer on
her mobile phone by using automated dialing equipment without human
intervention, unless the consumer has given her advance consent.2  But
if a subscriber is not listed on the Do Not Call List and has not made a
specific request to an advertiser to be placed on its company-specific Do
Not Call List, it is lawful for advertisers to make live telemarketing calls
to consumers on their mobile phones. Constitutionally-based commercial
free speech rights limit federal regulation of advertising that is not false
and misleading, such that m-advertisers are entitled to some meaningful
commercial access to mobile subscribers for commercial advertising228
purposes. The telemarketing rules do not apply to m-advertising sent
225. See King, supra note 27, Part V. See Rules & Regs. Implementing the Tel. Con-
sumer Prot. Act of 1991, Rpt. and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752 (1992); Rules & Regs.
Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10
F.C.C.R. 12391 (1995); Rules & Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
Order on Further Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 4609 (1997); see also Jaqualin Friend Peter-
son, Communications Act of 1934-Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 74 AM. JUR. 2D § 14
(2006). The TCPA's delivery restrictions apply to wireless phone numbers including "any
telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile
radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party
is charged for the call." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2005). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(a)(iii) (2007); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (2007) (clarifying that the making of tele-
phone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers is covered by the
delivery restrictions set out in sections (c) and (d) of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2007)); see gener-
ally Rules & Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Rep. & Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 14014 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 TCPA Order].
226. Phone calls to wireless phone numbers that are not live calls are generally prohib-
ited by the TCPA, including calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system. See 2003
TCPA Order, supra note 225, T 165; see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2005); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(a)(l)(iii) (2007). An "automatic telephone dialing system" means equipment with
the capacity "(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or se-
quential number generator; and, (B) to dial such numbers" 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2005).
227. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2005); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(l)(iii) (2007);
2003 TCPA Order, supra note 225, 165.
228. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-
64 (1980) (holding that the First Amendment protection of commercial free speech applies to
"the informational function of advertising;" however, governments are free to regulate com-
mercial messages that are untruthful or illegal and may "ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
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directly between RFID-enabled devices by wireless contactless commu-
nications, as long as the rn-ads are communicated to RFID-enabled
phones without using regulated telecommunications services. As illus-
trated by the BART-RFID Trial, the mobile phone user may "read" ads
from smart posters that include RFID tags." 9 In this case, the ad is com-
municated directly from one RFID-enabled device to another and does
not use the services of a mobile carrier, so the telemarketing rules will
not apply. Since the mobile phone user has initiated the advertising and
thus presumably wants to receive the ad, "opt-in" consent rules seem less
necessary here and perhaps consent can be implied.
2. Restrictions on Unsolicited Electronic
Commercial Communications
Generally speaking, marketers may send unsolicited commercial
electronic messages (e.g., unsolicited email advertisements or advertis-
ing "spam") to consumers and businesses in the United States without
obtaining the advance consent of the recipients as long as: (a) the mes-
sages conform to the requirements of the federal spam legislation,
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM) (e.g., not false or deceptive, form require-
ments met, or "opt-out" notice included); (b) the messages are not sent
directly to mobile phone subscribers (Mobile Service Commercial Mes-
sages or MSCMs, discussed next); and (c) the recipients have not
"opted-out" of receiving these types of commercial electronic messagesfrom he ,230
from the sender. Senders are required to notify recipients that they may
elect not to receive future email messages (by making "opt-out" requests
to senders) and senders are required to honor recipients' opt-out re-
quests.
23'
60, 68-69 (1983) (holding that the burden of discarding unsolicited "junk" mail is minimal
and does not outweigh commercial speech protections); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397
U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (stating that "the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be
placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate," and holding that an opt-out
statutory requirement for sexually provocative mail advertisement is a constitutional restric-
tion on commercial speech).
229. See discussion of the BART-RFID Trial, supra Part III.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2007). See also FTC, FTC FACTS FOR BUSINESS: THE CAN-
SPAM ACT: REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL EMAILERS, (Apr. 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.govfbcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus6l.shtm. Consumers also have the
ability to "opt-out" from receiving commercial electronic telephone calls (voice or text mes-
sages) on their wireless phones by registering their mobile phone numbers on the National Do
Not Call Registry. See supra Part VI.B. I. Further, some telemarketing practices, such as using
autodialing telephone equipment to generate telemarketing calls, are limited by federal law. 15
U.S.C. § 7704 (2007).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2007).
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CAN-SPAM allows advertisers to send unsolicited email communi-
cations to consumers, as long as the consumer has not made a request
not to receive such communications, effectively establishing an "opt-
out" process of obtaining consumer consent.232 In contrast, mobile
service commercial messages (MSCMs) are a special type of electronic
messages that can be sent to mobile phones. To send an MSCM, the
sender must obtain the consumer's consent before sending even one
message ("opt-in").233 MSCMs are electronic communications that gen-
erally contain advertising messages sent directly to mobile phones via
the Internet using a wireless Internet domain name.23 To ensure that ad-
vertisers have the ability to distinguish when an advertising message will
be covered by the MSCM rules, the FCC publishes lists of wireless
Internet domain names on its Web site.235 It is possible for anyone with
an Internet email account and knowledge of a mobile phone subscriber's
mobile telephone number to send an electronic message to the subscriber
using a domain name provided by the subscriber's mobile carrier. By
sending an email to a mobile subscriber (using the appropriate domain
name for the subscriber's mobile carrier and inserting the subscriber's
ten digit mobile phone number to create an electronic address for the
232. Id.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 7712(b)(1) (2009).
234. A MSCM is defined as a commercial electronic mail message transmitted directly
to a wireless device utilized by a subscriber of commercial mobile service (e.g., a cell or mo-
bile phone subscriber) in conjunction with that service. 15 U.S.C. § 7712 (2009) (emphasis
added), 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (2009). See also Lavergne, supra note 29, at 886. The term "mo-
bile spam" is often used to refer to commercial advertising solicitations made to mobile phone
subscribers or delivered to mobile phones, but it is a broader term than MSCM, because the
latter is limited to m-ads sent to or delivered using wireless Internet domain names. For exam-
ple, the FCC's ban on sending commercial messages to wireless devices without consent
"does not cover 'short messages' [text messages] sent from one mobile phone to another if to
do so does not use an Internet address" listed on the FCC's official list. See FCC, CAN-
SPAM: Unwanted Text Messages and E-Mail on Wireless Phones and Other Mobile Devices,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/canspam.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). However, if a
text message advertisement is generated using automated dialing equipment without the re-
cipient's consent, this would be also be prohibited by the TCPA. See 2003 TCPA Order, supra
note 225, 165.
235. 47 C.F.R. § 64.3100(a)(4) (2006). The list of wireless mail domain names is avail-
able on the FCC's Web site. See FCC, Consumer Policy Issues, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
policy/DomainNameDownload.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) [hereinafter FCC official list].
This domain name list is updated when wireless service providers submit valid domain names
or delete unused domain names. Wireless service providers are required to update the list not
less than thirty days before issuing subscribers any new or modified domain names and to
remove any domain names that has not been issued to subscribers or is no longer in use within
six months after placing it on the list or its last date or use. Id. Advertisers must consult the
FCC's official list before sending email and other electronic advertising to consumers; if an
address on the advertiser's mailing list includes a wireless Internet domain name on the FCC's
official list, the advertiser is not permitted to send advertising to the address without obtaining
the recipient's express prior consent. Id.
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subscriber), the information will be delivered as a text or multimedia
message on the subscriber's mobile phone.236 If CAN-SPAM's restrictive
rules did not make it unlawful to send commercial advertising messages
in this manner without obtaining the recipient's prior express consent, it
would be very easy for advertisers to send m-ads to mobile phone sub-
scribers to be delivered as text or multimedia messages on subscribers'
mobile phones. Because advertisers that generate electronic messages to
consumers via the Internet are not making telephone calls in the tradi-
tional sense, existing laws regulating telemarketing would not apply and
having previously listed one's mobile phone number on the National Do
Not Call Registry would not prevent the sending of MSCMs. The more
restrictive FCC rules under CAN-SPAM that apply to sending MSCMs
are designed to protect mobile phone subscribers from receiving this
type of mobile spam unless they have given their express consent.
However, to the extent that it is possible to send mobile advertising
messages in the form of pop-up, banner, text messages or e-mail to be
accessed by consumers on their RFID-enabled mobile phones without
using a wireless Internet domain name on the FCC's published list, the
MSCM rules do not apply. When the MSCM rules do not apply, at most,
only the "opt-out" notice and consent rules under CAN-SPAM apply.237
However, under the primary purpose rule, there are situations where
CAN-SPAM does not apply to electronic communications sent to mobile
devices.23 If a text message is sent to an RFID-enabled mobile phone,
but advertising is not the primary purpose of the communication, the
CAN-SPAM will not require opt-out notices to be included. CAN-SPAM
would not require opt-out notices for advertising messages sent along
with travel information requested by a consumer. Nor would an opt-out
notice be required for advertising such as a discount coupon included in
a message sent to confirm payment for a purchase made using contact-
less communications on an RFID-enabled mobile phone. Under CAN-
SPAM's primary purpose rule, these promotional messages are likely
exempt from most of the form and notice requirements.
236. FCC official list, supra note 235; Send Email to Phone and SMS Gateways, Email
Services, Resources and Tools, http://www.email-unlimited.comlstuff/send-email-to-
phone.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). See Lavergne, supra note 29, at 861.
237. See discussion and references, supra notes 230-232.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(17) (2007) (exempting transactional or relationship messages that
have a primary purpose of facilitating, completing, or confirming a commercial transactions
from most of the form and disclosure requirements of CAN-SPAM).
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3. Mobile Carriers' Obligations to Protect
Subscribers' Personal Data
The FCC also regulates telecommunication carriers' use and disclo-
sure of customer proprietary network information (CPNI), establishing a
form of personal data protection for telephone subscribers. 239 The CPNI
rules effectively limit the use and disclosure of CPNI for marketing pur-
poses, unless subscribers have given express authorization in advance
(essentially requiring opt-in notice and consent for disclosure of this type
of personal information by a carrier). 240 However, information that is
analogous to that which would be included in a phone directory is not
within the definition of CPNI. 4  So, for example, subscribers' mobile
phone numbers are not CPNI and there is no law that restricts publica-
tion, collection, use, disclosure or even sale of mobile phone numbers,
although currently mobile carriers in the United States do not issue offi-
cial directories of mobile phone numbers.2 42
The CPNI rules are unlikely to provide any real data protection to
consumers in the context of RFID-enabled mobile phones except to the
extent that mobile carriers are involved in collecting and processing con-
sumers' personal data that is also CPNI. For example, there is the
possibility that personal data of mobile phone users with RFID-enabled
phones used in RFID-embedded environments will be collected by busi-
nesses that are not mobile carriers, such as food retailers and banks that
are participating in the BART-RFID Trial. These non-carriers may col-
lect personal data to use for one purpose, like payment of goods and
services, but use and/or share the data with other advertisers to generate
unsolicited ads. For example, in the BART-RFID Trial, it would be
239. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-710 (2007)); Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Net-
work Information and Other Customer Information, Second Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. § 8061 (1998) [hereinafter CPNI Order 1998].
See also Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. § 14860, IN 5-25 (2002) (summarizing the history of the CPNI
Order, including amendments by the FCC to the original CPNI Order).
240. Section 222(c) of the Telecommunications Act protects consumers' informational
privacy by requiring the telecommunication carrier to obtain customer approval before using,
disclosing, or permitting access to specific types of personal information that fall within the
definition of CPNI, except as required by law or with the approval of the customer. 47 U.S.C.
§ 222(c)(1) (2000). The Telecommunications Act was amended in 1999 to include "location"
in the definition of CPNI. Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C.
§ 222(h)(1)(A) (1999).
241. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(e) (2000) (specifying that notwithstanding the telecommunica-
tion carriers' obligations under 47 U.S.C. § 222(b)-(d), the carrier shall provide subscriber list
information); 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(3) (2000) (defining subscriber list information as including
information normally included in a phone directory, such as name and address).
242. See King, supra note 27, at 281-83.
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lawful in the United States for consumers' mobile phone numbers, e-
mail addresses, purchasing history and other personal data to be stored in
a database that is then made available to businesses participating in the
trial, thus enabling these businesses to send m-ads by voice or text mes-
sages to consumers. Furthermore, because location data only receives
CPNI protection when it is generated by using the services of a federally
regulated telecommunications carrier, not all location data are protected
under U.S. law. It is possible for an advertiser to detect the location of an
RFID-tagged mobile phone by placing an RFID-reader in a shopping
mall, thus capturing data about the location of the consumer who is car-
rying the phone, yet this is not the type of location data that is protected
as CPNI as it does not relate to provision of mobile phone services by a
regulated carrier.
243
4. Other Potentially Applicable Federal Regulations
Apart from federal laws regulating telemarketing, spam and CPNI
that are enforced by the FIC and FCC, the Federal Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) prohibits interception or unauthorized
access to the contents of electronic communications, although there are
broad exceptions to this law.2" The ECPA is discussed here because it
may potentially provide some privacy protection for consumers in the
context of communications between RFID-enabled mobile phones and
145RFID readers installed for marketing or other purposes.
Some aspects of applying the ECPA to mobile communications are
not yet clear. For example, it is uncertain whether the wiretapping and
interception provisions of the ECPA (Title I) apply to interception of call
246location data related to mobile phone users. In addition, the ECPA's
243. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
244. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
[hereinafter Title I], 2701-12 [hereinafter Title I1], 3117, 3121-27 (2000) [hereinafter Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Devices]. Two statutory exceptions exclude from Title I intercep-
tions by "providers of communications systems": (1) the "provider exception;' 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000) (providing that a communications service provider may "intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in
any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of
the rights or property of the provider of that service."); and (2) the "consent exception," 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000) (providing that a person "acting under color of law" may intercept
an electronic communication if "such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception."). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (c) (2000); see also SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 143, at 269 ("For example a person can
secretly tap and record a communication to which that person is a party"). Title II also em-
braces the provider and consent exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2000). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b) (2000).
245. See Stein, supra note 64, 1 38.
246. See Lee, supra note 34, at 395 (explaining that the ECPA grants certain privacy
protections to electronic communications under § 2510(12), "[b]ut subsection C explicitly
When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped
prohibitions on unauthorized access to stored communications (Title II)
must also be examined to determine if they restrict access to location
information in computer storage about mobile phone users' locations.247
If the ECPA does not protect mobile phone call location data, other fed-
eral laws that regulate the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices
248could provide some measure of consumer privacy protection.
Even if the ECPA does not protect location data used in providing
LBS services, the ECPA may still be important to protect consumers'
personal data from unauthorized interceptions and unauthorized access
related to information stored on their RFID-enabled mobile phones or
communications between their RFID-enabled phones and other RFID-
enabled devices. This would be helpful in situations where other federal
privacy laws may not apply, such as privacy invasive m-advertising prac-
tices by third parties that are not covered by laws regulating
telecommunications carriers. For example, if RFID readers are used to
"skim, 24 9 or read personal data on RFID-tags without authorization, such
as those embedded in RFID-enabled phones, this could violate Title II of
the ECPA, unless one of the exceptions under the law applies. Further-
more, if an unauthorized person "eavesdrops" to intercept data as it is
read by an authorized RFID-reader,2 50 this could violate Title I of the
excludes from this definition 'any communication from a tracking device' and that another
section of the ECPA does address 'mobile tracking devices,' which are defined as 'an elec-
tronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object.' "). Whether this definition covers call location information related to mobile phones is
not certain.
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); Lee, supra note 34, at 398 (stating that the SCA regu-
lates the government's ability to require electronic communication service providers or remote
computing service providers to disclose "the name, address, local and long distance telephone
toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of
service of a subscriber.") See generally Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2711 (2000). These provisions do not specifically address wireless location informa-
tion. See Lee, supra note 34, at 398.
248. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000) (prohibiting any person from installing or
using a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order); see also
Lee, supra note 34, at 396 (suggesting that these provisions may not apply to tracking devices
that track a mobile phone user's geographic call location since they refer to "numbers dialed
or otherwise transmitted" on telephone lines).
249. EPIC Testimony on AK RFID Bill, supra note 108, at 3.
250. Id. at 4. (commenting that "in the absence of effective security techniques, RFID
tags are remotely and secretly readable," and that the "creation of a small, easily portable
RFID reader may be complex and expensive now, (but) will be easier as time passes"). EPIC's
Senior Counsel further testified that the distance necessary to read RFID tags was initially
thought to be only a few inches, but tests have shown that RFID tags can be read from thirty to
seventy feet away in some instances. Thus, the wireless nature of RFID technology presents a
security risk for consumers because they may well be unaware that their personal information
has been stolen through skimming or eavesdropping.
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ECPA, again provided that one of the exceptions under the law is not
applicable.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) should also be consid-
ered as a possible source of protection for consumers, as related to
privacy and security risks associated with RFID technologies, because it
prohibits computer fraud and provides a civil remedy for consumers."'
Arguably it would violate the CFAA for someone to place software on a
mobile phone without the phone user's consent for the purpose of gener-
ating m-ads.252
There is also the possibility that state laws could be adopted or ap-
plied by courts to protect the privacy and personal data in the context of
LBS and mobile marketing practices involving RFID-enabled mobile
phones."' Also, state privacy tort laws and state contract laws could be
applied to protect consumers' privacy and personal data related to m-
advertising and location-based services.5  However, to date these sources
of law, traditionally common law, have provided little privacy and data
protection for consumers and have not been used by courts to protect
consumer privacy in the context of RFID technologies.
C. Comparison of E. U. and U.S. Laws
Generally speaking, E.U. law provides more protection from unso-
licited advertising for consumers than U.S. law. For example, E.U.
legislation requires Member-States to adopt national laws to curb spam,
telemarketing calls and other forms of unsolicited marketing and prohib-
its sending advertising to consumers unless advertisers have obtained
consumers' prior consent. 55 On the other hand, unless consumers have
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2008) (providing that whoever "knowingly and with intent
to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access,
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,
unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer
and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year" has violated this law); see
also Garrie & Wong, supra note 31, at 493-94 (commenting that the CFAA requires a con-
sumer to prove a loss of an aggregate of five thousand dollars or more in order to recover in a
civil action, making it less useful as a tool of redress for consumers in personal data loss situa-
tions such as those associated with spyware).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). See also Garrie & Wong, supra note 31, at 481 (discuss-
ing unauthorized forms of spyware that accompany cell-phone applications).
253. See supra Part VII.B for discussion of developments in RFID-specific legislation at
the state level and federal and state laws that are designed to protect consumers' privacy in the
context of targeted marketing practices that collect and use consumers' personal data for direct
marketing purposes.
254. King, supra note 27, at 290-301.
255. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 185, art. 13. There is an exception to the prior con-
sent requirement that allows the sending of direct marketing of a company's own similar
products or services provided that the company gives customers the opportunity to object, free
of charge and clearly and distinctly, to the use of electronic contact details when they are col-
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"opted-out" of receiving these types of messages, U.S. law generally
allows businesses to make live telemarketing calls and to send unsolic-
ited commercial electronic messages to consumers by e-mail or Short
Message Service (SMS or text messages) as long as these messages are
not sent using a wireless Internet domain name on the FCC's published
Ist.56 Consequently, in the United States, the sending of truthful, nonde-
ceptive unsolicited commercial electronic communications (e.g., e-mail)
to consumers is generally lawful in the first instance, although consum-
ers have the right to "opt-out" of receiving future communications by
requesting that no more advertising be sent to them from a particular
advertiser.257 Also, telemarketing solicitations are generally lawful in the
United States in first instance, so long as they are made by a real person
(not solely through the use of autodialing equipment), although consum-
ers may take action to prevent or stop such calls by listing their phone
numbers on the National Do Not Call register or by making a company-
specific do not call request."'
Overall, the United States lacks a broad data protection framework
that would protect consumers in the context of RFID-enabled mobile
phones used to deliver mobile advertising and location-based services
and this creates an important regulatory gap. However, regulatory gaps
exist in the European Union as well. First, applying the European Un-
ion's data protection framework to the context of RFID-enabled mobile
phones used to deliver LBS and m-advertising is more challenging when
there is no personal data used in the process because then E.U. data pro-
tection laws generally do not apply. 2 9 Furthermore, since generating
advertising to RFID-enabled phones may be done without using the net-
works of public carriers, this also is a regulatory void that poses a risk to
consumers' privacy 2 6 Additionally, since tracking and profiling
lected and again on the occasion of each message in cases where the customer has not initially
refused such use. Id. art. 13(2).
256. See King, supra note 27, at 254-65, 267-71.
257. For example, if an m-advertiser sends an ad to the mobile phone owner's email
account at yahoo.com, this is not a MSCM, because to do so does not require using a wireless
Internet domain name on the FCC's official list. See U.S. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, Consumer
& Governmental Affairs Bureau, CAN-SPAM: Unwanted Text Messages and E-Mail on Wire-
less Phones and Other Devices (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/
canspam.html.
258. See discussion of the federal law restricting telemarketing practices, supra Part
VI.B. I.
259. See discussion of the European Union's focus on regulating personal data protec-
tion, supra Part VI.A.
260. For example, it is possible for advertisers to send advertising to mobile phones
without utilizing the services of a public carrier by including an ad in a message stored on
RFID tags in smart posters. Consumers who use their phones to read the smart poster in order
to obtain other desired information, like directions or product information, would also receive
the advertising messages in direct communications between the smart posters and their phones
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consumers using RFID-enabled mobile phones may be accomplished
without using any personal data, this is a potential regulatory gap as
261well.
In some respects, however, U.S. and E.U. laws are very similar.
First, both laws require consumers to "opt-in" before it is lawful for ad-
vertisers to make autodialed telemarketing calls to mobile phones.262
Since, as a practical matter, it is likely that marketers would use autodial-
ing equipment to deliver m-ads by SMS/text messages because making
live calls is likely to be more labor intensive and expensive, this type of
m-advertising is only permitted with the mobile phone user's consent in
both the United States and in the European Union.63
Second, using the Internet to generate electronic ads directly to mo-
bile phones using wireless Internet domain names (as opposed to
sending the ads to regular Internet e-mail addresses that mobile phone
subscribers choose to access through mobile phones with Internet ac-
cess) requires using wireless Internet domain names. So, in both the
United States and the European Union, users' prior consents are required
to send this type of m-advertising.6 Third, in both the United States and
the European Union, personal data gathered by mobile carriers that re-
lates to the location of mobile phone users when they are making or
receiving calls generally cannot be disclosed to third parties, such as
businesses that provide location-based services (including mobile adver-
tising), without obtaining the users' advance consent.
265
Fourth, in both the European Union and the United States, consum-
ers have legal protection that covers uses and disclosures of their
personal data by m-advertisers and other businesses delivering LBS to
the extent they have voluntarily adopted privacy policies-consumers
can seek government enforcement if companies violate their own privacy
without the necessity of using telecommunications services. Spyware or adware is another
possible way to generate m-advertising without using the services of a public carrier, although
downloading software via the Internet to a mobile phone would utilize the services of public
carriers like Intemet Services providers. This is not the only way to load adware or software
on mobile phones, however. For example, mobile phones could be sold with adware software
pre-installed in order to facilitate m-advertising. See discussion and accompanying text, supra
Part IV.
261. See discussion of profiling practices that do not use personal data, supra notes 140-
142 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part VI.A.I (application of general rules) and Part VII.B. 1-3 (application
of specific rules), including discussion of federal laws in the United States that restrict tele-
marketing and the sending of commercial solicitations to mobile phone subscribers using
wireless Internet domain names.
263. See supra Parts VI.A. 1, VI.B.I and accompanying text.
264. See supra Parts VI.A.I, VI.B.3.
265. See supra Parts VI.A.2, VI.B.3.
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policies because this is an unfair trade practice. Fifth, when consumer
profiling practices do not use personal data, no legislation in either the
United States or the European Union currently requires companies to
make consumer profiles available to consumers (e.g., group classifica-
tions used for marketing purposes).167 Additionally, as the laws in both
the European Union and the United States are currently being inter-
preted, it is unlikely that tracking consumers in public places using
anonymous but unique identifiers for marketing purposes is unlawful
because both E.U. and U.S. laws only restrict disclosures by publicly
regulated entities like mobile carriers, not marketers in general.
Next this article looks at new regulatory developments to see
whether they are likely to being U.S. and E.U. law closer together in
terms of regulating RFID applications for consumer devices, like the
mobile phone.
VII. RFID POLICY AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
Since 2006, the European Commission has been assessing the need
to regulate the use of RFID technologies in Europe to protect individual
privacy and personal data.2 68 It has sponsored several workshops on
RFID themes for participants from academia, industry and regulatory
bodies and has obtained comments from the public through an online
forum. 269 Although the European Commission's regulatory efforts focus
266. See discussion of unfair commercial practices acts in the European Union and the
United States, supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
267. But see discussion of the Data Protection Directive and the possibility that Article
15 may apply to automated decisions that do not use personal data, supra note 140 and ac-
companying text. See also infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing the FTC's proposed guidelines on
online behavioral advertising).
268. See European Commission, Directorate General Information Society & Media,
Towards an RFID Policy for Europe: Workshop Report, DRR-4046-EC (Aug. 31, 2006) (pre-
pared by Maarten Van De Voort & Andreas Ligtvoet); see also Speech, Viviane Reding,
Member of the European Commission responsible for Information Society and Media, The
RFID Revolution: Challenges and Options for Action, International CeBIT Summit, Hannover
(Mar. 9, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEEC/06/
162&format=HTML&aged= I &language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Reding Speech];
Jonathan Collins, European Commission Works on RFID Policy, RFID J., Mar 14, 2006,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleprint/2197/- I/.
269. See, e.g., EDPS Opinion on RFID, supra note 20. The European Commission is
required to consult with the EDPS when a proposal for legislation has a possible effect on data
protection. See Opinions, EDPS, http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/pid/
82 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) ("The EDPS analyses the proposal, taking into account the main
elements affecting data protection .... The EDPS makes constructive recommendations to
improve the proposal in this respect. The opinion of the EDPS is formally issued and then
forms part of the legislative process.").
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on RFID use in Europe, spokespersons have also stated that the Euro-
pean Commission is "stepping up efforts to join with the United States
and Asian countries in defining globally accepted RFID interoperability
standards, data-privacy practices and ethical principles" for applying the
technologies.2 70 Likewise, the U.S. government, and particularly the
FTC, has been considering the need to regulate the use of RFID tech-
nologies in the United States. The FTC has also held RFID workshops
on RFID themes.27'
European Union-level policy-makers have closely examined new
business practices that implement RFID technologies to determine if
they create significant privacy and data protection concerns (as well as
security concerns) for E.U. citizens. The analysis produced in this effort
is insightful, comprehensive and well-documented, providing a rich
foundation for discussions about privacy and data protection on the topic
of this paper. In contrast, this type of regulatory focus in the United
States is primarily taking place at the state level with the introduction of
state legislation on RFID to protect consumers' privacy and security. But
there are also important developments in the United States that focus on
regulating the online marketing practices to protect consumers. For ex-
ample the FTC has published guidelines on online behavioral marketing
practices that collect personal data, profile and track consumers. These
guidelines address some of the same privacy concerns identified earlier
in this paper that arise from using RFID-enabled mobile phones and
RFID-embedded consumer environments to deliver LBS and mobile ad-
vertising.
A. Regulatory Developments in the European Union
The European Commission has the power to initiate legislation to
regulate the use of RFID and address the privacy and data protection is-
sues related to RFID.272 In 2007, the European Commission announced
that the time had not yet come to adopt RFID regulations for Europe in
view of the continuing development of RFID technology and evolving
business applications of RFID.27' Rather than adopting new laws, the
270. EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at 5; Collins, supra note 268.
271. See, e.g., FTC Workshop Report, supra note 50, at 2.
272. EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at 10-11 (discussing the interplay of
European and Member-States' laws in the regulation of data protection in the European Union
and the timeframe for European Commission policy-making and consideration of the need for
new legislation to address RFID usage in the European Union).
273. Id. (reporting that by the end of 2007, the Commission will issue a recommendation
setting out the principles that public authorities and other stakeholders should apply to RFID
usage, will consider including appropriate provisions in the forthcoming proposal to amend
the E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC, (see supra note 185), and will take into account input
from the forthcoming RFID Stakeholder group and the Article 29 Data Protection Working
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European Commission announced that it planned to develop a set of
guidelines (so-called "soft law") that would lay out its expectations on
issues such as privacy and security with respect to the use of RFID tech-
nologies.274 To date, no new legislation has been proposed or adopted by
the European Commission to specifically regulate the use of RFID tech-
nologies in Europe. However, as discussed in the second part of this
section, the European Commission has issued draft recommendations
addressing the privacy, data protection and information security
principles for applications supported by RFID technologies. The pro-
posed recommendations, together with other recent policy-making and
regulatory actions of the European Commission, significantly advance
the discussion of the privacy and data protection implications of RFID
technologies and whether new government regulation or industry self-
regulation, or some combination of the two approaches, is needed to pro-
tect consumers' privacy.275 While some of the European Union
developments focus on broad data protection regulation rather than
RFID, they are discussed here because they include analysis of the use of
RFID technologies in Europe. What follows is a chronological discus-
sion of the policy-making and regulatory efforts of the European
Commission, beginning in 2007.
1. Recent Policy Focus on RFID
In early 2007, the European Commission issued its Communication
27on RFID. 76 In this Communication, the European Commission charac-
terized RFID information systems and associated security and privacy
risks as a "moving target" that will "require continuous monitoring, as-
sessment, guidance, regulation, and [research and development]. 2 7  The
European Commission stated, "The specific security and privacy risks
largely depend on the nature of the RFID applications," so a one-size-
278fits-all approach would not be appropriate. Furthermore, the European
Commission stated that "[p]rivacy and security should be built into the
Party. By the close of 2008, the Commission plans to reevaluate whether legislation is neces-
sary.). However, if fundamental privacy rights are not protected by future uses of the
technology, regulations will likely follow. Anne Broache, E.U. Official: Now Isn't Time for
RFID Regulations, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Apr. 3, 2007, http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/
soa/EU-official-Now-isn-t-time-for-RFID-regulations/0, 130061744,339274657,00.htm.
274. Broache, supra note 273. See also EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197, at
10-11.
275. See discussion of European Union regulatory reforms, infra Part VII.A.2.
276. E.C. Communication on RFID, supra note 197. In this Communication, the European
Commission announced that an RFID Stakeholder Group would be established for two years and
include representatives of consumer groups, market actors (industry) and national and European
Union government authorities, including data protection authorities. Id. at 9.
277. Id. at 6.
278. Id.
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RFID information systems before their widespread deployment ('secu-
rity and privacy-by-design'), rather than having to deal with it
afterwards. 2 79 The European Commission also noted that since "end us-
ers typically are not involved in the technology design stage, the
Commission will support the development of a set of application-
specific guidelines (code of conduct, good practices) by a core group of
experts representing all parties."28
In addition to its Communication on RFID, the European Commis-
sion issued a communication to the European Parliament and the
Council on the follow-up of the Work Program for better implementation
of the Data Protection Directive (2007 E.U. Communication on Data
Protection).2' This Communication on Data Protection stated the Euro-
pean Commission's conclusion that the Data Protection Directive
continues to be relevant in its role in providing a general framework for
data protection and fulfilling its objectives to guarantee a high level of
2812data protection; thus, it does not need to be amended. The European
Commission stated its intention to take up the challenges of new internet
and communications technologies and said it may propose specific legis-
lation at the European Union level in order to apply those principles to
specific requirements of the technologies, analogous to the approach in
the E-Privacy Directive.283
In June 2007, the Commission issued a decision to formally create
the Expert Group on Radio Frequency Identification, as had been previ-
ously announced in its Communication on RFID. This group was
established to provide advice to the European Commission on RFID us-
age and is responsible for developing "guidelines on how RFID
applications should operate taking into account the views of stakeholders
and issues relating to long-term users as well as economic and societal
aspects of RFID technologies., 285 Also in June 2007, the Article 29 Data
279. Id. at 9.
280. Id.
281. See generally EC Communication on Data Protection, supra note 164.
282. Id. at 9 (stating that the Data Protection Directive "gives shape to the fundamental
right to protection of personal data ... [and] [t]herefore the Commission does not envisage
submitting any legislative proposal to amend the Directive", but "will produce an interpretive
communication on some provisions.").
283. Id. at 10. One accomplishment listed was the Working Party's approval of the Euro-
pean Code of Conduct of the Federation of European Direct Marketing (FEDMA), which it
characterized as an important milestone, despite lack of progress in similar industry self-
regulatory efforts. Id. at 5.
284. Commission Decision 467/2007, art. 1, 2007 O.J. (L 176), 25 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007A1_ 176/1_ 7620070706en00250030.pdf
[hereinafter Decision 467/2007/EC]. See also EC Communication on RFID, supra note 197,
at 9-10.
285. Decision 467/2007, supra note 284, art. 2(b).
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Protection Working Party again joined the discussion when it issued an
Opinion on the concept of personal data. 6 The Opinion discussed the
applicability of the definition of personal data to the RFID context and
identified telephone location data and call log data as personal data, two
concepts that are very important for discussions of mobile advertising.
28 7
The Opinion also analyzed whether Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are
data relating to identifiable persons and therefore covered by the Data
Protection Directive. It found IP addresses are personal data in the con-
text of processing them to identify the users of computers (for example,
to identify copyright infringers), but also acknowledged that certain
types of IP addresses that do not allow identification of the user may not
be personal data (for example, IP addresses attributed to a computer in
an internet caf6, where no identification of the user is requested).2 88 Go-
ing further, relating to discussions about whether recording unique
identifiers on RFID tags may generate personal data, the Opinion stated
that for the processing of data to be covered by the Data Protection Di-
rective, it may not be necessary in all cases to be able to identify
individuals by name.2 8 9
286. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Per-
sonal Data, 01248/07/EN, WP 136 (June 20, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf [hereinafter Opinion 4/2007]. In
this opinion, the Working Party analyzed in depth the concept of "personal data" that should
be covered by the Data Protection Directive, breaking the definition into four distinct ele-
ments: (I) "any information," (2) "relating to," (3) "identified or identifiable," [natural
persons] and (4) "natural persons." Id. at 3-24.
287. Id. at 3, 10, 26. "In the context of discussions on the data protection issues raised by
RFID tags, the Working Party noted that 'data relates to an individual if it refers to the iden-
tity, characteristics or behavior of an individual or if such information is used to determine or
influence the way in which that person is treated or evaluated.'" Id. at 10. The Opinion stated
the intention of the Working Party to contribute to further analysis of the way in which data
protection rules may impact the use of RFIDs and the possible need for additional measures
that may be necessary to protect data protection rights. Id. at 26. The Opinion also discussed
situations where location data (here, generated by a system of satellite location set up by a taxi
company, i.e. GPS) makes it possible to determine the position of available taxis in real time.
Id. at I1. The Working Party concluded that the location data can be considered to be personal
information about taxi drivers and was subject to the data protection rules, even though the
purpose of the processing was to provide better customer service and to save fuel, not to moni-
tor the performance of taxi drivers, because the system allowed for monitoring taxi drivers'
performance. Id. Likewise, call log information for a telephone located inside a company
office could be personal data of employees using the phone and the cleaning staff who might
also use the phone. Id. The concept of personal data extended to both outgoing and incoming
calls insofar as all of them contain information about people's private life, social relationships
and communications. id.
288. Id. at 16-17.
289. For example:
Computerized files registering personal data usually assign a unique identifier to the
persons registered, in order to avoid confusion between any two persons in the file
... and web traffic surveillance tools make it easy to identify the behaviour of a
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In July 2007, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) pro-
vided his opinion on the European Commission's Communication on
Data Protection.9 The EDPS agreed with the European Commission's
Communication that, in the short-run, the Data Protection Directive
should not be amended and that review of the E-Privacy Directive needs
to be conducted to assess the possible need for more specific rules to
address data protection issues raised by new technologies such as the
Internet and RFID.2 9' However, the EDPS expressed serious reservations
about other points in the European Commission's Communication and
questioned whether it was unavoidable that the Data Protection Directive
would need to be amended in the longer term.292 The EDPS Opinion also
suggested that the European Commission set a timeline for its activities,
such as the preparation of a report on the implementation of the Data
Protection Directive 29 ' argued that there needs to be a long-term ap-
proach to resolve data protection issues in the context of a developing
surveillance society, 94 and regretted that the European Commission did
not more adequately address the perspective of global privacy and juris-
diction and practical solutions to provide global solutions. 295
machine and, behind the machine, that of its user. Thus the individual's personality
is pieced together in order to attribute certain decisions to him or her... [and] the
definition of personal data reflects this fact.
Id. at 14, ex.10.
290. EDPS Opinion on Data Protection, supra note 186.
291. Id. at 11, 1 75-76 (summarizing conclusions more fully developed earlier in the
document).
292. Id. at 11, 77 (summarizing conclusions more fully developed earlier in the docu-
ment).
293. Id. at 11, 78 (summarizing conclusions more fully developed earlier in the docu-
ment).
294. Id. at 11, 79 (summarizing conclusions more fully developed earlier in the docu-
ment).
295. Id. at 1I, 80 (summarizing conclusions more fully developed earlier in the docu-
ment). In this regard, the EDPS recommended that the EC consider:
[F]urther development of a Global Framework for data protection; the further de-
velopment of the special regime for transfer of data to third countries; international
agreements on jurisdiction or similar agreements with third countries; investing in
mechanisms for global compliance, such as the use of binding corporate rules by
multinational companies.
Id. The EDPS invited the EC to start developing a vision on this perspective that would
involve major stakeholders. Id. 6-77, $1 38-45 (discussing more specifically the recommenda-
tions of the EDPS to the EC to address the global privacy and jurisdiction issues related to
implementing the Data Protection Directive, including citations to work that had previously
been done).
When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped
Also in July 2007, the European Commission issued its final version
of "European Union, European Policy Outlook RFID. '2 96 In this policy
statement, the European Commission discusses the policy challenges
relative to RFID technologies, while stopping short of recommending
RFID-specific legislation to protect privacy. 2 97 It identified the need for
fair rules for privacy and governance of RFID as both a major opportu-
nity and challenge, noting that the potential invisibility of radio
frequency identification "demands a comprehensible and reliable ap-
proach to preservation of data protection, workers' rights and consumer
rights in those RFID applications that may be used to track people or to
build personal data profiles. 298 It also encourages the acceleration of
broad public usage and RFID acceptance in areas providing added value
to the end user, for example, the development of "mobile phones with
RFID reader functionalities as the human interface to wireless sensor
networks."2 99
Subsequently, in November 2007, the European Commission issued
a proposal to amend two existing directives, including the E-Privacy Di-
rective.3°° One of the proposed amendments to the E-Privacy Directive
296. Berlin Conference, European Policy Outlook RFID: Final Version, at 7 (July 2007)
(defining "ubiquitous computing" and "The Internet of Things"), available at http://
www.nextgenerationmedia.de/documentslEuropeanPolicy-Outlook-final-version.pdf [here-
inafter RFID Policy Statement].
297. Id. at 30 (commenting that "[c]urrently, a special RFID law seems counterproduc-
tive, since data protection legislation should remain as it is now: technology-neutral" and that
"[s]elf-regulation should be used to supplement regulatory measures, particularly in areas that
are too specific to be addressed by legislation.").
298. Id. at 35. The notion that data protection regulation should include informed con-
sent provoked discussion of the technical challenges to this concept posed by RFID:
The issue of ubiquitous data processing and storage raises a challenge in terms of
informed consent ... to the processing of individual-related data to be maintained
in an environment of hundreds of smart objects communicating (partially) autono-
mously. New technical and organizational concepts are likely to be needed to
maintain informed consent. Resolving the challenge of informed consent in a ubiq-
uitous environment must consider the features, possibilities and functional logic of
smart objects on the one hand, and the permanent awareness of "yes/no" decisions
and its practicability on the other hand.
Id. at 39-40.
299. Id. at 37-38. The RFID Policy Statement makes recommendations for data protec-
tion and consumer awareness to include the need to review data protection law at regular
intervals and to amend regulations as needed so that the law is adequate to address "the rap-
idly increasing interconnectedness of IT systems, mobile devices and everyday objects." Id. at
41-42. It also discusses the use of self-regulation, such as commitment by RFID users to a
universal and enforceable code of conduct, to supplement regulatory measures. Id. at 42.
300. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council Amending
Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Commu-
nications Networks, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and
the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No
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clarifies that the directive also applies to "public communications net-
works supporting data collection and identification devices including
contactless communications devices such as Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion devices".' The European Commission explains:
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) use radio fre-
quencies to capture data from uniquely identified tags, which
can then be transferred over existing communications networks.
The wide use of such technologies can bring considerable eco-
nomic and social benefits and thus make a powerful contribution
to the internal market if their use is acceptable to citizens. To
achieve that, it is necessary to ensure that the fundamental rights
of individuals, in particular the right to privacy and data protec-
tion, are safeguarded. When such devices are connected to
publicly available electronic communications networks or make
use of electronic communications services as a basic infrastruc-
ture, the relevant provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC, including
those on security, traffic and location data and on confidentiality,
should apply.3 °2
The proposed amendments to the E-Privacy Directive requires
Member-States to protect consumers from unauthorized access and stor-
age on their terminal equipment and is not limited to intrusions
accomplished using publicly available electronics communications net-
works:
[T]he storing of information, or gaining access to information al-
ready stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is
2006/2004 on Consumer Protection Cooperation, COM (2007) 298 final (Nov. 13, 2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/
698/com_2007_0698_en.pdf (clarifying that the Directive also applies to public communica-
tions networks supporting data collection and identification devices (including contactless
devices such as Radio Frequency Identification devices)); see generally E-Privacy Directive,
supra note 185.
301. The European Commission is proposing to amend Article 3 of the E-Privacy Direc-
tive to define "services concerned" as follows: "This Directive shall apply to the processing of
personal data in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communica-
tions services in public communication networks in the Community, including public
communications networks supporting data collection and identification devices." Id. at 33. See
also id. at 6, 12. The proposed amendments to the E-Privacy Directive also define "call" to
mean "a connection established by means of a publicly available telephone service allowing
two-way communication." Id. at 32. Other proposed changes to the E-Privacy Directive in-
clude user notification requirements for security breaches relating to users' personal data;
allowing Internet Service Providers to take legal action against spammers; and clarifying that
use of "spyware" remains illegal in the European Union regardless of the means of deploy-
ment. Id. at 11-12.
302. Id. at 19.
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only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned
is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accor-
dance with [the Data Protection Directive] ... about the
purposes of the processing and is offered the right to refuse such
processing by the data controller. °3
In the m-commerce and m-advertising context, for example, this
amendment will clarify that consumers with mobile phones will be enti-
tled to notice before their public mobile phone service providers, public
Internet service providers or anyone else may store information on their
mobile phones or access data already stored on their mobile phones be-
cause mobile phones are terminal equipment of the subscriber used in a
public electronics communication network. Thus, mobile advertisers and
other businesses that use RFID readers to access personal information
stored on consumer's mobile phones would be required to give notice of
the purposes of the processing and an opportunity to decline the access
and processing of their personal data.3°  Also, if a mobile advertiser uses
the Internet to convey personal data of a mobile subscriber that has been
collected using RFID technologies, the amended E-Privacy Directive
would apply. For personal data that is collected or otherwise processed
by RFID systems without using a public carrier's network or access or
storage on the consumer's terminal equipment, the general Data Protec-
tion Directive would continue to apply.
In December 2007, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued
an opinion on the European Commission's Communication on RFID.
The EDPS Opinion on RFID also responds to other significant actions
on RFID by the European Commission and by the Article 29 Data Pro-
tection Working Party that occurred in 2007, including the European
Commission's proposal to amend the E-Privacy Directive.05 The EDPS
303. Id. at 33-34. This amendment would replace Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive
that only applied to the use of electronic communications networks (public carriers) to store
information or access information on the user's terminal equipment. E-Privacy Directive,
supra note 185, art. 5(3).
304. Id. Exceptions to the requirement to obtain notice and consent before accessing or
processing subscribers' or users' data on the terminal equipment of the subscriber or user
include: (I) technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the
transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or (2) as
strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the
subscriber or user. Id. at 34, 4.
305. See EDPS Opinion on RFID, supra note 20, at 2; see also Press Release, EDPS
Opinion on RFID: Major Opportunities for Information Society But Privacy Issues Need To
Be Addressed With More Ambition, EDPS/07/13 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=EDPS/07/13&format=HTM L
&aged--0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The European Commission is required to consult
with the EDPS when a proposal for legislation has a possible impact on data protection. See
Consultation, EDPS, http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/lang/en/pid/80 (last visited
Fall 2008]
186 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:107
Opinion on RFID states that RFID qualifies as a fundamentally new
technological development which raises important questions about data
protection and privacy.30 First, examining the practical consequences of
the deployment of RFID-systems for data protection and privacy, the
EDPS states that in assessing the data protection and privacy concerns
associated with this fundamental new technology, it is important to con-
sider the consequences of the overall RFID infrastructure that includes
"the tag, the reader, the network, the reference database and the database
where the data produced by the association tag/reader is stored," as op-
posed to only focusing on RFID tags: °7 Next, the EDPS Opinion on
RFID analyzes the impact of RFID on privacy and data protection, first
providing a description of how these fundamental rights are protected
under the present legal framework, and then analyzing the possibilities
of fully using the present legal framework to protect privacy and data
Jan. 2, 2009). See also Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending, Among Others,
Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2008/C 181/01, OJ (C 181/1) (Apr. 10,
2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:181:
0001:0013:EN:PDF [hereinafter EDPS Opinion on Proposed E-Privacy Amendments].
306. EDPS Opinion on RFID, supra note 20, at 3 (limiting the EDPS Opinion to ques-
tions of data protection and privacy but recognizing that important questions are also raised in
other areas).
307. Id. at 3. The EDPS outlines key privacy and data protection issues that need to be
addressed concerning RFID tags and concerning RFID system deployment, listing five basic
issues at the system deployment level: (I) Identification of the data subject by RFID systems
and the need to do so in a data protection friendly way; (2) Identification of the controller who
is responsible for processing personal data according to the data protection legal framework,
recognizing the during the lifecycle of an RFID tag, the controller who processes the data may
change several times as additional services are provided in relation to the tagged object;
(3) Decreased meaning of the traditional distinction between the personal and public sphere in
the context of RFID technologies that may not be apparent to the data subject, including the
wireless nature of the tag communication, its ability to be read outside line-of-sight and its
evolving reading range; (4) The consequences of the size and physical properties of RFID tags
(recognizing that the goal of making tags small and cheap for purposes of commercial feasi-
bility also minimizes the likelihood of the tag including security measures and that wireless
communication is a feature of the tags which adds a layer of risk and supports a need for addi-
tional security features); (5) the lack of transparency of the processing of personal data that is
enabled by RFID systems, which may lead to unnoticed gathering and processing of informa-
tion capable of being used to profile individuals. The opinion compares RFID systems to
mobile phones, in terms of the likelihood that RFID technology, like mobile phone technol-
ogy, will be widely accepted by users despite its potentially intrusive privacy risks. The
opinion says the two technologies are distinguishable, however, in that mobile phones are
visible and can be turned off by users, while RFID chips and systems are not under the control
of the user and cannot be turned off. Id. at 5-6. The EDPS Opinion does not consider the pos-
sibility of converging technologies such as the context discussed in this paper in which mobile
phones may contain RFID tags and readers. When mobile phones are RFID-equipped and
consumer environments embedded with RFID tags and readers, even if this is not a universal
situation, heightened user tracking and lack of transparency of processing may also potentially
impact user acceptance of such mobile phone technologies.
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protection.3 °8 The EDPS makes the point that the interaction between
new technological developments like RFID and the requirements for an
effective legal framework for data protection are complex because "the
technology influences the legislation and the legislation influences the
technology."3°9 Specifically, the EDPS recommends that the opt-in prin-
cipal be made the cornerstone of RFID regulation from a data protection
standpoint, whether by legislation or self-regulation.30
The EDPS opinion advises that, in most situations, the "opt-in-
principle" at the point of sale is a legal obligation that already exists un-
der the Data Protection Directive, although there is good reason to
specify this obligation in self-regulatory instruments to ensure that it will
be implemented in the most appropriate way. It should also specify that
this principle applies to RFID applications that fall outside the scope of
the Data Protection Directive. 3' ' Further, the EDPS welcomes the
308. Id. at 6.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 9. The opinion lists potential non-binding self-regulatory (non-legislative)
instruments relevant to RFID regulation, including: interpretative communications or other
communications, promotion of best practices, the use of privacy seals and third-party privacy
audits, including the codes of conduct or good practice that the European Commission, "in
consultation with the RFID-Stakeholders Group, is expected to stimulate and to steer this
process of self-regulation" utilizing guidelines that public authorities and other stakeholders
should apply for RFID usage. Id. at 7-8.
311. Id. at 10, 17. For RFID applications that fall outside of the scope of the Data Pro-
tection Directive, the EDPS advises that specific implementation is needed (without
specifying what those applications may be). Id. Later in the opinion, while arguing for adop-
tion of a tailor-made legal framework to consist of a mix of regulatory tools which specify and
complement the existing legal framework, the EDPS argues that tailor-made legislation might
be needed, because:
[N]ot all RFID applications entail the processing of personal data. In other words, if
RFID applications do not entail the processing of personal data, parties involved in
the manufacturing and selling of RFID enabled products are not legally bound to
implement any technological measures that would prevent eavesdropping or the set-
ting up of readers without proper notice to individuals. Yet, as demonstrated,
privacy risks derived from the possible surveillance of individuals also exist for
such RFID applications, thus demanding the same type of privacy safeguards. Pre-
cisely, this may be the case for item level tagging in consumer products before the
point of sale. In sum, RFID applications that do not process personal data may still
threaten individuals' privacy by enabling surreptitious surveillance and the use of
the information for unacceptable purposes.
Id. at 14. See also supra Part V (discussing the privacy implications of profiling based on
RFID and other technologies that produce ambient intelligence based on autonomic comput-
ing capabilities and why use of these technologies by advertisers to generate customer profiles
may fall outside data protection regulation). RFID and other technologies that produce ambi-
ent intelligence, and the automatic customer profiling enabled through their use produce
knowledge about groups of customers from aggregated customer data, have consequences for
individual customers, although they may be unaware of the implications of the profiling; thus
"raising ... questions in relation to privacy and security; especially with regard to data protec-
tion legislation." Hildebrandt, supra note 65, at 6-7, 16-17 (arguing for effective transparency
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European Commission's endorsement of specification and adoption of
early design criteria to minimize privacy and data protection threats (so
called "privacy by design," including Best Available Techniques or
"BATs"). However, the EDPS opinion questions the effectiveness of soft
law approaches for regulation of RFID uses in Europe and advocates
adoption of legislation to regulate the main issues of RFID usage in case
the effective implementation of the existing legal framework fails.3 2 Fi-
nally, the EDPS calls for more efforts to address the "inherently trans-
border" dimension of RFID systems at an international level. The EDPS
noted that RFID systems are already trans-border, as the activity of an
RFID tag might not stop at the point of sale.3 3 Also, from the level of
overall RFID systems, it is necessary to consider the privacy implica-
tions of transfers of personal data about E.U. citizens made to a third
country by a producer of the tagged item that is based outside the Euro-
pean Union.1 4
2. European Union Releases Draft RFID Recommendations
In February 2008, the European Commission issued a Draft RFID
Recommendation addressing the privacy, data protection and
information security principles for applications supported by RFID and
solicited comments on its recommendation."' The comment period has
enhancing tools (TETs) that create profiles which are both both accessible and assessable and
that may affect the lives of people, as opposed to privacy-enhancing technologies that focus on
hiding of data or anonymization).
312. See EDPS Opinion on RFID, supra note 20, at 13. Referencing the European
Commission's Communication on RFID, the EDPS comments:
The [EC] refers to RFID as the gateway to a new phase of development of the In-
formation Society, often referred to as the "internet of things" and RFID tags will
constitute key elements of the "ambient intelligent" environments. These environ-
ments are also important steps in the development of what is often called the
"Surveillance Society".
Id. Thus, the EDPS concluded, "Against this background, legislative action in the area of
RFID can be justified. RFID may bring about a qualitative change." Id.
313. Id. at 15.
314. Id. The EDPS also noted the need to address governance of RFID identity reference
databases as a critical dimension for appropriate enforcement of the E.U. data protection legal
framework. Id.
315. European Commission, Introduction to the Public Consultation on the RFID Pri-
vacy, Data Protection and Security (2008) [hereinafter Draft RFID Recommendation] (the
period to comment ended April 25, 2008). As of the date of this writing, the European Com-
mission had not issued final RFID recommendations. See also ANEC & BEUC, Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) Draft Commission Recommendation on the Implementation
of Privacy and Information Security Principles in Applications Supported by Radio-Frequency
Identification- "RFID Privacy and Security Recommendation", http://www.anec.org/
attachments/ANEC-ICT-2008-G-017final.pdf (presenting, in full, the text of the European
Union's Draft RFID Recommendations and the joint comments thereto by the ANEC and
When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped
closed and the European Commission is expected to issue final RFID
guidance soon.3 6 The Draft RFID Recommendation provides "guidance"
to Member-States and stakeholders on the design and operation of RFID
applications in a "lawful, ethically admissible and socially and
politically acceptable way, respecting the right to privacy and ensuring
protection of personal data and appropriate information security.37 The
Draft RFID Recommendation is not binding law, although it does not
preclude Member-States from adopting binding legislation."'
Article 7 of the Draft RFID Recommendation covers RFID use in
retail applications and provides advice on providing notice and obtaining
consumers' consent, specifying when "opt-in", as opposed to "opt-out",
consent should be given by consumers.3 9 Article 7 recommends
harmonized signs to notify consumers of the presence of an RFID tag in
a retail product and discusses the content of notices to consumers. It
suggests a notice to inform consumers: (1) of the presence of a RFID tag
in a retail product; (2) whether the tag has a specified, explicit and
legitimate purpose after sale; (3) about the likely reasonable privacy
risks relating to the presence of the tag; and (4) of measures consumers
can take to mitigate these risks.
When the operation of the specific RFID application associated with
the tag involves processing personal data, Article 7 states that a retailer
must comply with the Data Privacy Directive in terms of legitimately
processing personal data, and needs to either deactivate the RFID tag at
the point of sale or obtain consumer consent to receive a product with an
active RFID tag ("opt-in" consent).32' Retailers are advised to conduct
BEUC). See also BEUC, the European Consumers' Organisation, http://www.beuc.eu (last
visited Jan. 16, 2009); ANEC, The European Consumer Voice in Standardisation,
http://www.anec.eu (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
316. See EC Opens Comment on RFID Recommendations, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY IN-
FORMATION CENTER, Feb. 25, 2008, http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/.
317. Draft RFID Recommendation, supra note 315, art.I. Article 10 of the Draft RFID
Recommendation specifies that the European Commission will provide a report on the imple-
mentation of this Recommendation and its impact on economic operators and consumers
within three years. Id. art. 10. Additionally, the European Commission stated that, "[W]here
appropriate, [it] may amend this Recommendation or submit any other proposal it may deem
necessary, including binding measures, in order to better achieve the goals of the Recommen-
dation." Id. See also Data Protection Directive, supra note 97; E-Privacy Directive, supra note
185.
318. See Draft RFID Recommendation, supra note 315, art. 1.
319. Id. art. 7.3. In its commentary preceding draft Article 7.3, the European Commis-
sion explains: "In accordance with Directive 95/46, the article recommends that tags that
contain personal data should be subject to the 'opt-in' principle at the point-of-sale, that is tags
are [to be] deactivated by default unless the consumer wants to keep them active." Id. (ex-
planatory comments to Article 7).
320. Id. art. 7.2.
321. Id. art. 7.3.
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privacy impact assessments to determine if an RFID application
associated with a tag that will be active after sale involves processing
personal data. If the privacy impact assessment conducted by the retailer
shows a significant likelihood of personal data being generated from the
use of the RFID application, then the retailer should either deactivate the
tag or obtain consumer consent to receive an RFID-tagged retail product
that will be active post-sale.322 On the other hand, where an RFID
application does not involve processing of personal data (or where the
privacy impact assessment has shown negligible risk of personal data
being generated through the application), the Data Privacy Directive is
not applicable and the retailer need not obtain consumer consent to sell a
retail product with an active RFID-tag. Where personal data will not be
processed post-sale by an RFID application, the retailer should still
provide an easily accessible facility to deactivate or remove the tag.
Thus, the Draft RFID Recommendation essentially establishes an "opt-
out" consent procedure for applications that do not process personal data
in which the tag may remain active unless the consumer takes action to
request deactivation of the tag. 2 3
When deactivation of an RFID tag in a consumer product is required
at the time of sale (for example, if the tag contains personal data) or if
deactivation is requested by the consumer, the guidelines state that
deactivation or removal of RFID tags should not reduce or terminate any
of the legal obligations of the retailer or manufacturer toward the
consumer (e.g., warranty service rights).324 Furthermore, deactivation or
removal of the tags by the retailer should be done immediately and free
of charge to the consumer.32 Finally, consumers should be able to verify
126that the action to deactivate the tag is effective.
Despite the advisory nature of the European Commission's Draft
RFID recommendations, supporters of the RFID industry argue that if
they are not revised, they potentially will undercut the value of RFID to
deliver value to companies and consumers across Europe. These industry
supporters argue the recommendations lack balance between protecting
the public and overregulation that will stifle technical adoption and
innovation.327
322. See infra Part IX.A.
323. Draft RFID Recommendation, supra note 315, art. 7.3. See also Information Com-
missioner's Office, United Kingdom, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook, http://
www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia-handbook-html/html/I-intro.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2009) [hereinafter ICO PIA Handbook].
324. Draft RFID Recommendation, supra note 315, art. 7.4.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Mark Roberti, Give Your Views to the EU-Now!, RFID J., Apr. 7, 2008, at 2,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/4003/l/1 28/.
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B. Regulatory Developments in the United States
Compared to the regulatory focus on the privacy implications of
commercializing RFID technologies that has taken place in the European
Union, there has been almost no regulatory focus on RFID or m-
advertising practices in the United States, at least at the federal level.
Early on, the FTC,32 the leading federal agency charged with protecting
consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices, held workshops
to assess the potential effect of RFID technologies on consumers. Subse-
quently, the FTC chose to encourage self-regulatory efforts by the RFID
industry as opposed to supporting the adoption of new laws to address
applications of RFID.329 In 2008, the FTC held two workshops to investi-
gate the security and privacy implications of contactless payment
systems that utilize radio frequency identification and the various de-
vices used for contactless payment systems, indicating that it may be
taking a closer look at new applications of RFID, including the security
and privacy issues associated with RFID-enabled consumer devices. 30 To
date, however, most of the developments in the United States related to
regulating RFID are taking place at the state level, including the intro-
duction of RFID-specific state legislation, as described in the next
section. On the other hand, there have been recent federal-level devel-
opments that focus on protecting consumers' privacy and personal data
related to online marketing practices, in the form of FTC proposed
guidelines for behavioral marketing practices. These proposed guidelines
address many of the same privacy and data protection issues identified
with respect to delivering LBS and m-advertising using RFID-enabled
328. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(I)(b) (2008) (providing FTC enforcement authority that covers
unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occur in or affect interstate commerce). The FTC
posts information regarding enforcement actions against companies that have breached their
privacy policies on its Web site at http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
329. See FTC Workshop Report, supra note 50, at 21-23; see also Jonathan Collins, FTC
Asks RFID Users to Self-Regulate, RFID J., Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/
view/1437/l/lI. Of course, in the future, the FTC could change its position favoring industry
self-regulation with respect to RFID applications and use its existing enforcement powers to
more closely scrutinize new applications of RFID technologies that effect consumer privacy
and data protection.
330. FTC to Host Another Workshop on RFID Privacy Concerns, Contactless Payments,
CONTACTLESSNEWS, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.contactlessnews.com/2008/08/21/ftc-to-host-
another-workshop-on-rfid-privacy-concerns-contactless-payments. See also FTC to Scruti-
nize Contactless Payment Technology, NETWORKWORLD, May 12, 2008, http://
www.networkworld.com/community/node/27710 (noting that contactless payment technol-
ogy uses RIFD chips embedded in smart cards, mobile phones, or USB devices to enable
consumers to make debit and credit transactions, typically for low value purchases by holding
an RFID-enabled device in proximity to an RFID reader). The BART-RFID Trial is an exam-
ple of consumers using contactless payment technology enabled through their RFID-enabled
mobile phones in an RFID-embedded environment. See supra Part III for a discussion of this
consumer trial.
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mobile phones such as privacy concerns associated with consumer track-
ing and profiling for marketing purposes. Congress has also begun
investigating whether there is a need to regulate online behavioral mar-
keting practices to protect consumers' privacy and security.33" '
1. State RFID Legislation
At the state level, there have been some regulatory efforts to address
the commercialization of RFID technologies through legislation de-
signed to protect consumers' privacy. In 2008, Washington enacted the
first RFID-specific state legislation of its type, making it a criminal of-
fense to "skim" an RFID device, defined to cover the intentional
scanning of another person's identification device without that person's
prior knowledge and consent for the purpose of fraud, identity theft or
132any other illegal purpose. Proposed language in the bill would have
made it a felony for any company or person to slip an RFID chip into a
cell phone, loyalty card, or other device without that person's prior
knowledge and consent."' However, this provision was omitted from the
final bill that was adopted into law. Also omitted from the new law was a
provision that would have made it unlawful to read an RFID tag contain-
ing a consumer's personal information without her notice and consent
3-14and to use that information for marketing purposes.
California also passed an anti-skimming bill that makes it a crime to
intentionally remotely read someone's RFID data on an identification
331. Congress held hearings in 2008 to investigate whether there is a need to regulate
online behavioral advertising practices to protect consumers' security and privacy. Joelie
Tessler, Microsoft, Google Back Broad Privacy Legislation, SFGATE.COM, July 9, 2008,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgif=/n/a/2008/07/09/financial/f125127D29.DTL (re-
porting on a Senate Commerce Committee hearing on online advertising).
332. Electronic Communication Devices, REV. CODE WASH. § 19.300.020 (2008) (effec-
tive June 12, 2008, adding a new chapter to Title 19 RCW, and making it a felony to
"intentionally [scan] another person's identification device remotely, without that person's
prior knowledge and consent, for the purpose of fraud, identity theft, or for any other illegal
purpose"). See also Kristi Heim, State Leads Way on RFID Privacy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31,
2008, at C4; Claire Swedberg, Washington State Governor Signs Anti-Skimming Law, RFID J.,
Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.rfidjoumal.conarticle/articleprint/3988/- 1/Il.
333. See Heim, supra note 332, at C4.
334. See Claire Swedburg, Washington State House Gives Nod to Privacy Bill, RFID J.,
Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleprint/3928/-l/I. The 2008 Washington
legislation would have made use of skimmed data for marketing purposes, by a retailer, a civil
offense with a fine of up to $10,000 for each violation (however, this provision was dropped
from the final bill which was enacted). Id. at I. In 2009, legislation was again introduced in
Washington to restrict use of skimmed data for marketing purposes and to require labeling
consumer products or packaging that is embedded with RFID technologies. See Claire Swed-
berg, Washington State Rep Reintroduces RFID Legislation, RFID J., Jan. 13, 2009,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/view/4541/. This legislation has not yet been adopted.
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document without that person's knowledge or prior consent.335 The law
makes an exception from the definition of this new crime for uninten-
tional reading of RFID tags from identification documents, including
unintentionally remotely reading a person's identification document in
the process of using RFID in the course of operating a contactless identi-
fication document system. Under the exception, it is not a crime to
unintentionally remotely read a person's identification document unless
the reader thereafter intentionally discloses, stores or uses the personal
data derived from the reading without the other person's knowledge and
consent. At least in some circumstances, California's anti-skimming law
appears to protect consumers from skimming of their identification
documents to obtain personal data that could later be used for marketing
336purposes.
RFID-specific legislation has also been proposed in other states.
Proposed legislation is pending in New Hampshire that would require a
notification label on any consumer product that contains RFID chips:"
The proposed legislation would prohibit tracking of individuals by
means of remotely readable devices in consumer products, such as RFID
tags. "8 The bill also requires a consumer notice for consumer products
that include remotely readable devices that states: "This (specify product
type) may contain a remotely readable device which can be read without
your knowledge if it is brought within range of a reader device."339 Alter-
natively, the required consumer notice may be provided by a graphical
335. S.B. 31, 2007-08 Cal. Reg. Sess. (adopted Sept. 30, 2008). Identification docu-
ments are broadly defined in the bill to mean "any document containing data that is issued to
an individual and which that individual, and only that individual, uses alone or in conjunction
with any other information for the primary purpose of establishing his or her identity." Id.
§ 1798.795(c). Driver's licenses and identification cards issued by public agencies or private
businesses are included in the definition. Id. See also K.C. Jones, California Bans RFID
Skimming, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/
mobility/RFID/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=210605275.
336. S.B. 31 does not appear to apply to the provision of RFID-enabled mobile phones
to consumers or reading RFID data from those phones since it only applies to identification
documents defined as "any document containing data." S.B. 31, § 2; CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1798.795(c) (2008)
337. See Heim, supra note 332.
338. See An Act Relative to the Regulation of Remotely Readable Devices and the Ille-
gal Use of Payment Card Scanning Devices or Reencoders, H.B. 686, 160th Gen. Ct., 2007
Sess. § 358-T:5 (N.H. 2007) (as amended by the House, Mar. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2008/HBO686.html [hereinafter H.B. 686]. In the
bill, "'track' means to locate, follow, or plot the path of an individual by means of a remotely
readable device, but shall not include technology used by the enhanced 911 system or com-
mercial mobile radio service pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 332." Id. § 358-T: I VIII. H.B. 686
was passed by the state House of Representatives and is currently pending in the state Senate.
See H.B. 686, Advanced Bill Status Search, New Hampshire Legislature, http://
www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill-status/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
339. See H.B. 686, supra note 338, § 358-T- 1.
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system designed to provide a standardized way to show the presence of a
remotely readable device.40 The bill's notice requirements for consumer
products that include RFID tags are not applicable to locating technolo-
gies in which unique identification via radio waves is an essential part of
the consumer's use of the product, including technologies used to pro-
vide the 911 emergency response system and to provide commercial
mobile radio service (e.g., wireless telephone service provided by mobile
carriers). 4 If this bill is enacted in New Hampshire, it appears it will not
require a consumer RFID notice before sale of RFID-enabled mobile
phones. It also would not restrict the use of location tracking technolo-
gies by mobile carriers, such as cell phone triangulation or GPS, that are
part of providing mobile services to consumers. However, the bill rea-
sonably may be interpreted to restrict direct tracking of consumers with
RFID-tagged mobile phones for purposes of delivering LBS and mobile
advertising, because this type of tracking does not utilize the location
tracking technologies used by mobile carriers in the delivery of services
to subscribers. While the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
supports H.B. 686, it urges revision of the bill to add provisions regulat-
ing unique identifiers stored on tags that could be linked to databases
containing personally identifiable information and requiring labeling of
"RFID readers and interrogators, as well as RFID tags and products con-
,,142taining tags .
Alaska is also considering proposed legislation to outlaw unauthor-
ized scanning and reading of RFID tags and prohibit providers from
requiring continued activation of RFID tags in order for consumers "to
exchange, return, repair, or service an item that" contains an RFID tag.343
This proposed legislation in Alaska also requires providers of RFID-
tagged products to give consumers notice of RFID-tags and obtain their
340. Id. §§ 358-T: l(III)(a), 358-T:2(II).
341. Id. § 358-T: 1(11) (defining "consumer product," for purposes of the legislation to
require a notice to be affixed to consumer products that a remotely readable device has been
affixed or implanted, to exclude "an identification document or any product to the extent that
unique identification via radio waves is an essential part of the consumer's use, including, but
not limited to, commercial mobile radio service as described in 47 U.S.C. § 332.")
342. EPIC Letter, supra note 7 (EPIC's analysis of H.B. 686). H.B. 686 § 358-T:4(II)
restricts the use of identification documents permitted under the section from containing,
transmitting or enabling "the remote reading of any personal information other than a unique
personal identifier number which is not a social security number." H.B. 686, supra note 338.
EPIC argues that these unique identifiers can be used to create detailed personal profiles of
individuals and to track individuals and thus need to be regulated to prevent misuse or abuse.
See also EPIC's Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology, supra note 172.
343. An Act Relating to Electronic Communication Devices and to Personal Information
and Making Certain Violations Related to Electronic Communication Devices Unfair Trade
Practices, S.B. 293, 25th Legis., 2008 Sess. §§ 45.48.040, 45.48.060 (Alaska 2008). EPIC
testified on the proposed Alaska legislation before the Alaska State Senate.
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advance consent before collecting and using their personal informa-
tion." EPIC analyzed this proposed legislation and recommended four
changes including: (1) adding a private right of action so that citizens
may directly pursue a remedy; (2) adding stronger consumer deactiva-
tion rights so that it shifts the burden from the consumer to the provider
to deactivate an RFID device at the consumer's request and to provide an
option to consumers for permanent deactivation of the device; (3) adding
provisions to cover unique identifiers linked to databases containing per-
sonally identifiable information; and (4) requiring labeling of RFID
readers and interrogators, as well as RFID tags and products containing
tags.: 5
In sum, as of the time of this writing, no state law has been adopted
that requires notice and/or labeling of RFID-enabled mobile phones by
providers or that regulates m-advertising practices related to the use of
RFID-enabled mobile phones.
2. Federal and State Guidelines on Online
Marketing Practices
It is a common practice for Web sites to collect data about consum-
ers' Web-surfing behavior and to use that information to help their
advertising clients deliver targeted ads to specific consumers, based on
their online behavior, demographics and interests.46 These practices in-
volve consumer profiling, as discussed earlier in this paper.47 Such
targeted marketing practices are not federally regulated in the United
States and the Web sites and advertisers are not currently required by law
to obtain the consent of consumers before collecting and using this in-
formation for targeted marketing purposes (apart from the requirement to
comply with their own privacy policies to avoid engaging in unfair or
deceptive trade practices that are prohibited by the FTC).348
While the FTC has not yet addressed consumer privacy regarding
mobile advertising practices that collect data about consumers' behavior
using their mobile phones in order to target them with mobile advertis-
ing, it has published self-regulatory privacy principles for online
marketing practices known as "behavioral advertising" (online behavioral
344. Id. § 45.48.020; see also Top News, EPIC Urges Alaska Senate to Protect Consum-
ers from RFID Misuse, EPIC, Mar. 17, 2008, http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2009) (discussing Alaska's proposed S.B. 293 on electronic communication devices including
RFID technologies).
345. EPIC Testimony on A K RFID Bill, supra note 108, at 6-9.
346. See Louise Story, A Push to Limit the Tracking of Web Surfers' Clicks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2008.
347. See generally text and references discussing consumer profiling, supra Part IV.E.
348. See supra Part VII (discussing breach of promises in a privacy policy as an unfair
and deceptive trade practice within the FTC's regulatory jurisdiction).
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advertising is the practice of tracking consumers' activities online in or-
der to direct target advertising to them). These guidelines recommend
that Web sites post a privacy statement and obtain consumers' consent in
advance before collecting their data.49 Consumer groups have urged the
FTC to adopt a "do not track" registry that would allow consumers to
prevent advertisers from collecting information about them.
At the state level, legislation was proposed (but not enacted) in New
York that would require Web sites and advertisers to obtain consumers'
consent before collecting and using their personal data for targeted
online advertising purposes. This legislation would have made it a crime
to violate consumers' privacy rights under the statute.35' This proposed
law also would have regulated practices that can generally be described
as consumer profiling. 352 Due to the interstate nature of Internet access, it
would be difficult for online marketers to comply with this law by pro-
viding privacy protections for people residing in New York but not for
residents of other states, but it could encourage Web sites to adopt na-
tional privacy standards and practices consistent with the New York law.
A trade group representing several large Internet companies opposes the
bill and argues that it is most likely unconstitutional. The debate over
349. FED. TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 45-47 (2009), http:/www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf (an-
nouncing a set of online behavioral advertising principles to guide self-regulatory practices of
companies engaged in behavioral advertising). The privacy principles include: (1) transpar-
ency and consumer control; (2) reasonable security and limited data retention for consumer
data; (3) affirmative express consent for material changes to existing privacy promises; and
(4) affirmative express consent to (or prohibition against) using sensitive data for behavioral
advertising. Id. Regarding notice and consent, the FTC's guidelines provide: "Every Web site
where data is collected for behavioral advertising should provide a clear, consumer-friendly,
and prominent statement that (1) data about consumers' activities online is being collected at
the site for use in providing advertising about products and services tailored to individual
customers' interests, and (2) consumers can choose whether or not to have their information
collected for such purpose." Id. at 46.
350. Diane Bartz, Consumer Groups Urge "Do Not Track" Registry, REUTERS, Apr. 15,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSN1520070020080415; see
also Grant Gross, Privacy Advocates: Consumer Education Isn't Enough, IDG NEWS SER-
VICE, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/144756/privacy-
advocatesconsumer education isnt enough.html (arguing that Congress should pass online
privacy regulation including a "do not track" register). Congress held hearings in 2008 to
investigate whether there is a need to regulate online behavioral advertising practices to pro-
tect consumers' security and privacy. Joelie Tessler, Microsoft, Google Back Broad Privacy
Legislation, SFGATE.COM, July 9, 2008, http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/
2008/07/09/financial/fl25127D29.DTL (reporting on a Senate Commerce Committee hearing
on online advertising).
351. See Story, supra note 346, at 1.
352. See generally text supra Part I.E.
353. Group Calls Targeted Advertising Bill Unconstitutional, GIGALAW, Apr. 10, 2008,
http://www.gigalaw.com/news/2008/04/group-callls-targeted-advertising-bill.html (citing WALL
ST. J.).
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whether government regulation is necessary to regulate behavioral ad-
vertising practices or if industry should be allowed to self-regulate is
likely to be intense and to extend to emerging mobile advertising prac-
tices. "
VIII. PROPOSING SELF-REGULATORY STEPS TO ADDRESS
CONSUMER PRIVACY CONCERNS
Apart from the ongoing work on RFID by governments in the Euro-
pean Union and the United States, notable work has already been done
by respected organizations to analyze the privacy and data protection
concerns associated with commercial use of RFID and to propose guide-
lines to protect consumers in this context. For example, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) published its "Guidelines on Com-
mercial Use of RFID Technology" in 2004 .3" The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also made an in-
sightful contribution to this discussion with its 2007 report: "Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID): A Focus on Information Security and
Privacy," and has been involved in designing privacy and data protection
guidelines since issuing its 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines. 6 The work
of EPIC and the OECD is a good starting point for discussion of needed
regulatory reform. EPIC's work articulates consumer privacy and data
354. Renee Boucher Ferguson, A Battle is Brewing Over Online Behavioral Advertising,
EWEEK, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Apps/A-Battle-ls-Brewing-
Over-Online-Behavioral-Advertising-Market/. See Villoch III, supra note 18 (discussing the
role of government regulation and industry self-regulation to ensure consumer trust in order to
encourage the growth of e-commerce). Those who argue government regulation to protect
consumer privacy will unduly restrict the growth of mobile commerce and that mobile adver-
tising will be able to appreciate the industry self-regulatory approaches to protecting consumer
privacy are in the next section of this paper.
355. See EPIC's Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology, supra note 172.
356. See OECD Report on RFID, supra note 16, at 41; OECD Guidelines on the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), available at
http:/www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,es_2649-34255_15589524 -1- 1,00.html. The
OECD fair information practices include these general principles: (1) collection limitation;
(2) data quality principle; (3) purpose specification; (4) use limitation principle (which
includes a restriction on use of the individual's personal data without the consent of the data
subject or by the authority of law); (5) security safeguards principle; (6) openness principle;
(7) individual participation principle; and (8) accountability principle. Ciocchetti, supra note
101, at 61 n.26. The OECD is an international organization established in 1961 and composed
of thirty member countries committed to democracy and the market economy, which shares
expertise and views with one hundred other countries and market economies. About the
OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_367341031 I -I 1,00.
html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). The United States and many European Union member-
countries are also members of OECD. Ratification of the Convention on the OECD: OECD
Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649-34483 1889402
1l1_l,00.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
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protection principles that are a foundation for the analysis in this section
regarding the commercial use of RFID-enabled phones to deliver LBS
and mobile advertising. Similarly the OECD Report on RFID identifies
important issues from a general standpoint that need to be resolved in
this new specific context.
While it may be unlikely that broad data protection legislation will
be adopted in the United States, legislative efforts to regulate the use of
RFID in consumer products and targeted marketing practices may be
gaining momentum.357 Although there has been much examination of the
use of RFID technologies from the standpoint of privacy and security in
the European Union, the European Commission's newly proposed RFID
Recommendation is not binding legislation, and instead encourages in-
dustry and company self-regulation.31 8 Even if new laws are not adopted
in the European Union or the United States to regulate RFID-enabled
mobile phones and RFID-embedded consumer environments, high levels
of protection could be afforded for consumers by conducting privacy
impact assessments in the context of RFID-enabled mobile phones to be
used in RFID-embedded environments, taking into consideration the
usefulness of this application of RFID technologies for the delivery of
mobile advertising and other location-based services.
This next section of the paper discusses privacy-impact assessments
as a self-regulatory process to be used by companies to identify relevant
consumer privacy concerns and possible policy and technical design re-
lated to applications of RFID for consumer products like mobile phones.
Then, considering the new business context of using RFID-enabled
phones to deliver mobile advertising and location-based services, it de-
scribes three classes of topics that should be included in privacy impact
assessments and provides an example application for each type of classi-
fication. Finally, this section provides a list of questions for discussion
among legal and technical experts seeking to find privacy-enhancing so-
lutions for the consumer privacy challenges posed by RFID-enabled
mobile phones.
A. The Need for Privacy Impact Assessments
A privacy impact assessment (PIA) "is usefully defined as a process
whereby a project's potential privacy issues and risks are identified and
examined from the perspectives of all stakeholders, and a search is
357. See supra Part VII.B.
358. See supra Part VII.A.2.
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undertaken for ways to avoid or minimi[z]e privacy concerns."359 One of
the most significant aspects of the European Union's Proposed RFID
Recommendation is its support for conducting PIAs before introducing
new products or services based on RFID technology to consumers.
As the OECD Report on RFID emphasizes:
There is a broad variety of RFID hardware and software con-
figurations deployed in many different contexts. RFID
technology does not systematically or inherently generate pri-
vacy issues and, when it does, the nature, scope and extent of
these privacy issues vary according to both the technology and
the use context. In most cases, the potential invasion of privacy
through the use of RFID is likely to be proportionate to several
interrelated parameters including: (i) a tag's capacity to be read
at a distance without the participation of the individual; (ii) the
possibility to reveal intrusive or sensitive information about in-
dividuals through inferences and profiling; (iii) the degree of
interoperability (who can read the tags; who can access the full
information about the product); and (iv) the tracking capabilities
of RFID .6
While technology-neutral regulation is often advocated as an essen-
tial regulatory principle in order for governments to avoid adopting
regulation that stifles technological innovation, not all uses of RFID pre-
sent the same privacy and data protection concerns, and the business
context and the particular technologies involved are important considera-
tions. Consistent with the OECD's Report on RFID, RFID privacy
guidelines should not be one-size-fits-all; rather, the specific privacy
risks for consumers should be considered in the context of the RFID
technologies being used162 and privacy-protecting solutions proposed.
The OECD's Report on RFID states that, due to the wide variety of
technical configurations and use scenarios, there will be a need to
conduct PIAs for new commercial contexts. A PIA should consist of an
in-depth examination of whether and to what extent the use of the tech-
nology actually gives rise to privacy concerns in a given system and
should include: "examining the RFID application, the kind of data
collected, the nature and technical specification of the RFID technology
359. ICO PIA Handbook, supra note 323, at pt.II. A PtA aims to prevent problems from
a privacy perspective and is best undertaken at an early stage in a project and is distinguished
from a privacy audit (which is after the fact) and from a legal compliance audit. Id.
360. Draft RFID Recommendation, supra note 315, art. 3.1 (privacy and data protection
measures should include a privacy impact assessment by application operators).
361. OECD Report on RFID, supra note 16, at 38.
362. Id. at 48.
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used and the potential that the collected data will be related to an indi-
vidual or identifiable individual. 3 63 The OECD's Report on RFID
recommends that the PIA occur early, at the design stage, so that the pri-
vacy impact of an RFID system can be identified and best strategies to
mitigate privacy risks can be employed.36 The OECD's Report on RFID
further advocates a holistic approach to privacy management that would
consider "each stage and each component of the overall system" and
"the whole lifecycle of the RFID data within an organization's broader
information system. 365
These PIAs need to be done in the context of providing LBS services
and mobile advertising through RFID-equipped mobile phones. The
process will necessarily involve technical experts as well as legal and
business experts. It is anticipated that businesses and industry-
associations, such as global industry associations like the Near Field
Communication Forum (NFC Forum), will contribute input to the pri-
vacy discussions that need to occur related to this topic.
The NFC Forum is an industry association of global businesses
brought together by their support of the development of near field com-
munications technologies and services. The NFC Forum's members
include mobile carriers, mobile handset providers and other businesses
that are involved in developing applications and providing services to
support delivery of LBS and mobile advertising in the context of RFID-
enabled mobile phones using NFC technologies. 366 As discussed earlier
in this article, the Privacy Advisory Council of the NFC Forum is plan-
ning to issue guidance for developing privacy policies related to the use
of NFC technology and a privacy checklist detailing for interested par-
ties the privacy tenets associated with using NFC technologies. 36 At the
time of this writing, the NFC Forum had not yet published these re-
sources on its Web site, but when they are available, they will need to be
examined in light of existing privacy regulation and the need for ade-




366. NFC Forum, Members, http://www.nfc-forum.org/member-companies/ (last visited
Jan. 4, 2009).
367. See NFC Forum, Privacy Advisory Council, http://www.nfc-forum.org/aboutus/
committees.and.wgs#pac (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). For a discussion of the NFC's plans to
issue privacy guidance in the form of a position paper that addresses policies for protecting
privacy when using NFC technology and a privacy checklist, see supra note 172 and accom-
panying text.
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B. Topics for Privacy Impact Assessments
The process of conducting a PIA should include a consideration of
the application of fair information practices in the context of using
RFID-enabled mobile phones to deliver LBS and m-advertising.3 68 It
should also consider privacy-enhancing technologies . Since there is no
one-size-fits-all PIA, this article offers three examples of topic categories
to include in PIAs related to the use of RFID-enabled phones in deliver-
ing LBS and m-advertising, as follows:
1. Implementing Fair Information Practices
The need to provide adequate notice to consumers who will use the
RFID-enabled phones in RFID-embedded environments is consistent
with the generally accepted fair information practice of notice to con-
sumers.370 A PIA in this context should consider including the following
types of information in consumer notices:
(a) That the consumer's mobile phone is RFID-enabled, includ-
ing whether it contains a tag, reader, or both and the
applicable communication ranges;
(b) Whether the consumer's environment (e.g., shopping center,
bus station) is embedded with RFID technologies;
(c) Whether the consumer is being profiled or tracked, by whom,
and for what purpose;
(d) Whether data (e.g., personal, profiling, tracking) about the
consumer is being collected, used, stored in a data base,
shared, etc.;
(e) How long the data are stored, where and by whom, and
whether the data has been made anonymous;
368. As David Flaharty says:
Various models exist for privacy impact assessments that can be customised to the
needs of any organisation. The essential goal is to describe personal data flows as
fully as possible so as to understand what impact the innovation or modification
may have on the personal privacy of employees or customers and how fair informa-
tion practices may be complied with.
David Flaherty, Privacy Impact Assessments: An Essential Tool for Data Protection, 7 PRI-
VACY L. & POL'Y REP. 85, 85 (2000), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/PLPRI
2000/45.html (emphasis added).
369. ICO PIA Handbook, supra note 323, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, at pt.II. The
ICO PIA Handbook lists three types of privacy-enhancing technologies: (1) means of counter-
ing against privacy-invasive technologies; (2) means of providing genuine, untraceable
anonymity; (3) means of providing strongly protected pseudonymity. Id.
370. See text supra Part IV.B.
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(f) If consumer profiles are used to deliver targeted marketing,
how a consumer can learn about the individual or group pro-
files applied to him and explanation of the contents of those
profiles expressed in language that would be meaningful to a
typical consumer;
(g) Whether access to location-based services may be accompa-
nied by delivery of m-advertising to the consumer and
information about the consumer's ability to control the fre-
quency, type and time of delivery of any m-advertising;
(h) Whether m-advertisers and other parties involved in the spe-
cific RFID system have privacy policies, and if so, short
notices that include the essential elements of applicable poli-
cies along with links to full privacy policies.
There are many considerations to discuss beyond the contents of the
notice, including identifying ways to deliver meaningful notice, such as
using standardized logos as well as a written notice, providing notice at
times relevant to consumer choice and providing notice in a form that
can be accessed and displayed on mobile phones.
2. Application of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
In the OECD Report on RFID, general concepts about PETs are dis-
cussed, including the design of RFID tags to include features that
empower RFID systems and users to control the technology and prevent
or mitigate privacy risks. For example, the report suggests that a "kill
command" could be included that is initiated by the retailer at the point
of sale to deactivate the RFID tag permanently unless the consumer ex-
pressly agrees otherwise.37 ' Alternatively, the report comments that an
RFID tag's antenna could be removed to shorten its read-range, thus
turning a longer range tag into a shorter range tag. A shorter range tag
may still be read, for example for warranty service. But a shorter range
tag poses less of a privacy-risk for a consumer in terms of the possibility
371. OECD Report on RFID, supra note 16, at 47. See also Seven Paths to Privacy, Scl.
AM., Sept. 2008, at 37, which offers policy recommendations for government regulation to
protect privacy:
Regulate the use of RFID tags. When RFID tags are embedded in a retail product,
they should be disabled once the shopper has paid for the product. Even if they
store nothing more than a serial number, they enable anyone who carriers such a tag
to be followed surreptitiously. If they must remain readable-as in licenses, pass-
ports, and the like-their presence should be disclosed to the carrier. If the tags
store personal information, including information about time and place, it should be
encrypted and the carrier should be warned about its presence.
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that the tag will be read by other parties and perhaps used to track the
consumer because the tag is only readable if it comes sufficiently close
to REID readers. The design alternatives described in the above scenar-
ios give consumers the ability to be anonymous by deactivating RFID
tags in products they purchase or to minimize the likelihood that RFID
tags in their possession will be read after the point of sale unless they are
seeking warranty or other assistance.
When this general theory of PETs is applied in the mobile phone
context, the parties conducting the privacy impact assessment should
consider which types of technical measures will give mobile phone users
some effective control over their privacy when mobile phones have built-
in RFID tags and RFID readers. Are there specific ways to give users
control that relate to the phone's design for use in delivery of location-
based services and m-advertising? Those conducting the privacy impact
assessment should consider that users of their products may have differ-
ent views about the desirable level of privacy that they want:
• Some users will want to have the RFID-tags "killed" at pur-
chase and may choose to disable the RFID readers in their
phones, perhaps because they do not intend to use them and
fear they will be exposed to more mobile spam;
" Others will want to be able to use the RFID-features in their
phones in the future, but not all the time (e.g., these users
would appreciate an "on/off switch" for RFID-tags and RFID-
readers in their phones if it is technically feasible); and
" Still others may want to have (or be neutral to having) the
RFID-features on their phones functional all of the time.
Generally speaking, it is technically possible for REID tags to be
"killed" permanently or put into a "sleep" mode from which they can be
awakened.373 One suggestion to preserve the consumer benefits of RFID
372. Id.
373. See Ari Juels, RFID Security and Privacy: A Research Survey, 24 IEEE J. ON SE-
LECTED AREAS IN COMM. 381, 386 (2006). RFID readers can send kill commands to RFID
tags that render the tag permanently inoperative. Id. To prevent uncontrolled deactivation of
tags, the kill command is protected by a PIN (generally a 32-bit code). Id. "Killing or discard-
ing tags enforces consumer privacy effectively, but it eliminates all of the post-purchase
benefits of RFID for the consumer," such as the ability to return the item without a receipt. Id.
Alternatively, the RFID tag can be put to sleep, which makes it only temporarily inactive. Id.
However, this would provide no privacy protection if any RFID reader could wake the tag, so
access control mechanisms are needed, such as PINs. Id. Controlling the PINs for kill or sleep
commands is a difficult task, especially for consumers. Id. If the consumer must do this in
order to maintain control over his tags, the consumer would need to keep track of them as well
as key them in or scan them in order to use them. Id. One benefit of having a mobile phone is
that the PIN could be transmitted to the mobile phone for use. Id.
Fall 20081
204 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:107
tags post-sale is to design an RFID tag that is able to store a privacy bit
in its memory that is either "on" or "off'. When it is "on," the tag cannot
be scanned. When it is "off," the tag can be scanned for such purposes as
obtaining warranty service or to return the product without a receipt."'
The "on/off' status of a tag can be changed if the RFID tag is writable
by an RFID scanner, but for security purposes, it is recommended that an
RFID-tag-specific PIN be required to change the on/off status of the
tag.375 At least conceptually, design features like those described above
would enhance the protection of consumers' privacy and give them con-
trol over whether or not the RFID tags in their phones can be read by
RFID readers in their environments. This topic should be considered in
privacy impact assessments for these new types of mobile phones.
Similarly, privacy impact assessments should consider ways to give
consumers a choice about whether the RFID readers in their mobile
phones are operable. Since an RFID reader must have a power source,
such as a battery, in order to operate, presumably disconnecting the bat-
tery by turning the phone off will temporarily put the phone's RFID
reader out of operation. However, turning the phone off may be imprac-
tical for most mobile phone users because it would interfere with their
ability to use the phone for other purposes. Furthermore, if the phone's
RFID reader is on when the phone is on, the user may want to be able to
choose whether or not the reader will read all RFID tags that are de-
tected within its read range. One reason for this concern is that tags in
the consumer's environment may contain advertising or links to advertis-
ing Web sites, so having an RFID reader in one's phone that reads every
tag that it comes into contact with could expose the mobile phone user to
unwanted advertising solicitations displayed on their mobile phone.376 In
374. Ari Juels, RFID Privacy: A Technical Primer for the Non-Technical Reader, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY, A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 57, 70 (K.
Strandburg & D. Stan Raicu eds., Springer-Verlag 2005). At the time of this writing, no source
was found for information about the specific types of privacy enhancing design features have
been included in the new RFID-enabled mobile phones that are being tested in consumer tri-
als.
375. Id.
376. The RFID technologies that are the basis of Near Field Communications technolo-
gies to be incorporated in mobile phones and other consumer devices can be described as
enabling technologies that allow one NFC-compliant device to make contact with another
NFC-compliant device by touching each other or coming close to each other, "typically within
a few centimeters." INNOVISION RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY PLC, supra note 60, § 4 (describ-
ing how NFC-enabled mobile phones can obtain information from NFC-compliant smart
posters by bringing it close to or touching the poster with their phones, for example, and
thereby access a few lines of text or a Web link).
According to Innovision:
For two devices to communicate using NFC, one device must have an NFC
reader/writer and one must have an NFC tag. The tag is essentially an integrated
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the case of RFID-enabled mobile phones that utilize Near Field Com-
munications technologies, it does not appear that the user has any control
over whether his phone will read RFID tags in his environment other
than to avoid coming within the read-range.3" Although, at present, this
read range may be short and there may be few smart posters or other
NFC-compliant tagged items in consumers' environments to be read, this
will change as the technology is adopted for many business applica-
tions. 8 Receiving advertising by virtue of reading it with one's mobile
phone may not technically be spamming in the sense that spam is gener-
ally defined as unsolicited advertising. Perhaps it should be categorized
as permissive-based advertising assuming the user's RFID reader has
initiated the sending of mobile advertising to the phone by interrogating
the RFID tags that contain the advertising content. On the other hand, if
the tags in the smart posters are capable of initiating contact with the
consumer's mobile phone, then this distinction becomes less clear.379
Such advertising is likely to be unwelcome if there is no way for the user
to avoid reading advertising on RFID-tags simply by coming into their
proximity.
Another question that needs to be addressed from a technical stand-
point is, can users selectively control which RFID readers in their
circuit containing data, connected to an antenna that can be read and written by the
reader. There are two modes of operation covered by the NFC protocol: active and
passive. In active mode, both devices generate their own radio field to transmit data.
In passive mode, only one device generates a radio field, while the other uses load
modulation to transfer data. The NFC protocol specified that the initiating device is
responsible for generating the radio field in this case. The passive mode of commu-
nication is very important for battery-powered devices like mobile phones and
PDAs that need to prioritize energy use. The NFC protocol enables such devices to
be used in power-saving mode, so that energy can be conserved for other opera-
tions.
Id. at5.
377. Id. For insights into which NFC-enabled device controls communications between
two NFC-enabled devices, see id. § 2.3. NFC-enabled devices are configured to enable the
NFC-enabled reading device to initiate communication between two NFC-enabled devices
that are in close proximity to each other without the necessity of operator action (except to
authorize payment transactions). There is apparently no "on/off' feature that gives the opera-
tor of a NFC-enabled device that is being read by another NFC-enabled device control over
whether such communication may be initiated by a reading device.
378. Id. at 7 (listing "[o]ther devices and equipment likely to become NFC-enabled in
the near future [to] include: cash registers and other point-of-sale equipment; cash machines;
posters, street signs, bus stops and points of interest; vending machines and parking meters;
turnstiles, entry systems and door openers; and product packaging.").
379. Active RFID tags are able to initiate contact with an RFID-reader because they have
access to a power source, as opposed to semi-active or passive tags which cannot initiate con-
tact with an RFID-reader. Weis, supra note 5, at 978. The power source of an RFID tag "will
determine a tag's potential read range, lifetime, cost, and the kinds of functionalities that it
may offer." Id.
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environments are permitted to read the RFID tags in their phones? For
example, in the BART-RFID Trial discussed earlier in this article, users
must push one button or enter a pin code to activate contactless commu-
nications for payment of transit fares.380 But will a similar control
feature, such as a "disable RFID tag"/off-button, allow users to decide
whether other RFID readers that have been embedded in a shopping mall
or other environment may be allowed to detect their presence through
the process of reading the RFID tags in their phones? Passive RFID-tags
generally broadcast information stored on the tags whenever they come
into the read range of an RFID-reader (essentially they have no "on/off"
switch) and they may respond to interrogation by readers without alert-
ing the person who is carrying the device.38' If the RFID tags included in
mobile phones lack an "on/off" switch, a technical solution will need to
312be found to address this privacy concern.
3. Implementing Privacy Enhancing Technologies
That Enhance Transparency
Labeling RFID-readers in shopping malls and subways is consistent
with the fair information practice of notice because it alerts consumers
that their personal information and privacy may be at risk if they have
RFID-equipped phones with them. Alternatively, PETs that provide no-
tice could be designed, such as designing phones to alert their owners
they are within the read range of RFID-readers. Such PETs would serve
the purpose of making the components of RFID systems more transpar-
ent so that consumers can take steps to protect their privacy and personal
information. Transparency is needed by consumers because the nature of
the technology is to work silently in the background without the need for
human interaction. If this technology creates privacy risks and nothing is
done to alert consumers of the risks, they may go unnoticed by consum-
ers.
As discussed earlier in this article, there is also a pressing need to
consider transparency enhancing technologies to address the privacy im-
plications of consumer profiling."3 This section considers some of the
privacy concerns associated with profiling. Of particular importance is
380. See supra text accompanying note 78 (discussing action required by mobile phone
user to intitiate payment).
381. See Juels, supra note 373, at 382.
382. See Mark Roberti, Zhenuine Introduces Consumer-Controllable Tag, Online Regis-
try, RFID J., Jan. 28, 2009 (announcing that a startup firm has developed a method for making
radio frequency transponders that communicate with interrogators only when a person acti-
vates the tag by pressing a button on it, enabling consumers to prevent others from reading
information on tags they hold without their consent).
383. See discussion of the privacy implications of profiling for targeted marketing pur-
poses, supra Part V.E. See generally Dinant et al., supra note 13.
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the use of profiling as part of a system to deliver targeted location-based
services and targeted m-advertising and the possibility of addressing
these privacy concerns through the employment of PETs designed to
provide transparency to consumers. For example, it has been suggested
that in order to make consumer profiling practices more transparent,
consumers should be given access to information about the classifica-
tions applied to them for this purpose.M PETs designed to provide
transparency have been described as transparency-enhanced technologies
or TETs. This topic is particularly appropriate when considering indus-
try and company self-regulation in the current context. This is because
there are no clear legal obligations for companies to give consumers ac-
cess to the group profiles that are being applied to them by marketers or
businesses delivering location-based services, especially when those
classifications are based on anonymous data and no personal data are
being used or generated.386 Arguably, consumers have an important pri-
vacy interest in gaining access to profiling information in order to better
understand how the application of these profiles is affecting their lives.
Access to this type of information is essential in our society in order to
exercise personal autonomy and individual freedom.387 Practically, such
access may also influence the discussion of whether legal regulation of
targeted marketed practices is needed.
C. Other Privacy Questions That May Have Technical Solutions
This section outlines RFID-specific privacy questions and possible
technical solutions that relate to RFID-enabled phones used in
RFID-embedded environments for delivery of LBS and mobile adver-
tising. These questions were revealed by the study conducted for this
paper and are based on discussions with technical experts and a review
of literature regarding protecting users' privacy and security with re-
spect to RFID technologies."' These sources support the conclusion
384. See supra Part V.A (referencing the work of Mireille Hildebrandt on transparency-
enhancing technologies).
385. Id.
386. Although there appears to be no current basis in U.S. law to argue that there is a
legal obligation to disclose this information, there is some basis to argue that E.U. law may
make the use of classifications for this purpose unlawful, at least without the consent of the
affected consumers. See discussion on Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive, supra note
140; see also supra Part VII.B.2. for discussion of developments in U.S. law about the need
for privacy protections related to online behavioral advertising practices that could lead to
legislation to protect consumers in this context. See generally Dinant et al., supra note 13.
387. See discussion supra Parts V.E., VI.A.
388. See generally Gildas Avoine, Bibliography on Security and Privacy in RFID Sys-
tems, UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, LouVAIN-LA-NEUVE, BELGIUM, May 18, 2008,
http://www.avoine.net/rfid/; Juels, supra note 112 (discussing solutions for problems of au-
thentication and privacy regarding RFID); Juels, supra note 373, at 381 (providing a survey of
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that, at least theoretically, there are technical solutions for many of the
perceived privacy concerns related to RFID-enabled mobile phones.
The list is offered to stimulate discussion among privacy experts with
technical and legal backgrounds who can hopefully work together to
find privacy-enhancing solutions to adequately protect consumers' pri-
vacy in the era of RFID-enabled mobile phones, location-based
services and mobile advertising. To the extent that such solutions are
found, it will reduce the need for RFID-specific government regulation
that could discourage further development of new and useful location-
based services using RFID technologies and create legal barriers en-
gaging in global mobile commerce.
(1) Is it technically possible to give a consumer the ability to
temporarily disable the RFID tags and RFID reader in his
mobile phone? Yes, it is theoretically feasible to include an
"off switch" allowing a user to temporarily or permanently
disable the RFID features of his phone after purchase. One
way to do this would be to connect the RFID-tag and the
RFID-reader in the user's mobile phone to the electronic sys-
tem in the phone, thus enabling the user to control whether
the RFID-tag and RFID-reader are active by pushing a button
to disable these features.189 Another approach would be to in-
clude a switch in RFID tags used in mobile phones that
prevent the RFID tags from being read by RFID readers
unless the phones' users activate the tags by pushing a but-
ton.390
(2) Is it technically feasible to design an RFID-enabled mobile
phone that will allow the user to release part of the informa-
technical research on the problems of privacy and security for RFID); Juels, supra note 374;
Ari Juels & Stephen Weis, Defining Strong Privacy for RFID, CRYPTOLOGY EPRINT ARCHIVE,
Report 2006/137 (2006) http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/137.pdf; Henrik Granau, Design patterns
and Business Models for a New Generation of RFID Solutions, RFIDsEC (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://www.rfidsec.com/docs/RFID%202.0%20article%2012-11-2007.pdf (discussing the new
generation of RFID Solutions, RFID 2.0).
389. These conceptual design proposals are based on discussions among legal and RFID
experts at a meeting at Universitd Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium held in
May 2008 [hereinafter Meeting to Discuss Privacy-Enhancing Design Features for RFID-
Enabled Mobile Phones]. Any errors in describing these possible technical design features and
the underlying technology remain the author's own.
390. See Roberti, supra note 382 (reporting that a start-up company recently announced
that it had developed a mechanical switch for passive RFID-tags that will put the tag's owner
in control of whether information on the tag can be read by RFID-readers). The "tags can be
used in driver's licenses, passports and even individual items to protect the consumer's pri-
vacy." Id. (quoting Denny Choi, president of Zhenuine, the company that developed the new
switch for RFID tags).
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tion stored on his phone (like his contact information) to an
advertiser or other business (like a friend-finder service)
while keeping other parts of the information stored on his
phone private? Yes, at least theoretically because the informa-
tion stored on a mobile phone is stored in computer memory
and computer memory may be partitioned so that different
access restrictions can be put on different components of
computer memory. There are at least two types of memory on
RFID-enabled mobile phones-the memory storage on the
RFID chips in RFID tags embedded in the phone and the
memory storage on the phone itself that allows the user to
store his contact list. Both types of memory storage could be
partitioned to impose access restrictions, giving the user the
ability to control access to some of the data stored on his
phone and protecting other data stored on his phone from un-
authorized access. This feature would be particularly helpful
to give the user control over whether to release his personal
information and the contact information for other people
stored on his phone that is included in his contact list. Simi-
larly, to the extent that the RFID tag in his mobile phone
contains personal and non-personal information, the ability to
partition the memory on the RFID tag and control access to
the different parts of the memory would enable the user to
control access to his personal information. For example, the
user could release his unique identifying number for the
phone that is stored on the phone's RFID tag, perhaps to get
warranty service for the phone, while protecting other per-
sonal information stored on the tag, such as his mobile phone
number.39'
(3) Is there a way to use database technology linked to the Inter-
net to enhance the transparency of RFID systems designed to
interact with consumer devices like RFID-enabled mobile
phones? Yes, in theory, each consumer could be provided with
an individual online account that she can access in order to
review the personal data that a business has collected and
used to deliver mobile advertising and other location-based
391. Id. Encryption can be used to protect data stored on the user's phone. See Albrecht,
supra note 7, at 74 (discussing the encryption features of RFID tags designed using the ISO
14443 standard and the need to crack the encryption to read data from an ISO 14443 chip).
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services to her.392 Individual online accounts could also be
used by marketers to give a consumer access to the individual
or group classifications or profiles that have been constructed
in order to generate targeted advertising and other promotions
to her as part of its customer relationship management strate-
gies.93
(4) Is there a way to make use of a passive RFID-tag anonymous,
so that it will not reveal any personally-identifying informa-
tion about the user? Yes, the passive RFID chip in the user's
mobile phone could certainly be used to store only informa-
tion that is not personal information, such as a unique
identification number for the phone, but not the user's mobile
phone number, name, etc. 9 Even if personal information is
stored on the RFID-tag in the user's mobile phone, theoreti-
cally a process of encryption could be used in conjunction
with the RFID-tag so that the personal information that is
stored on the tag will not reveal any personal information to
an outsider who skims the information on the tag unless the
outsider also has access to the encryption key.395 However,
even when information on an RFID tag is encrypted, it can be
used to track or profile a consumer since the encrypted data
still provides a unique reference for the mobile phone that can
be used for tracking or profiling.396
(5) Is there a technical way to prevent consumer profiling of a
mobile phone user that is otherwise made possible due to hav-
392. See Cleff & Gidofalvi, supra note 38, at 273 (suggesting the creation of personal
data accounts for each user in a secure system that limits access to the personal data of a cer-
tain user, perhaps by means of a digital signature).
393. Meeting to Discuss Privacy-Enhancing Design Features for RFID-Enabled Mobile
Phones, supra note 389.
394. See Juels, supra note 373, at 382-83 (commenting that "most RFID tags emit
unique identifiers ... [but] the threat to privacy grows when a tag serial number is combined
with personal information.").
395. Id. at 385 (categorizing RFID tags as "basic tags," meaning those that cannot exe-
cute standard cryptographic operations like encryption, and "symmetric-key tags", those that
are able to perform symmetric key cryptographic operations and cost more than basic RFID
tags).
396. See id. at 382-83. This report explains why RFID tags that contain encrypted data
can still be used for tracking:
Most RFID tags emit unique identifiers, even data with cryptographic algorithms
.... In consequence, a person carrying an RFID tag effectively broadcasts a fixed
serial number to nearby readers; providing a ready vehicle for clandestine physical
tracking. Such tracking is possible even if a fixed tag serial number is random and
carriers no intrinsic data. Id. at 382-83.
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ing an RFID-equipped mobile phone? Yes, it is theoretically
possible to design RFID-tags to emit a different identification
number, for example, a randomly generated number, each
time they are accessed in order to prevent a party that is read-
ing the tag from identifying the phone as the same phone that
has communicated with an RFID-reader on previous occa-
sions. Although profiling for customer relationship purposes
can be accomplished without knowing the identity of the mo-
bile phone user, it is not possible to track a consumer with an
RFID-enabled mobile phone if his phone emits a different
identifier each time an RFID reader detects the phone's pres-
ence. So, it is possible to give consumers' control over
whether their RFID-enabled phones permit profiling by mar-
keters by designing software for mobile phones that will give
consumers the ability to use their phones without having their
phones emit a constant unique identifying number, e.g., by
generating a different random number whenever the phones
communicate with RFID readers such as those in shopping
malls or transit centers. 97
(6) Is standardization of mobile phone design occurring in the
case of RFID-enabled mobile phones so that the same pri-
vacy-enhancing design features will be included in phones
used by both E.U. and U.S. consumers? Yes, there are indus-
try-led efforts to standardize the design of RFID applications
for mobile phones in order to achieve the goal of making mo-
bile phones interoperable with RFID systems around the
world. For example, Near Field Communications (NFC)
technologies are being developed by the Near Field
Communication Forum.39' NFC technologies incorporate
RFID into the design of mobile handsets, software for mobile
phones and other components of RFID systems that will en-
able businesses to communicate with these phones to deliver
mobile advertising and other location-based services. There
is a great opportunity for the NFC Forum (or another similar
industry consortium focusing on RFID technologies for mo-
bile phones) to include standardized technical design features
397. Meeting to Discuss Privacy-Enhancing Design Features for RFID-Enabled Mobile
Phones, supra note 389.
398. See discussion of the NFC Forum, supra Part VI.B.
399. Id. As discussed earlier, the NFC Forum is the leading global consortium of indus-
try players involved in this effort and includes handset manufacturers, software designers, and
mobile carriers that are all working together to achieve the goal of interoperability of NFC
technologies in consumer devices. Id.
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to protect consumers' privacy and personal data in the NFC
technologies being developed to incorporated into RFID-
enabled mobile phones and RFID-embedded consumer
environments. The challenge for the NFC Forum is to develop
privacy-enhancing technologies for RFID-enabled mobile
phones. If it does so, it will be able to make a significant con-
tribution to finding global privacy solutions. Due to the
difficulty of legislating global privacy solutions, standardiza-
tion combined with development of privacy-enhancing
technologies will provide more consistent global privacy pro-
tections for consumers in this new business context than could
be achieved through government regulation that would likely
differ from country to country.
CONCLUSION
The evaluation of consumer privacy presented in this article is the
starting point for discussions that need to take place among relevant in-
dustry leaders, government regulators and technical experts as they take
on the important task of addressing consumer privacy concerns regarding
the implications of RFID-enabled phones, mobile advertising and other
location-based services. Due to the global nature of mobile commerce
and the opportunity for mobile advertising and location-based services to
be offered to consumers no matter where they live, there needs to be in-
ternational cooperation to identify global solutions to support the growth
of mobile commerce-solutions that will both protect personal privacy
interests and establish a framework for businesses that is predictable and
workable for global transactions. It is critical for companies, industry
associations and government regulators to engage in privacy impact as-
sessments that address the RFID-specific implications of new mobile
phone technologies. Industry leaders like the Near Field Communica-
tions Forum are uniquely poised to provide leadership in the effort to
find and adopt privacy-enhancing technologies and practices that will
protect consumers in the era of RFID-enabled mobile phones.
It is too soon to tell if current efforts at industry self-regulation will
be successful. If industry self-regulation responds to the privacy chal-
lenges of RFID and adopts privacy enhancing technologies and policies
that give consumers the tools and knowledge they need to take an active
role in their own privacy protection, the role of government regulators
may be able to be limited to regulatory oversight. Such oversight should
be focused on the important consumer protection role that is now pro-
vided by governments in the European Union and the United States. This
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vision of successful industry self-regulation is certainly rosy and indi-
cates a future for mobile commerce that is bright for mobile advertisers,
businesses that provide other location-based services and the RFID in-
dustry. This scenario is equally bright for consumers who will reap the
benefit of new location-based services and relevant advertising, while
having their privacy adequately protected.
Failure of industry self-regulation in this new business context
would come at considerable risk to consumers' privacy. It would lead to
the potential abuses described earlier in this article and the likelihood
that RFID-specific regulation will be adopted in both the European Un-
ion and the United States. Compared to the United States, the European
Union seems poised to intervene by imposing binding RFID-specific
regulation should industry self-regulation fail to protect consumers' pri-
vacy. Should the European Union decide to actively regulate RFID
technologies and the United States fail to do so, this would create a regu-
latory imbalance that would have negative ramifications for the growth
of global mobile commerce.
